Andrew Brewer v. Secretary, Department of Corrections , 596 F. App'x 855 ( 2015 )


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  •            Case: 13-13272   Date Filed: 01/07/2015   Page: 1 of 8
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-13272
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 6:09-cv-02041-CEH-TBS
    ANDREW BREWER,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
    CORRECTIONS,
    FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (January 7, 2015)
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 13-13272     Date Filed: 01/07/2015   Page: 2 of 8
    Andrew Brewer, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
    court’s denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     habeas corpus petition related to his
    convictions and life sentences imposed after he pled guilty to second-degree
    murder and burglary of a dwelling while armed. Relevant to this appeal, a
    provision of his written plea agreement provided that the State would not
    recommend “a number of years” at sentencing. Brewer pled guilty after both his
    counsel and the State informed the court at the plea hearing that, under the plea
    agreement, the State was free to argue for a life sentence. At sentencing, Brewer’s
    counsel did not object when the State asked the court to impose a life sentence.
    Brewer raised a breach-of-plea claim for the first time on state post-conviction
    review. The state post-conviction court denied relief, finding that Brewer’s
    substantive claim that his plea was involuntary because of the State’s alleged
    breach of the plea agreement was procedurally barred and that Brewer had failed to
    establish ineffective assistance of counsel to excuse the procedural default. The
    district court denied his § 2254 and Brewer appeals.
    On appeal, Brewer first argues that the state post-conviction court’s
    determination that the prosecution did not breach the plea agreement was based on
    an unreasonable determination of the facts and application of the law because he
    only signed the agreement with the “reasonable understanding” that the state would
    “stand down” at sentencing and make no recommendation. He next argues that his
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    counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not objecting to the State’s argument in
    favor of a life sentence because, if his counsel had objected, there was a reasonable
    probability that the court would have allowed him to withdraw his plea.
    Upon review of the entire record on appeal, and after consideration of the
    parties’ appellate briefs, we affirm.
    I.
    We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a habeas petition
    de novo, including its determination of whether the state court’s decision was
    unreasonable. Cave v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 
    638 F.3d 739
    , 743 (11th Cir.
    2011). In a § 2254 habeas proceeding, where the petition was filed after
    April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
    (“AEDPA”) limits our review of a state court decision. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d).
    Section 2254(d) states:
    An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
    custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
    with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
    court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
    (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
    an unreasonable application of, clearly established
    Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
    United States; or
    (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
    unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
    evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
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    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d).
    The phrase “clearly established federal law” in § 2254(d) “refers to the
    holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the decisions of the United States Supreme
    Court] as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor,
    
