Clifton Bell v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority ( 2014 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-10864
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-01117-JEC
CLIFTON BELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
CHIEF WANDA DUNHAM,
Personally,
ASSISTANT CHIEF JOSEPH DORSEY,
Personally,
A, B, AND C, BEING THOSE PERSONS, FIRMS OR
ENTITIES PRESENTLY UNKNOWN TO PLAINTIFF,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(August 14, 2014)
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Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Clifton Bell appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for relief from
summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) and (4), and for sanctions under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. Bell argues that it was an abuse of discretion to find that Bell’s
former employer, Metro Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority’s (MARTA) failure to
maintain a particular memo (the “Memo”) in Bell’s personnel file, was not a
violation of law. Further, he argues that the summary judgment ruling was void
due to an erroneous application of the law. 1 Upon review of the record and
consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Bell resigned from his position with the MARTA police department after he
was charged with four rules violations pertaining to false or incomplete testimony
and unauthorized written communications. The charges were made at the
conclusion of an internal investigation concerning purchases made on a Best Buy
account that Bell had opened without the proper authority. As a result of the
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Bell raised several other issues, including whether the district court improperly declined
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims, and whether it abused its
discretion by “justifying and/or mitigating MARTA [sic] unlawful actions regarding MARTA’s
failure to maintain its files as required by Georgia law.” However, he failed to provide
substantive argument in support of these claims and, therefore, has abandoned them on appeal.
See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004). He also failed
to provide substantive argument in support of his claim that sanctions were warranted, so he has
also abandoned that issue on appeal. Id.
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investigation, Bell was given the option of resignation or termination. He chose to
resign.
Subsequently, Bell brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action raising due process
and constructive discharge claims against MARTA, MARTA Chief of Police
Wanda Dunham, and MARTA Assistant Chief of Police Joseph Dorsey
(collectively, “MARTA”). Although Bell tendered his resignation on March 5,
2007, he alleged that he was actually terminated, unbeknownst to him, on March 2,
2007, without being given a name-clearing hearing.
Following discovery, the Defendants filed a joint motion for summary
judgment. In support, they attached, among other things, excerpts from Dunham’s
deposition, in which she explained that she drafted Bell’s termination letter in
anticipation of the March 5, 2007 meeting, and she displayed the letter to Bell at
that March 5th meeting when she gave him the choice between resignation and
termination. MARTA also attached an excerpt of MARTA’s General Order 26-
103, which provided that terminated employees who are state certified have a right
to a name-clearing hearing scheduled within five days of termination.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of MARTA, finding
that Bell’s claims were untimely. Bell appealed, and we affirmed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment. Bell Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 521
F. App’x 862 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). Bell then filed a motion for relief
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from the district court’s summary judgment order and for sanctions under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(3) and (4) and Rule 37, respectively.
The basis for Bell’s motion was the Memo, a document he obtained in April
2013 through an Open Records Act request to the Georgia Peace Officer Standards
and Training Council. The Memo was authored by Sergeant S. Reynolds, Internal
Affairs Commander of the MARTA police department. The Memo indicated that
Bell was terminated on March 2, 2007 for rules violations related to “false
testimony” and “written communications.” Bell asserted that the Memo was
fraudulently withheld by MARTA during discovery in his § 1983 case. According
to Bell, the Memo raised a question of fact as to whether he was terminated or
resigned, and thus was a factual issue for a jury to decide. He contended that the
Memo also called into question all the district court’s findings underlying its
decision to grant MARTA’s motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, Bell
contended, the statute of limitations could not have begun to run until he
discovered the Memo in April 2013. Finally, he argued that the court should issue
sanctions because the Memo, which MARTA concealed, destroyed, and
intentionally withheld from the court, was critical to his prima facie showing of the
merits of his complaint.
The district court denied Bell’s motion. He timely appealed. Now on
appeal, Bell argues that the Memo was material because it contradicted MARTA’s
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assertion that Bell was not terminated, but that he chose to resign. Thus, MARTA
violated his substantive and procedural due process rights by terminating him
without providing a name-clearing hearing. MARTA’s withholding of the Memo
affected the district court’s conclusion about Bell’s separation status and the
calculation of the statute of limitations. He contends that he was prevented from
an opportunity to clearly and properly present his case.
DISCUSSION
We typically review a district court’s order under Rule 60(b) for abuse of
discretion. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Northwestern Nat’l Ins. Co., 198
F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999). However, we review de novo a district court’s
ruling on a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside a judgment as void, because the
question of the validity of a judgment is a legal one. Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d
1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2001).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) states: “On motion and just terms, the
court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (3) fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void . . .”. Fed. R. Civ. P.
60. However, “[a]n appeal of a ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion . . . is narrow in
scope, addressing only the propriety of the denial or grant of relief and does not
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raise issues in the underlying judgment for review.” Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 198
F.3d at 1338.
To prevail on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, the movant must prove by “clear and
convincing evidence that an adverse party has obtained the [judgment] through
fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct.” Frederick v. Kirby Tankships, Inc.,
205 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2000). Additionally, the moving party must show
that the opposing party’s conduct prevented him from “fully and fairly presenting
his case.” Id.
Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment
or order that is void. Burke, 252 F.3d at 1263. “Generally, a judgment is void
under Rule 60(b)(4) if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction, . . . if it acted in
a manner inconsistent with due process of law[, or] if the rendering court was
powerless to enter it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In a Rule 60(b) motion, “[t]he losing party must do more than show that a
grant of [the] motion might have been warranted; he must demonstrate a
justification for relief so compelling that the district court was required to grant
[the] motion.” Maradiaga v. United States, 679 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court here did not abuse its discretion by denying Bell relief
under Rule 60(b)(3). Bell did not produce clear and convincing evidence of fraud
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or misconduct by the defendants sufficient to support relief under Rule 60(b)(3).
Frederick, 205 F.3d at 1287. The court accepted MARTA’s explanation for why
the Memo was not produced in discovery—it was not placed or maintained in
Bell’s personnel file because it did not accurately reflect the fact that Bell resigned
in lieu of termination—and there was no evidence to suggest otherwise.
Further, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the Memo
did not affect its substantive rulings or its statute of limitations ruling. Although
Bell discovered the Memo in April 2013, he was aware of all the facts which
would support a cause of action when MARTA responded to his initial Open
Records Act request in January 2008, but he did not file the underlying § 1983
action until April 2010, outside of the limitations period. Therefore, the memo did
not affect the district court’s statute of limitations ruling, which we previously
affirmed. See Bell, 521 Fed App’x at 865. Bell certainly did not provide
justification for relief so compelling that the district court was required to grant the
motion. Maradiaga, 679 F.3d at 1291. Moreover, he did not show that MARTA’s
failure to produce the Memo in discovery prevented him from fully and fairly
presenting his case. Frederick, 205 F.3d at 1287. He enjoyed a full opportunity to
litigate the issue of whether he was terminated or resigned, and the discovery of the
Memo did not change the basic facts underlying the complaint, including his
admission that he resigned from his position in lieu of being terminated.
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Furthermore, the district court did not err by denying relief under Rule
60(b)(4), as Bell identified no jurisdictional or other defect that would render the
judgment void, nor did he show that the district court acted in a manner
inconsistent with due process of law. Burke, 252 F.3d at 1263.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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