Carlos Antonio Ortega Bonilla v. USA ( 2016 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-15327
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-22768-MGC
CARLOS ANTONIO ORTEGA BONILLA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ANDREA HOFFMAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(June 20, 2016)
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Before TJOFLAT, HULL and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Carlos Antonio Ortega Bonilla appeals the district court’s dismissal
of his complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
failure to state a claim. Bonilla asserted claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”) and Bivens 1 against the United States and Assistant United States
Attorney Andrea Hoffman (“the Defendants”) arising out of the arrest, detention,
and prosecution of Bonilla for his alleged involvement in an international drug
smuggling operation. After review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
We recount below the relevant facts by accepting the allegations in the
complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to Bonilla. Fin.
Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2007).
A. Bonilla’s Background and Social Status
Bonilla, a 64-year-old Colombian citizen, was a well-respected member of
the Colombian community. Bonilla served as a pilot for Colombia’s national
airline for over 25 years. Thereafter, Bonilla assumed high-ranking positions for
the Colombian government, including serving as the Director of Air Safety for the
1
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.
Ct. 1999 (1971) (establishing that a plaintiff may bring suit directly under the Constitution
against federal officers in their individual capacity for constitutional violations).
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Civil Aviation Authority of Colombia. In 2004, Bonilla retired from his position
as Director, began working as an aviation consultant, and also started a part-time
business brokering the sale and lease of airplanes.
B. Investigation, Arrest, Detention, and Prosecution of Bonilla
At some point prior to June 2012, the United States initiated an investigation
into an international drug smuggling operation occurring in Colombia. While the
investigation was a “highly coordinated” effort between the Drug Enforcement
Administration (“DEA”) and Colombian law enforcement, the United States was
“in charge.” As part of the investigation, DEA agents made monthly payments to
Colombian narcotics officers and paid them “bonuses” for their investigative
efforts.
On June 28, 2012, Bonilla was extradited to a prison in Florida where a
DEA agent arrested Bonilla on suspicion of drug-smuggling activity. The United
States accused Bonilla of selling airplanes to drug traffickers and claimed that
phone wiretaps proved as much. However, the apparently incriminating wiretaps
actually demonstrated that Bonilla refused to sell airplanes to people that he
suspected were drug traffickers and, according to Bonilla, affirmatively established
his innocence. Bonilla alleged that “the Defendants maliciously and recklessly
arrested, prosecuted and detained [him] due to his alleged involvement in a
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complex drug smuggling operation . . . in spite of [their] knowledge that he was
innocent of any wrongdoing.”
The United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida delegated
responsibility for prosecuting Bonilla to Defendant Andrea Hoffman, an Assistant
United States Attorney. Bonilla alleged that prosecutor Hoffman unlawfully
withheld exculpatory phone wiretaps despite his repeated requests for the
disclosure of such evidence. Bonilla also alleged that Hoffman unlawfully
withheld evidence proving that the DEA paid “bonuses” to individual Colombian
narcotics police officers for their investigative efforts. According to Bonilla,
Hoffman tried to “create a case against [him] that simply did not exist,” going so
far as to represent that a secret witness existed who would testify against him.
In August 2012, the United States dismissed all charges against Bonilla.
Bonilla’s arrest and detention negatively impacted his family life, mental health,
credibility, reputation, and ability to secure employment.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Complaint
On July 28, 2014, Bonilla filed a counseled, nine-count complaint in federal
district court against the United States of America and Hoffman. Bonilla brought
the following claims against only the Defendant United States pursuant to the
FTCA: (1) false arrest (Count I); (2) false imprisonment (Count II); (3) malicious
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prosecution (Count III); (4) abuse of process (Count IV); (5) intentional infliction
of emotional distress (Count V); and (6) negligence (Count VI).
Bonilla brought the following claims against only Defendant Hoffman
pursuant to Bivens: (1) Constitutional claim under the Fifth Amendment (Count
VII); (2) Constitutional claim under the Fourth Amendment (Count VIII); and
(3) Constitutional claim for Brady 2 Rule violation (Count IX).
B. Dismissal of the Complaint
In a September 20, 2015 order, the district court granted the Defendants’
joint motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court
concluded that Bonilla’s FTCA claims against the Defendant United States were
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity because they were based on the
actions of Hoffman, a federal prosecutor, who does not qualify as an “investigative
or law enforcement officer” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). The
district court also concluded that Defendant Hoffman was entitled to absolute
immunity from Bonilla’s Bivens claims because those claims arose from
Hoffman’s performance of her prosecutorial duties. Bonilla appeals the district
court’s September 20, 2015 dismissal order.
2
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963) (holding that a defendant’s due
process rights are violated when the prosecution suppresses material evidence favorable to the
defendant).
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. Cinotto v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 674 F.3d 1285,
1291 (11th Cir. 2012). When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court looks to see
whether the complaint contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789
F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015). This plausibility standard is met when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id.“A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). Indeed, a complaint’s
factual allegations must be enough “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965
(2007). “[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal
conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset
Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002).
