Aristotle Sampson v. Warden, FCC Coleman - USP I , 605 F. App'x 861 ( 2015 )

Case: 14-11682 Date Filed: 03/30/2015 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-11682
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:10-cv-00418-WTH-PRL
ARISTOTLE SAMPSON,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, FCC COLEMAN - USP I,
Respondent - Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(March 30, 2015)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Aristotle Sampson, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, was convicted of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and sentenced under the Armed
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), in 1999. He brought an initial
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motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in 2000, and the district court denied it on
the merits. In 2010, Sampson filed the instant habeas corpus petition, this time
seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He challenged his ACCA sentence
enhancement and asserted that the government used perjured grand jury testimony
to secure an indictment. The district court dismissed the petition on September 23,
2013, after determining that Sampson’s challenge to his ACCA enhancement failed
on the merits. It did not address whether the “savings clause” of § 2255 afforded it
jurisdiction to entertain the § 2241 petition, nor did it address Sampson’s perjured
testimony claim. Sampson moved for reconsideration on October 28, 2013, the
district court denied reconsideration in April 2014, and Sampson appealed. On
appeal, he asserts that the district court erred in its analysis of his ACCA claim and
violated Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) by not addressing his
perjured testimony claim. After careful review, we dismiss the appeal in part, and
vacate and remand it in part.
We are obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte and
review jurisdictional issues de novo. Williams v. Chatman, 510 F.3d 1290, 1293
(11th Cir. 2007). In a habeas case, the timely filing of a notice of appeal is a
jurisdictional requirement. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-13 (2007). We
read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, but issues not briefed on appeal by a
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pro se party are still deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874
(11th Cir. 2008).
In a civil case, a party has 60 days from the entry of the judgment or order
appealed from to file a notice of appeal where the United States is a party to the
case. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(B). A timely filed Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 motion, or a
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 motion -- filed within 28 days of the relevant judgment or order --
tolls the time that a party has to file a notice of appeal. Fed.R.App.P.
4(a)(4)(A)(iv), (v), and (vi); Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, 60. We can consider a timely appeal
from an order denying a motion for reconsideration, even if the motion was
untimely to toll the appeal period. See Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v.
Thione Int’l, Inc., 615 F.3d 1352, 1359 n.14 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that we
had jurisdiction to review the district court’s order on a post-judgment motion,
although the motion was untimely to toll the appeal period from the underlying
judgment).
Because Sampson filed his post-judgment reconsideration motion more than
28 days after the judgment, it did not serve to toll the time in which he was
required to file a notice of appeal. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv) and (vi).
Sampson’s April 2014 notice of appeal, therefore, was untimely to appeal the
September 23, 2013 dismissal of his § 2241 petition, and we lack jurisdiction to
review that order. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(B); Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209-13.
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Accordingly, to the extent that Sampson challenges the underlying denial of his §
2241 petition, his appeal is dismissed.
That being said, the notice of appeal was timely as to the denial of
Sampson’s motion for reconsideration, and Sampson’s notice of appeal references
that order, so we may review arguments that Sampson raises on appeal regarding
that order. See Fed.R.App.P. 3(c)(1)(B) and 4(a)(1)(B). Moreover, Sampson’s
initial brief, construed liberally, does not abandon his challenge to the denial of his
motion for reconsideration. Timson, 518 F.3d at 874.
However, we cannot rule on questions that the district court never had
jurisdiction to entertain. Williams v. Warden, 713 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir.
2013). We also have an obligation to consider, sua sponte, whether the district
court properly exercised jurisdiction over a case. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of
Florida v. Kraus-Anderson Constr. Co., 607 F.3d 1268, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2010).
While § 2255 is the primary method of collateral attack for federal prisoners,
§ 2241 provides a limited, additional basis for habeas actions brought by federal
prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The “savings clause” of § 2255 opens the portal
to relief under § 2241 if “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Bryant v. Warden, FCC
Coleman-Medium, 738 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2013). Whether the savings
clause “may open the portal to a § 2241 petition” is a threshold jurisdictional
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question that must be decided before delving into a petitioner’s claim. Bryant, 738
F.3d at 1262; see also Williams, 713 F.3d at 1337.
Here, as always, we have a duty to determine sua sponte whether the district
court lacked jurisdiction over the case. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida,
607 F.3d at 1272-73. As the record shows, the district court resolved Sampson’s §
2241 petition on the merits, without discussing whether the savings clause
provided it jurisdiction to entertain the petition in the first place. Whether the
savings clause “may open the portal to a § 2241 petition” is a threshold
jurisdictional question that must be decided before delving into a petitioner’s
claims. Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1262. Because the district court never established that
the savings clause gave it jurisdiction over the case, we cannot determine whether
it had jurisdiction to rule on the motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the
district court’s order denying reconsideration is vacated, and the matter is
remanded to the district court with instructions to consider whether there was a
proper basis for exercising jurisdiction over the case.
DISMISSED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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