Marva Watkins v. Kid One Transport ( 2013 )

Case: 12-14391 Date Filed: 02/28/2013 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-14391
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-00126-MEF-CSC
MARVA WATKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KID ONE TRANSPORT,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
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(February 28, 2013)
Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 12-14391 Date Filed: 02/28/2013 Page: 2 of 4
Marva Watkins, proceeding pro se, appeals the summary judgment entered
by the District Court in favor of favor of Kid One Transport System, Inc. (“Kid
One”) on her claims of race and gender discrimination brought under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a).
In her complaint, Watkins alleged that Kid One deprived her of vacation pay, paid
her lower wages than other employees, and terminated her employment illegally on
the basis of her race (black) and sex (female). Kid One, in moving for summary
judgment, asserted that Watkins was terminated from her position as a driver
because its insurance carrier cancelled her coverage; that she was not deprived of
her vacation pay or paid lower wages based on her race; and that she had failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies regarding her claim of gender discrimination.
The District Court granted Kid One’s motion, concluding that Watkins failed to
establish a prima facie case of race discrimination and failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies as to her gender discrimination claim. Watkins appeals
the court’s judgment.
Watkins’s brief does not address the District Court’s order granting
summary judgment—the order under review. Accordingly, her appeal is
presumptively abandoned. Because she is proceeding pro se, however, we do
consider whether summary judgment was appropriate.
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Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of her race or gender. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To bring suit under
Title VII, a plaintiff must first exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a
timely discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”). Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th
Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). Watkins’s EEOC filing failed to
charge gender discrimination; in fact, it asserted no facts revealing such
discrimination. The District Court therefore did not err in rejecting that claim. We
consider, instead, the claim of race discrimination.
Watkins attempted to prove her claim of race discrimination by
circumstantial evidence, and thus invoked the burden-of-proof model established
by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817,
1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289
(11th Cir. 2003). Her first step was to show that she was: (1) a member of the
protected class; (2) qualified for her current position; (3) subject to an adverse
employment action; and (4) replaced by someone outside the protected group or
treated less favorably than any similarly situated employee outside her protected
group. Maynard, 342 F.3d at 1289. If she completed that step, Kid One had the
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obligation of coming forth with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
employment decision. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03, 93 S.Ct. at
1824. If it did that, Watkins had to show that the reason was pretextual. Id. at 804,
93 S.Ct. at 1825.
Kid One was entitled to summary judgment on Watkins’s claim of race
discrimination,1 because the undisputed evidence does not support the inference
that Kid One treated non-black employees more favorably than it treated Watkins,
who is black. The record contains no evidence of any person, regardless of race,
who was allowed to remain employed as a driver with Kid One after the insurer
cancelled the driver’s coverage. Further, there is no evidence that non-black
employees were paid higher wages or paid for unused vacation leave after being
terminated from employment with Kid One.
AFFIRMED.
1
Watkins satisfied the first and third McDonnell Douglas Corp. steps, but, according to the
evidence, not the second or third. And she did not establish as pretext the company’s non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision.
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