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B. FTCA Claims against the United States
On appeal, Bonilla argues that the district court erred by dismissing his
FTCA claims on sovereign immunity grounds. We disagree.
“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and
its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1000
(1994). The FTCA was designed primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of
the United States from suits in tort. Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. ___, ___,
133 S. Ct. 1441, 1443 (2013). The United States waives sovereign immunity in
§ 1346(b) of the FTCA, which provides:
[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, . . .
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). However, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) creates an exception to the
waiver of sovereign immunity, as well as an exception to that exception, by
providing that the waiver in § 1346(b) “shall not apply to”:
[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights:
Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or
law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the
provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply
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to any claim arising . . . out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Thus, while § 2680(h) carves out an exception to the waiver
of sovereign immunity with respect to the commission of certain enumerated
intentional torts, the United States may still be liable for those torts when federal
“investigative or law enforcement officers” commit them. See id.; see also
Nguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). Section 2680(h)
defines an “investigative or law enforcement officer” as “any officer of the United
States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make
arrests for violations of Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
Here, the district court properly dismissed Bonilla’s FTCA claims under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. All of Bonilla’s FTCA claims maintain causes of
action for intentional torts from which the United States is immune. Bonilla’s false
arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process claims are
barred under the plain language of § 2680(h). See id. Additionally, Bonilla’s
negligence and emotional distress claims, though not enumerated in § 2680(h), are
still barred because they are derived from the same conduct that forms the basis of
the enumerated causes of action. See Metz v. United States, 788 F.2d 1528, 1534
(11th Cir. 1986) (“[A] cause of action which is distinct from one of those excepted
under § 2680(h) will nevertheless be deemed to ‘arise out of’ an excepted cause of
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action when the underlying governmental conduct which constitutes an excepted
cause of action is ‘essential’ to plaintiff's claim.”).
Bonilla nevertheless argues that the waiver of sovereign immunity for
intentional torts committed by “investigators or law enforcement officers” applies
to this case in two ways. First, Bonilla contends that Hoffman’s conduct “went far
beyond her prosecutorial duties such that she was acting in the role of an
investigative or law enforcement officer for purposes of the FTCA.” According to
Bonilla, the United States does not enjoy sovereign immunity where a federal
prosecutor commits certain tortious acts in an investigative or law enforcement
capacity.
With respect to Hoffman’s conduct, prosecutors do not qualify as
“investigative or law enforcement officer[s]” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h) as they are not empowered to execute searches, seize evidence, or make
arrests. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); 28 U.S.C. § 547 (setting out the duties of U.S.
Attorneys). Nor does the complaint allege that Hoffman performed any of these
functions. Accordingly, based on the allegations in this case, Hoffman does not
qualify as an “investigative or law enforcement officer” under the plain meaning of
§ 2680(h), and sovereign immunity precludes FTCA liability arising from her
allegedly tortious conduct.
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Second, Bonilla argues that, regardless of Hoffman’s conduct, the complaint
sets forth detailed allegations of tortious misconduct by DEA agents and other
federal law enforcement officers. According to Bonilla, the United States does not
enjoy sovereign immunity where DEA agents, who are clearly law enforcement
officers, commit certain tortious acts.
With respect to the DEA’s conduct, we have no doubt that DEA agents
qualify as “federal investigative or law enforcement officer[s]” under § 2680(h),
which means that the United States does not enjoy sovereign immunity from
claims based on the DEA’s commission of certain intentional torts. See Nguyen,
556 F.3d at 1260. However, the complaint does not contain sufficiently specific
allegations relating to the DEA’s actual conduct to state an FTCA claim against the
United States.
The complaint alleges numerous instances of misconduct by Hoffman and
the United States in general, but contains very few allegations concerning the
actual conduct of the DEA or other federal law enforcement officers. Indeed,
Hoffman is the only agent of the United States who the complaint ever identifies
by name. All we can glean from the complaint is that unidentified DEA agents
(1) coordinated a drug-smuggling investigation with Colombian law enforcement,
(2) arrested Bonilla on June 28, 2012, upon suspicion of drug-smuggling, (3) paid
“bonuses” to Colombian narcotics officers for their investigative efforts, and
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(4) received from Bonilla’s attorney and Colombian agents some evidence tending
to exculpate Bonilla. These allegations, accepted as true, do not establish the
unlawfulness of Bonilla’s arrest and detention and, therefore, do not state a claim
for false arrest, false imprisonment, or any of the other related causes of action that
form the basis of Bonilla’s FTCA claims. 3 Additionally, none of Bonilla’s FTCA
counts contain any allegations even mentioning the conduct of the DEA or other
federal law enforcement officials.
At most, one could speculate that Bonilla’s allegations concerning the
“United States” and “U.S. authorities” refer to the actions of the DEA or other
federal law enforcement officials. However, complaints that do not “raise a right
to relief above the speculative level” will not survive dismissal. See Bell Atl.
Corp., 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.