    529 U.S. 362
    , 412, 
    120 S.Ct. 1495
    , 1523, 
    146 L.Ed.2d 389
     (2000). Under
    § 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” clause, we will grant relief only “if the state court
    arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a
    question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme
    Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 412-13, 
    120 S.Ct. at 1523
    . Under § 2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable application” clause, we will grant
    relief only “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from
    [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts
    of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413, 
    120 S.Ct. at 1523
    . We may overturn factual
    findings by the state habeas court only when a petitioner produces “clear and
    convincing evidence” that those findings are erroneous. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (e)(1).
    A federal claim is subject to procedural default when the state court applies
    an independent and adequate ground of state procedure to conclude that the
    petitioner’s federal claim is barred. Judd v. Haley, 
    250 F.3d 1308
    , 1313 (11th Cir.
    2001). A state’s procedural ruling rests on independent and adequate state grounds
    if: (1) the last state court rendering a judgment in a case clearly and expressly
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    states that it is relying on state procedural rules to resolve the federal claim without
    reaching the claim’s merits; (2) the rule relied upon is not intertwined with federal
    law; and (3) the state law is adequate, meaning that it is not applied in an arbitrary
    or unprecedented fashion. 
    Id.
     A procedural default may be excused, however, if
    the movant establishes (1) “cause for not raising the claim of error on direct appeal
    and actual prejudice from the alleged error,” or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of
    justice, which means actual innocence. McKay v. United States, 
    657 F.3d 1190
    ,
    1196 (11th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original). A pro se petitioner is not exempted
    from the cause-and-prejudice requirement and “must still show either that an
    objective factor external to himself caused him to default his claim, or that the
    defaulted claim raises an issue that was ‘intrinsically beyond [a] pro se petitioner’s
    ability to present.’” McCoy v. Newsome, 
    953 F.2d 1252
    , 1258 (11th Cir. 1992)
    (alteration in original) (citation omitted). A petitioner’s “failure to act or think like
    a lawyer cannot be cause for failing to assert a claim . . . .” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, if both exhausted and not procedurally
    defaulted itself, may constitute cause. Hill v. Jones, 
    81 F.3d 1015
    , 1029-31 (11th
    Cir. 1996).
    The state court determined that Brewer’s claim that the prosecution breached
    his plea agreement was procedurally barred. Brewer has not shown that that
    determination was error or cause and prejudice to excuse the default.
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    To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must establish
    two things: (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient,” meaning it “fell below an
    objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “the deficient performance
    prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. To
    satisfy the deficient-performance prong, the defendant must show that counsel
    made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the
    Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. The defendant must rebut the
    strong presumption that his counsel’s conduct fell within the range of reasonable
    professional assistance. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. A defendant may satisfy the
    prejudice prong by showing a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
    unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
    reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
    outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. The Supreme Court has elaborated that
    “[t]he likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.”
    Harrington v. Richter, 
    562 U.S. 86
    , ___, 
    131 S.Ct. 770
    , 792, 
    178 L.Ed.2d 624
    (2011). To show prejudice when challenging a guilty plea based on ineffective
    assistance of counsel, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
    probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
    would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. 52
    , 58-59,
    
    106 S.Ct. 366
    , 370, 
    88 L.Ed.2d 203
     (1985). Given the deference owed counsel
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    under Strickland in combination with AEDPA, our review of a claim of ineffective
    assistance brought under § 2254 is “doubly deferential.” Cullen v. Pinholster,
    563 U.S. ___, ___, 
    131 S.Ct. 1388
    , 1403, 
    179 L.Ed.2d 557
     (2011).
    Appellate counsel need not “raise all nonfrivolous issues on appeal.” Payne
    v. United States, 
    566 F.3d 1276
    , 1277 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). We will
    find appellate counsel’s performance prejudicial if a “neglected claim would have
    a reasonable probability of success on appeal.” Heath v. Jones, 
    941 F.2d 1126
    ,
    1132 (11th Cir. 1991).
    In Barnhill v. State, Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal noted that “any
    claim relating to the voluntariness of a defendant’s plea must be pursued by the
    filing of a motion to withdraw the plea within thirty days after sentencing.”
    
    828 So.2d 405
    , 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). The court held that Barnhill’s claim
    challenging the voluntariness of his plea was limited to considering whether he
    received ineffective assistance of counsel because Barnhill raised the claim in a
    state post-conviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850
    without first having filed timely a motion to withdraw his plea. 
    Id.
    “[P]lea bargains are essentially contracts.” Puckett v. United States,
    
    556 U.S. 129
    , 137, 
    129 S.Ct. 1423
    , 1430, 
    173 L.Ed.2d 266
     (2009). In Santobello,
    the Supreme Court held that, “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a
    promise by the government, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or
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    consideration, such a promise must be fulfilled.” 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499.
    Where the government fails to fulfill a promise that induced a guilty plea, the court
    that sentenced the defendant has the discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy,
    such as allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea or ordering specific
    performance. Id. at 262-63, 92 S.Ct. at 499.
    Given the record of Brewer’s written plea agreement and his change-of-plea
    hearing, the state post-conviction court did not unreasonably apply clearly
    established federal law, or make an unreasonable determination of the facts, in
    rejecting his claim that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the State’s
    alleged breach of the plea agreement in seeking a life sentence at sentencing.
    Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object when the State asked for a life
    sentence because any objection would have been meritless because the parties
    made clear at the change-of-plea hearing that the State was permitted to make such
    a request under the plea agreement.
    AFFIRMED.
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