Megan E. Mitchell v. Harvey E. Stewart, III , 608 F. App'x 730 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-13035
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:12-cv-00132-CDL
MEGAN E. MITCHELL,
CLIFTON JACKSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
HARVEY E. STEWART, III,
DAVID WHIRRELL,
MICHAEL MAXEY,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
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(April 9, 2015)
Before HULL, MARTIN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Harvey E. Stewart, III, David Whirrell, and Michael Maxey (Defendants),
three Greene County police officers, appeal the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity. This case arose from Megan E. Mitchell’s and Clifton Jackson’s
(Plaintiffs) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law suit, alleging that the Defendants
violated their Fourth Amendment rights when (1) they entered and searched the
Plaintiffs’ home, (2) arrested them without probable cause, and (3) transported
them to the jail with their genitalia exposed. The Defendants moved for summary
judgment, claiming qualified immunity. The district court granted qualified
immunity for the first two claims, but denied qualified immunity and official
immunity for the third claim. On appeal, the Defendants challenge whether there
are genuine issues of material fact about whether the manner of transportation to
the jail violated the Fourth Amendment. The Defendants argue alternatively that
even if there are genuine issues of material fact, the Plaintiffs’ rights were not
clearly established at the time of any violation. After careful consideration, we
affirm.
I.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of summary judgment. Fils v.
City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment may
be granted only when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 56(a). In viewing the evidence, this Court draws all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and “when conflicts arise
between the facts evidenced by the parties, we credit the nonmoving party’s
version.” Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
II.
The Defendants first argue that there are no genuine issues of material fact
about whether they unreasonably seized the Plaintiffs. If an officer has probable
cause to arrest a person, the seizure must still be reasonable. Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 8, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1699 (1985). “To determine the constitutionality of
a seizure we must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” Id. (quotation marks
omitted) (alteration adopted). Additionally, “it is plain that reasonableness
depends on not only when a seizure is made, but also how it is carried out.” Id.Viewing—as we must—the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiffs, the record reveals the following version of events. 1 The Plaintiffs were
in their home engaging in sexual activity when the Defendants arrived, knocked on
the door, and announced themselves as police officers. Jackson asked the officers
1
Because the Plaintiffs do not challenge the district court’s grant of qualified immunity on their
claims that the officers unlawfully entered and searched the Plaintiffs’ home and arrested them
without probable cause, we assume here that the officers’ search was lawful and that they had
probable cause to arrest the Plaintiffs.
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to wait for him to put on clothes, but an officer shouted that “we’ll worry about
clothes in a minute.” Jackson opened the door completely naked. The officers had
Jackson sit on a couch, still naked. Mitchell, wearing a sweater that did not cover
her, then appeared in the living room and sat on the couch. Both Mitchell and
Jackson stated that all three officers had flashlights and repeatedly shined the light
on their faces and genitalia. Mitchell specifically stated that she “saw each of them
looking directly at [her] exposed body.” At one point, Mitchell said she was “cold
and needed some clothes,” but the officers refused to allow her to put on clothing
other than the sweater.
Eventually, the officers arrested the Plaintiffs and prepared to transport them
to jail. Jackson alleged that he “grabbed [a] jacket and put it on while Officer
Maxey was handcuffing [him],” but that he was wearing nothing else. He was
taken without pants to a police car, with his genitalia fully exposed. Meanwhile,
Mitchell alleged that
[Officer] Whirrell grabbed my arms and handcuffed me behind my
back. . . . My sweater flung completely open. Nothing was covered.
My breast was exposed. My genitals were exposed. [Officer] Stewart
kept his flashlight on me the entire time as I was being handcuffed.
Then he walked toward my kitchen. [Officer] Whirrell turned me
around and I asked him again, could I please get some clothes on. He
said, “No”. We walked out of my front door with his flashlight still
on.
Mitchell Decl. 7, ECF No. 60-1. The officer took her outside and placed her in
another police car. A number of neighbors who witnessed Mitchell and Jackson as
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they walked to the police cars stated unequivocally that they saw Mitchell’s and
Jackson’s genitalia. See, e.g., McCommons Decl. 1–2, ECF No. 60-3 (stating that
“Cliff [Jackson] had on a white jacket with nothing underneath” and that “Megan
[Mitchell] had on an open sweater” with her “breast and private area” exposed); M.
