Catherine M. Hunter v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2016 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-11567
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:13-cv-00466-GKS-GJK
CATHERINE M. HUNTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(June 7, 2016)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Catherine Hunter, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order
affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) denial of
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). On appeal, Hunter argues that the
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) made only a “boilerplate” credibility finding,
erred by giving no weight to the opinion of her treating physician, failed to include
all of her impairments and consider them jointly in her decision, and did not
address whether she met a listed impairment. The Commissioner responds that
Hunter has waived many of her arguments and that the rest fail on the merits.
After careful review of the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm.
I.
Hunter filed an application for a period of disability and DIB, alleging a
disability onset date of April 27, 2007. Hunter alleged that she had bipolar
disorder, anxiety disorder and panic attacks, a sleep behavioral disorder, and severe
back problems, including a bulging disc in her back. Eventually, Hunter’s claim
was heard by an ALJ in March 2012.
After the hearing, the ALJ issued her decision denying Hunter’s claim for
benefits. Initially, the ALJ determined that Hunter remained insured under the
Social Security Act through December 31, 2007 (“the date last insured”).
Accordingly, the ALJ analyzed whether Hunter was under a disability from the
disability onset date through the date last insured.
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Using the five-step sequential process, the ALJ found the following:
(1) Hunter had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant
period; (2) she had severe impairments of anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder,
obsessive-compulsive personality disorder, paranoia, disc herniation of the cervical
spine, and neck and back pain; (3) she did not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listings in
the Listing of Impairments, specifically Listings 12.04 and 12.06; (4) based on
Hunter’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), Hunter could not perform her past
relevant work; and (5) considering Hunter’s age, education, work experience, and
RFC, there were jobs in the national economy in significant numbers that she could
perform.
The ALJ determined that Hunter had the RFC to perform light work, except
that she could occasionally stoop and climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; was
limited to frequent overhead reaching bilaterally; could perform simple, routine,
repetitive one-to-two-step tasks; and should not work with the general public or
with a team. In light of that RFC and a vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ
determined that Hunter was capable of making a successful adjustment to other
work that existed in significant numbers in the national economy, such as a cleaner
housekeeper or assembler of printed products.
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Hunter sought review of the ALJ’s decision from the Appeals Council,
which denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner. Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). Hunter
then challenged the ALJ’s decision in federal district court. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). Based on the recommendation of the magistrate judge, the district court
affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. Hunter now appeals.
II.
In Social Security appeals, we review “whether the Commissioner’s decision
is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Winschel v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Our deferential review precludes us from deciding the facts anew,
making credibility determinations, or re-weighing the evidence. Id. Consequently,
we must affirm the agency’s findings, including credibility determinations, if they
are supported by substantial evidence, even if the evidence preponderates against
them. Mitchell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014).
A claimant for disability benefits must prove that she is disabled. Moore v.
Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). To determine whether a claimant
is disabled, the ALJ conducts a five-step evaluation process, which includes the
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following considerations: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe
impairment or combination of impairments; (3) if so, whether the impairment
meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of
Impairments; (4) if not, based on an RFC assessment, whether the claimant can
perform any of her past work, even with the impairment; and (5) if not, whether
significant numbers of jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can
perform in light of the her RFC, age, education, and work experience. Winschel,
631 F.3d at 1178.
III.
Hunter contends that the ALJ made a “boilerplate” credibility finding and
failed to appreciate the objective evidence. The ALJ found that Hunter’s medical
impairments could reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged symptoms but
that Hunter was not fully credible regarding her symptoms, functional limitations,
or inability to engage in work activity on a consistent and sustained basis.
Where a claimant attempts to establish disability through her own testimony
of pain or other subjective symptoms, the “pain standard” applies. See Wilson v.
Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002); Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221,
1223 (11th Cir. 1991). The Commissioner must consider a claimant’s subjective
testimony if the claimant shows “evidence of an underlying medical condition, and
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either (1) objective medical evidence to confirm the severity of the alleged pain
arising from that condition, or (2) that the objectively determined medical
condition is of a severity that can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged
pain.” Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992). “The claimant’s
subjective testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the standard is
itself sufficient to support a finding of disability.” Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223. The
ALJ may discredit a claimant’s subjective testimony, but the ALJ must “articulate
explicit and adequate reasons for doing so.” Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225.
