Edgar Segura Ocoro v. United States ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-10123
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket Nos. 1:12-cv-00493-CB; 1:05-cr-00013-CB-C-1
EDGAR SEGURA OCORO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
________________________
(April 6, 2015)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JULIE CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Edgar Segura Ocoro appeals pro se the denial of his motion to vacate his
sentence of 240 months of imprisonment. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We issued a certificate
of appealability to address two issues: (1) whether Ocoro was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing to determine if counsel was ineffective for failing to advise
Ocoro “about his options in pleading guilty . . . [and] the consequences of pleading
guilty”; and (2) whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
enhancement of Ocoro’s sentence on the basis it “violated the explicit or implicit
assurances given to the Colombian government to secure [his] extradition.” We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We divide our discussion in two parts. First, we discuss Ocoro’s extradition
from Colombia, his change of plea and sentencing proceedings, and his direct
appeal. Second, we discuss Ocoro’s motion to vacate his sentence.
A. Ocoro’s Extradition, Guilty Plea Proceedings, and Direct Appeal
In 2005, a federal grand jury charged Ocoro with conspiring to possess with
intent to distribute more than 50 kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and
conspiring to launder money, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Oroco fled to Colombia, but a
diplomatic note written by the Embassy of the United States in March 2009 stated
that the Colombian government had agreed to extradite Ocoro “pursuant to
Resolution No. 533, dated December 24, 2008.” The diplomatic note gave
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assurances that Ocoro would “not be subject to ‘forced disappearance,’ torture or
cruel or unusual punishment, degrading or inhumane treatment, ‘exile,’ life
imprisonment, ‘confiscation without due process of law,’ or the imposition of the
death penalty.” The diplomatic note also stated that Ocoro would not be sentenced
to imprisonment for life, although that was the maximum penalty for his offenses.
Ocoro had an initial appearance hearing on April 8, 2009.
On June 1, 2009, the United States filed a notice of intent to enhance
Ocoro’s sentence. See 21 U.S.C. § 851. The notice stated that, on December 28,
1987, Ocoro had pleaded guilty in a Texas court to possessing a controlled
substance.
On June 26, 2009, Ocoro entered an agreement to plead guilty to both
conspiracy charges in exchange for a recommendation from the United States that
Ocoro receive a reduction of his sentence for substantial assistance, see U.S.S.G.
§ 5K1.1; Fed. R. Crim. P. 35, or receive a sentence at the low end of his advisory
guideline range. The plea agreement stated that Ocoro faced a mandatory
minimum sentence of 20 years of imprisonment for conspiring to distribute cocaine
and a maximum penalty of 20 years of imprisonment for conspiring to launder
money and that Ocoro was waiving his right to challenge his sentence, subject to
certain exceptions. The agreement also stated that Ocoro “had the benefit of legal
counsel [during] negotiat[ions]”; he had conferred with counsel about “possible
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defenses to the charges” and was “completely satisfied with the legal advice”; his
“plea[s] of guilty [had been] freely and voluntarily made and [had] not [been] the
result of force, threats, promises, or representations apart from those” described in
the plea agreement; and he had received “no promises from anyone as to the
particular sentence that the Court [might] impose.” In the factual resume, Ocoro
admitted that he was responsible for “40 kilograms of cocaine.”
During his change of plea hearing, Ocoro acknowledged that he was “fully
satisfied” with his attorney’s services; he “fully underst[ood] the terms and
conditions of the plea agreement and the factual resume[] and . . . agree[d] with
[them]”; and he had “commit[ted] the acts and [did] the things that [he had]
admitted to in” the factual resume. Ocoro also acknowledged that he had not been
induced or coerced to plead guilty and that he faced a sentence of 20 years of
imprisonment. The prosecutor stated that “the enhanced penalty [for conspiring to
distribute cocaine] is 20 years to life without parole” and that she was not
requesting the maximum penalty because of the “assurance given to [the country of
Colombia].” The district court accepted Ocoro’s pleas of guilty.
Ocoro’s presentence investigation report provided that he had an adjusted
offense level of 35, a criminal history of IV, and an advisory guideline range
between 235 and 293 months of imprisonment. The report also provided that
Ocoro was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years of imprisonment
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because of his prior conviction for possessing a controlled substance. See 21
U.S.C. § 851. Due to the enhancement, Ocoro faced a sentencing range of 240 to
293 months of imprisonment.
Ocoro objected pro se to the enhancement of his sentence. Ocoro argued that
he had received “insufficient” notice; his prior conviction was too remote; and it
was “unconstitutional” for the prosecutor to exercise unfettered discretion to
determine whether to request the enhancement. The prosecutor responded that
Ocoro “had knowledge of the enhancement information at the time of his guilty
plea . . . pursuant to his plea agreement,” which “put[] his statutory minimum
mandatory [sentence] at 20 years.” Defense counsel stated that he and Ocoro had
discussed the mandatory minimum sentence. Defense counsel also stated that he
thought the “objections to the presentence report [were] moot based on the
enhancement that was filed and [because] . . . Ocoro ha[d] admitted . . . [to the]
prior conviction.”
At sentencing, the district court overruled Ocoro’s objections. Ocoro stated
that “there [were] some points regarding the enhancement . . . that [his] attorney
[had] not presented,” but rather than address those issues, Ocoro said that his
attorney was obligated to “present them.” The district court considered the
statutory sentencing factors, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and sentenced Ocoro to 240
months of imprisonment.