Jackson Decl. 1–2, ECF No. 60-4 (stating that he “could see everything, including
[Jackson’s] private area” and that he “could see [Mitchell’s] breast”); Thomas
Decl. 1–2, ECF No. 60-5 (stating that he “could see [Jackson’s] genital area as he
walked to the police car parked on the street,” and that he “could see [Mitchell’s]
breast and private area” because “[s]he did not have on any bottoms or anything
underneath the jacket”); L. Jackson Decl. 2, ECF No. 60-6 (noting that “Cliff
[Jackson] did not have on a shirt or underwear” and that “[h]e was fully exposed,”
and that he “could see Megan[ Mitchell’s] breast through the sweater she had on”).
Once the police car carrying Mitchell arrived at the jail, Mitchell got out of
the car, walked through the door, and sat on a bench—still dressed in only a
sweater. At least two male inmates claimed to see her exposed body in the jail.
See, e.g., Davis Decl. 1–2, ECF No. 60-2 (“Through the window I saw Megan
Mitchell in a little brown shirt with her breast and genitals exposed. I saw her
standing in the area you are searched at before you entered the jail. The other
trustees and I took turns looking out the window at Megan.”). Based on this
version of events, we agree with the district court that a reasonable jury could find
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that Mitchell’s and Jackson’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated because
their seizure and transportation to the jail was unreasonable. See Fortner v.
Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1993) (recognizing the “constitutional
right to bodily privacy because most people have ‘a special sense of privacy in
their genitals, and involuntary exposure of them in the presence of people of the
other sex may be especially demeaning and humiliating’” (quoting Lee v. Downs,
641 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1981))).
The Defendants argue that based on a video recording from one of the police
cars at the scene, it is beyond dispute that Mitchell’s private areas were not
exposed in the sweater because the sweater was buttoned and it extended
“considerably below the waist area.” They rely on Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007), in which the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen opposing
parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that
version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id.
at 380, 127 S. Ct. at 1776.
However, this video recording does not “blatantly contradict[]” the
Plaintiffs’ allegations. As Officers Whirrell and Maxey admit in their brief, “[t]he
DVD is [of] less than optimal quality.” Also, the video only shows Mitchell’s full
profile for about six seconds, as she is being walked from the house to the police
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car. The lighting is extremely dim, and the footage is grainy. In those brief
seconds, it is difficult to tell the extent to which Mitchell is exposed as she walks.
And looking at the record images of the sweater taken after the incident, even if the
sweater was fully buttoned as the Defendants claim, a reasonable jury could find
that Mitchell’s pubic area was nonetheless exposed since the buttons do not secure
the bottom of the sweater. Given the lack of clarity, the video footage in this case
hardly resolves the question. It is simply one additional piece of evidence the jury
may consider to determine Mitchell’s exposure.
Beyond that, although the Defendants admit that Jackson “was taken to jail
without pants,” as confirmed by the video footage, the Defendants argue that they
believed “the appropriate thing to do was to get [Jackson] on into the vehicle”
since they had “heated exchanges” with him in the house. In other words, they
argue that Jackson’s nudity was justified by the circumstances. But whether any
“heated exchanges” justified the officers’ decision to prevent Jackson from
wearing pants is precisely the type of fact-specific inquiry that should be left to the
jury. We agree with the district court that
[t]he evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs shows
that (1) Mitchell was naked except for a sweater that did not cover her
private areas; (2) Jackson was naked except for a jacket that did not
cover his private areas; (3) before the officers arrested Plaintiffs and
escorted them from the house, the officers pointed their flashlights
directly at Plaintiffs and looked at their exposed bodies; (4) each
Plaintiff asked Defendants for clothes at least twice; and (5) Plaintiffs’
neighbors and jail inmates could see Plaintiffs’ exposed bodies.
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These facts must be accepted when deciding Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
Although a jury may discredit this version of events at trial, we are not at liberty to
make that determination on summary judgment. In the light most favorable to the
Plaintiffs, there are genuine issues of material fact about whether the Plaintiffs’
Fourth Amendment rights were violated.
III.
Defendants argue that even if there are genuine issues of material fact about
whether the seizure here was unconstitutional, the district court still erred in
denying them qualified immunity because no constitutional violation was clearly
established at the time of the incident. Qualified immunity protects government
officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages.