Here, the ALJ’s decision to discredit Hunter’s subjective testimony was
supported by substantial evidence. See Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 782. Far from
making a “boilerplate” credibility finding, the ALJ examined Hunter’s medical
records in detail and provided explicit and adequate reasons for discrediting
Hunter’s testimony. The ALJ found that Hunter’s mental-health treatment records
and evidence of her daily activities, such as regularly driving a car, failed to
support her testimony that she was unable to work due to diminished focus, panic
attacks, and emotional outburst. The ALJ also noted that no medical records
indicated that Hunter had received mental-health treatment during the alleged
period of disability. The ALJ likewise reviewed medical records of Hunter’s
physical impairments and found that the evidence failed to support her testimony
regarding the severity of her symptoms.
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Hunter contends that the ALJ failed to appreciate the objective evidence, but
the ALJ was not required to discuss every piece of evidence in her decision. See
id. The ALJ’s decision did not constitute an impermissible “broad rejection,” and
it was sufficient to show that the ALJ considered Hunter’s medical condition as a
whole and had a reasoned basis, supported by substantial evidence, for discrediting
Hunter’s subjective testimony. See id. Furthermore, the ALJ did not violate the
pain standard because, although the ALJ found that Hunter’s impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause to the alleged symptoms, the ALJ articulated
explicit and adequate reasons for discrediting Hunter’s subjective testimony, which
was critical to her claim. See Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225; Marbury, 957 F.2d at 839.
Next, Hunter argues that the ALJ erred in deciding to give the opinion of her
treating physician, Dr. Parmanand Gurnani, little weight. The ALJ must give the
opinion of a treating physician substantial or considerable weight unless good
cause is shown not to do so. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179. Good cause exists where
(1) the physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence, (2) the evidence
supported a contrary finding, or (3) the physician’s opinion was conclusory or
inconsistent with his or her own medical records. Id. “[T]he ALJ must state with
particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons
therefor.” Id. When the ALJ’s articulated reasons for assigning limited weight to
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a treating physician’s opinion are supported by substantial evidence, no reversible
error occurs. See Moore, 405 F.3d at 1212.
Here, the ALJ articulated reasons, supported by substantial evidence,
showing good cause to assign Dr. Gurnani’s 2012 evaluation little weight.
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179. The ALJ found that Dr. Gurnani’s statement lacked
supporting treatment records, that Hunter had not seen Dr. Gurnani for seven years
before the evaluation, and that the evaluation was inconsistent with other evidence
on the record. The record supports these findings. As a result, the ALJ articulated
good cause not to give Dr. Gurnani’s opinion substantial weight. See id.
Third, Hunter argues that the ALJ’s finding of no disability is not supported
by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to include all of Hunter’s
impairments when presenting a hypothetical question to the vocational expert. At
step 5 of the evaluation process, the ALJ must determine whether significant
numbers of jobs that the claimant can perform exist in the national economy. Id. at
1178. An ALJ may make this determination either by applying the Medical
Vocational Guidelines or by obtaining the testimony of a vocational expert. Id. at
1180. “In order for a vocational expert’s testimony to constitute substantial
evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question that comprises all of the
claimant’s impairments.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). But the ALJ is “not
required to include findings in the hypothetical that the ALJ had properly rejected
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as unsupported.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th
Cir. 2004).
Here, because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to give the
medical opinion of Dr. Gurnani little weight, the ALJ was not required to include
in the hypothetical Dr. Gurnani’s additional findings. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at
1180; Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1161. In addition, to the extent Hunter argues that the
ALJ failed to consider Hunter’s disc herniation of the cervical spine, we disagree,
as the ALJ found that it was a severe impairment and Hunter has not explained
how this impairment should have affected her RFC assessment. Overall, Hunter
has not shown that the ALJ’s hypothetical question failed to contain all relevant
limitations. See Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1161.
Finally, Hunter contends that her severe mental impairments, which she
asserts are permanent and have affected her since childhood, met Listing 12.08.
But because she did not raise this argument to the district court, we do not consider
it on appeal. See Stewart v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 115, 115
(11th Cir. 1994) (“As a general principle, this court will not address an argument
that has not been raised in the district court.”). In any case, the ALJ’s
determination that Hunter did not meet the “Paragraph B” criteria for Listings
12.04 and 12.06 likewise precludes Hunter from showing that she met Listing
12.08. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Listings 12.04, 12.06, & 12.08.
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Hunter asserts that the ALJ left out four of Hunter’s conditions when assessing
whether she met a listed impairment, but she does not explain what conditions
were overlooked, nor does our review of the ALJ’s decision support Hunter’s
assertion.
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision finding that
Hunter was not under a disability from the disability onset date through the date
last insured was supported by substantial evidence and was based on proper legal
standards. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
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