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Ocoro appealed, and counsel filed a motion to withdraw from further
representation and a brief in support. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87
S. Ct. 1396 (1967). We affirmed Ocoro’s convictions and sentence.
B. Ocoro’s Motion to Vacate
Ocoro moved to vacate his sentence on three claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. First, Ocoro argued that counsel had represented that the prosecutor
would withdraw the motion for enhancement after Ocoro changed his pleas from
not guilty to guilty. Second, Ocoro argued that his counsel should have advised
him that he could preserve his right to appeal by going to trial or pleading guilty
without an agreement and that he could undergo a trial on stipulated facts to
preserve any “non-jurisdictional errors.” Third, Ocoro argued that counsel should
have objected to the enhancement of his sentence on grounds that it violated the
doctrine of dual criminality and that the offense had occurred before December 17,
1997. Ocoro asserted that, had he known of the alternatives to entering a plea
agreement, he would have insisted on going to trial, having a bench trial on
stipulated facts, or entering a blind plea of guilty. Ocoro moved for an evidentiary
hearing.
The district court denied Ocoro’s motion without an evidentiary hearing.
The district court ruled that Ocoro’s argument about being misled by counsel about
application of the enhancement was contradicted by Ocoro’s plea agreement and
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his statements during his change of plea hearing. Ocoro was not prejudiced by his
counsel’s failure to advise him about various methods of resolving his charges, the
district court determined, because Ocoro would have faced an increased sentencing
range had he gone to trial; Ocoro would have had the same result had he entered a
blind plea of guilty; and Ocoro’s “assertion that he would have chosen a trial based
on stipulated facts [was] . . . illusory” because “a trial of that type requires the
agreement of both parties, and there [was] no basis for concluding that the
government would have been amenable to such a proceeding.” The district court
also ruled that an objection to the sentence enhancement would have been
“frivolous.” Ocoro failed to provide “any legal or factual support[ for his
argument] that no Colombian citizen can be extradited for any acts committed
before 1997”; he was not extradited for “the prior offense charge”; and his
extradition did not violate the doctrine of dual criminality because he offered no
argument that “the offenses charged in [his] indictment [were] not serious offenses
in Colombia.”
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
On denial of a motion to vacate a sentence, we review findings of fact for
clear error and the application of law to those facts de novo. Dell v. United States,
710 F.3d 1267, 1272 (11th Cir. 2013). We review the denial of an evidentiary
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hearing for abuse of discretion. Brown v. United States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1335 n.3
(11th Cir. 2013).
III. DISCUSSION
Oroco argues that his trial counsel provided deficient representation. Oroco
argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the enhancement on
the ground that it violated the assurances provided to the Colombian government.
Ocoro also argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether
his counsel provided inadequate advice about the processes available to resolve his
criminal charges. His arguments fail.
We review de novo the denial of a claim of ineffective assistance. Osley v.
United States, 751 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2014). To prevail on that claim, a
movant must satisfy a two-part standard. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984). The movant must first prove
“that counsel made errors so serious that [he] was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. If
counsel’s performance was deficient, the movant must also prove that counsel’s
error was “so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.” Id.
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The district court did not err by denying Ocoro’s claim that counsel made a
professional error by failing to object to the enhancement of Ocoro’s sentence
based on the violation of assurances given to Colombia. The application of the
enhancement did not violate the assurances in the diplomatic note that Ocoro
would not be mistreated or receive a sentence of life imprisonment. Ocoro argues
that the sentence enhancement violates the rule of specialty because it conflicted
with an assurance that he would be prosecuted in compliance with Article 35 of the
Constitution of Colombia, which requires that the conduct underlying the criminal
charge occur before December 17, 1997. But “[t]he rule of specialty applies only to
extraditions pursuant to treaty,” United States v. Valencia-Trujillo, 573 F.3d 1171,
1179 (11th Cir. 2009), and Ocoro fails to cite any treaty between the United States
and Colombia under which he was purportedly extradited. According to the
diplomatic note, the “Government of Colombia . . . approved [Ocoro’s] extradition
. . . pursuant to Resolution Number 533, dated December 24, 2008.” Ocoro was not
extradited under a treaty and lacked standing to assert a violation of the rule of
specialty. Because the enhancement of Ocoro’s sentence did not violate any
assurances given for his extradition, “[t]here was no reason for counsel to object.”
Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917 (11th Cir. 2001).
The district court also did not abuse its discretion when it denied Oroco an
evidentiary hearing on his claim that his counsel failed to advise him of the
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methods available to resolve his criminal charges. An evidentiary hearing is
unnecessary when “the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); Gordon v.
United States, 518 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008). Even if we were to assume
that counsel was deficient for failing to inform Ocoro that he could go to trial,
plead guilty without the benefit of an agreement, or request a trial based on
stipulated facts, Ocoro could not establish “a reasonable probability” that the
outcome of his case would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694,
104 S. Ct. at 2068. Oroco does not deny that he conspired to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. § 846, and regardless of the method of his
conviction, he would have faced, at a minimum, a sentence of 20 years of
imprisonment for having a prior conviction for a drug offense, id. §§ 841(b)(1)(A),
851. Oroco argues that he could have preserved his right to appeal had he disposed
of his charges by means other than pleading guilty with an agreement, but he does
not identify any issue that he would have raised on appeal. And Ocoro fails to
recognize that, without his plea agreement, he would likely have received a longer
sentence because he would not have received a reduction of his offense level for
his acceptance of responsibility, see U.S.S.G. 3E1.1, nor would the government
have been obligated to recommend that he receive a sentence at the low end of his
advisory guideline range. Because the district court could determine from the
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record that Ocoro was not entitled to postconviction relief, no evidentiary hearing
was required to resolve his claim of ineffective assistance.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the denial of Ocoro’s motion to vacate.
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