Ultimately, we are left with nothing more than Bonilla’s vague, threadbare,
and conclusory allegations concerning the conduct of the DEA, which do not state
an FTCA claim against the United States that is plausible on its face. See Surtain,
789 F.3d at 1245; Oxford Asset Mgmt., 297 F.3d at 1188.
In sum, under § 2680(h), sovereign immunity precludes FTCA liability
arising from the tortious conduct alleged in the complaint. Hoffman is not an
3
Bonilla’s allegation that his attorney and criminal investigator repeatedly provided the
DEA with evidence that “unequivocally proved [his] innocence” amounts to nothing more than a
“legal conclusion[] masquerading as fact[]” that does not prevent dismissal. Oxford Asset
Mgmt., 297 F.3d at 1188.
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“investigative or law enforcement officer,” and while a DEA agent is, the
allegations regarding the DEA’s conduct is not sufficiently specific to state a
claim. Because the complaint does not state a claim against the United States
based on the conduct of an “investigative or law enforcement officer,” the
“investigative or law enforcement officer” exception in § 2680(h) does not apply
and the United States enjoys sovereign immunity from Bonilla’s FTCA claims.
C. Bivens Claims against Hoffman
On appeal, Bonilla also argues that the district court erred by dismissing his
Bivens claims against Hoffman under the doctrine of absolute immunity. Bonilla
argues that absolute immunity does not protect Hoffman because her misconduct
exceeded the scope of her duties as an Assistant United States Attorney. We
disagree.
“Prosecutors are . . . entitled to absolute immunity from damages for acts or
omissions associated with the judicial process, in particular, those taken in
initiating a prosecution and in presenting the government’s case.” Bolin v. Story,
225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000). “Such absolute immunity extends to a
prosecutor’s acts undertaken … in preparing for the initiation of judicial
proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate
for the State.” Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation
marks omitted) (alteration in original).
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“[A]bsolute immunity does not necessarily shield a prosecutor from liability
when he is performing a function that is not associated with his role as an advocate
for the state.” Mastroianni v. Bowers, 173 F.3d 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 1999). For
example, absolute immunity is not available where a prosecutor performs an
investigative function. See Rivera v. Leal, 359 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2004).
“A prosecutor functions as an investigator when he searches for the clues and
corroboration that might give him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be
arrested.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Acts protected by absolute immunity include a prosecutor’s “professional
evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509
U.S. 259, 273, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2615 (1993). Absolute immunity also extends to
the “task of evaluating the credibility of the alleged exculpatory information,”
which “no doubt requires the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.” Long v. Satz,
181 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted). Additionally,
“[i]njury flowing from a procedural due process violation . . . that results from a
prosecutor’s failure to comply with the Brady rule cannot be redressed by a civil
damages action against the prosecutor . . . because the prosecutor is absolutely
immune from such liability.” Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1305 n.8 (11th Cir.
2007).
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Here, the district court properly dismissed Bonilla’s Bivens claims under the
doctrine of absolute immunity. The substance of Bonilla’s Bivens claims, as
alleged in the complaint, are essentially twofold: (1) Hoffman allegedly violated
Bonilla’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by ignoring exculpatory evidence
and detaining him despite knowledge of his actual innocence, and (2) Hoffman
allegedly violated Bonilla’s Constitutional rights under Brady by failing to disclose
exculpatory evidence during the investigative phase. Hoffman enjoys absolute
immunity from both types of Bivens claims.
Bonilla’s first species of Bivens claim concerns the very type of
prosecutorial functions traditionally protected by absolute immunity. Bonilla seeks
recovery from Hoffman based on her alleged failure to weigh properly the value of
exculpatory evidence collected by the DEA. But absolute immunity protects
prosecutors from liability when evaluating exculpatory evidence and performing a
“professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police,” as Hoffman did
here. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S. Ct. at 2615; Long, 181 F.3d at 1279.
Additionally, Hoffman’s alleged knowledge of Bonilla’s actual innocence is both a
legal conclusion and an “unwarranted deduction[] of fact[]” that will not prevent
dismissal. Oxford Asset Mgmt., 297 F.3d at 1188.
Hoffman also enjoys absolute immunity from Bonilla’s Bivens claims based
on her alleged Brady violations. Hoffman’s alleged failure to comply with Brady
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constitutes an exercise of her prosecutorial function and entitles her to absolute
immunity. See Porter, 483 F.3d at 1305 n.8. Indeed, when Hoffman told the DEA
to “stand down” and not disclose exculpatory wiretap evidence, allegedly in
violation of Brady, she was not performing an investigative function. See Rivera,
359 F.3d at 1353. Rather, Hoffman was performing a prosecutorial function, for
which she is absolutely immune. See Porter, 483 F.3d at 1305 n.8.
Bonilla’s remaining allegations concerning Hoffman’s general prosecutorial
misconduct amount to nothing more than a claim for malicious prosecution, for
which absolute immunity attaches. Jones, 174 F.3d at 1281. Accordingly,
Hoffman enjoys absolute immunity from Bonilla’s Bivens claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Bonilla’s
complaint.
AFFIRMED.
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