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1696 (1999). All parties
agree that the officers here were engaged in discretionary functions. Under the
Supreme Court’s qualified immunity standard, even if “a violation could be made
out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions,” a court must also ask whether
the right at issue was “clearly established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201,
121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining
whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202,
121 S. Ct. at 2156.
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This Court has recognized three ways that a Plaintiff can show a right was
clearly established. “First, the plaintiffs may establish that the right was clearly
established by pointing to a materially similar case decided by the Supreme Court,
this Court, or the [state] Supreme Court.” Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1256
(11th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). Second, the Plaintiffs “also may show
that a constitutional right was clearly established through a broader, clearly
established principle that should control the novel facts of the situation.” Id.(quotation marks omitted) (alterations adopted). “However, the principle must be
established with obvious clarity by the case law so that every objectively
reasonable government official facing the circumstances would know that the
official’s conduct did violate federal law when the official acted.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted). “Finally, the words of the pertinent federal statute or federal
constitutional provision in some cases will be specific enough to establish clearly
the law applicable to particular conduct and circumstances and to overcome
qualified immunity, even in the total absence of case law.” Id. at 1257 (quotation
marks omitted).
The district court focused primarily on the second avenue, finding “a broad,
clearly established principle that individuals who have been placed in police
custody have a constitutional right to bodily privacy.” We agree. This Court has
recognized this right in at least two cases. In Fortner v. Thomas, we
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“recognize[ed] a prisoner’s constitutional right to bodily privacy because most
people have ‘a special sense of privacy in their genitals, and involuntary exposure
of them in the presence of people of the other sex may be especially demeaning
and humiliating.’” 983 F.2d at 1030 (quoting Lee, 641 F.2d at 1119); see also id.(“[W]e now recognize that prisoners retain a constitutional right to bodily
privacy.”). And in Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107 (11th Cir. 2006), we again
affirmed “the privacy rights of prisoners emphasizing the harm of compelled
nudity.” Id. at 1111. These two cases clearly establish the principle that, absent a
legitimate reason, individuals maintain a right to bodily privacy, in particular the
right not to have their genitals exposed to onlookers.
The Defendants argue that Fortner and Boxer X do not clearly establish that
the officers’ conduct in this case was unconstitutional because those two cases
dealt with female prison officers who forced male prisoners to expose their private
areas. This might be an effective argument if we were relying on the first way to
find a clearly established right, which requires providing a “materially similar
case.” Terrell, 668 F.3d at 1256. But the district court followed the second
avenue, which requires only a “broader, clearly established principle that should
control the novel facts of [a] situation.” Id. As the district court wisely reasoned:
If convicted prisoners retain a constitutional right to bodily privacy
while in jail, then they must have had that right before they were
incarcerated, which means that free citizens enjoy at least the same
right to bodily privacy. And if a prison guard must have a legitimate
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reason for impinging an inmate’s right to bodily privacy, then an
arresting officer certainly must have a legitimate reason for violating
the bodily privacy rights of an arrestee.
Indeed, prisoners retained a right to bodily privacy in Fortner even though “we
must give great deference to the decisions of prison officials.” Fortner, 983 F.2d at1029 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1878 (1979)). The
rights of arrestees are surely as substantial as those of inmates. Of course, at trial,
the jury may determine that the officers here did have a legitimate reason for
exposing the Plaintiffs to onlookers in this way. But we may not make that
determination for them at the summary-judgment stage. We find it was clearly
established at the time of the incident in question that the Plaintiffs had a broad
constitutional right to bodily privacy, and that in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could find that the Defendants violated that right.
IV.
The Defendants offer similar arguments to say that they are entitled to
official immunity on the Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. In Georgia, “[p]ublic agents
are immune from liability for their discretionary acts unless they are done with
malice or intent to injure.” Taylor v. Waldo, 709 S.E.2d 278, 281 (Ga. Ct. App.
2011). “[A]ctual malice requires deliberate intention to do wrong.” City of
Atlanta v. Shavers, 756 S.E.2d 204, 206 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis omitted). We agree with the district court that “a jury could
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conclude that Defendants knew that Plaintiffs were nearly naked and that there was
no legitimate purpose for parading them in front of their neighbors and to the jail
that way, but Defendants did it anyway.” Thus, for the same reasons we affirm the
district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, we
affirm the district court’s denial of official immunity on the Plaintiffs’ state-law
claims.
Finally, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the
Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages under both state and federal law. See
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b) (allowing punitive damages under Georgia state law
where “the defendant’s actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud,
wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the
presumption of conscious indifference to consequences”); Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 51, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1638 (1983) (noting, in a § 1983 case, that a jury may
award punitive damages if the defendant’s conduct involved a “reckless or callous
indifference” to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights). As we have said
repeatedly, “[n]o matter how egregious the defendant’s conduct, whether to award
punitives is left to the factfinder.” Wright v. Sheppard, 919 F.2d 665, 671 (11th
Cir. 1990).
AFFIRMED.
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