Herman Joseph Zann, III v. Daniel R. Whidby ( 2013 )


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  •           Case: 12-16013   Date Filed: 08/16/2013   Page: 1 of 3
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 12-16013
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-000919-JHH
    HERMAN JOSEPH ZANN, III,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    DANIEL R. WHIDBY
    Deputy,
    Defendant - Appellant,
    JEFFERSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,
    as a person under USC Section 1983,
    Defendant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (August 16, 2013)
    Case: 12-16013       Date Filed: 08/16/2013       Page: 2 of 3
    Before CARNES, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, and MARRA, * District
    Judge.
    PER CURIAM:
    After studying the briefs and the relevant parts of the record, we conclude
    that the district court’s order denying summary judgment is due to be affirmed
    because viewing the evidence, especially the testimony in his deposition, in the
    light most favorable to Zann, no reasonable officer could have believed that all of
    the force applied to him after the first application of the taser was reasonable and
    not excessive in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Fils v. City of Aventura,
    
    647 F.3d 1272
    , 1288–90 (11th Cir. 2011).
    We have not overlooked Whidby’s argument that the “obvious clarity”
    exception to qualified immunity was not argued to the district court. We reject that
    argument for several reasons. First, in his brief to the district court Zann did argue
    that “the amount of force used against [him] by Defendant Whidby went well
    beyond anything that could be considered reasonable.” That is, essentially, the
    obvious clarity test applied to this type of claim. Second, in his brief Zann relied
    in part on Oliver v. Fiorino, 
    586 F.3d 898
     (11th Cir. 2009), which is an obvious
    clarity case. Third, we will not reverse a district court for applying the proper law
    and reaching the correct result even though the prevailing party was not as helpful
    *
    Honorable Kenneth A. Marra, United States District Judge for the Southern District of
    Florida, sitting by designation.
    2
    Case: 12-16013      Date Filed: 08/16/2013     Page: 3 of 3
    as it could have been. See Fils, 
    647 F.3d at 1285
     (“A district court may look at all
    the evidence in the record to determine whether issues of material fact exist
    regarding the plaintiff’s asserted causes of action.”); see also Thomas v. Cooper
    Lighting, Inc., 
    506 F.3d 1361
    , 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We may affirm the district
    court’s judgment on any ground that appears in the record whether or not that
    ground was relied upon or even considered by the court below.”). Our review,
    after all, is de novo, so Whidby had a full and fair opportunity to put forward his
    argument about why the facts of this case do not fall squarely within the obvious
    clarity exception, and we have found those arguments to be obviously
    unpersuasive.
    AFFIRMED. 1
    1
    This case was originally scheduled for oral argument but was removed from the oral
    argument calendar under 11th Cir. R. 34-3(f).
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-16013

Judges: Carnes, Tjoflat, Marra

Filed Date: 8/16/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024