Case: 13-12172 Date Filed: 01/09/2014 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-12172
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:11-cr-00101-JA-KRS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHAD WARNER,
a.k.a. Ace,
a.k.a. Aceito,
a.k.a. Alex Rodriguez,
a.k.a. Willy Sosa,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(January 9, 2014)
Case: 13-12172 Date Filed: 01/09/2014 Page: 2 of 3
Before HULL, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Chad Warner appeals pro se the denial of a motion by the government to
reduce his sentence based on his substantial assistance. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b).
Warner argues that the district court violated his right to due process under the
Fifth Amendment; considered allegedly improper sentencing factors; and should
have exercised its discretion to reduce his sentence based on his substantial
assistance. We affirm.
Warner argues that the district court violated his right to due process by
considering his codefendant’s statements that he was violent without giving him
notice or an opportunity to respond, but Warner was given an opportunity to
respond to the statements considered by the district court. When confronted with
his codefendants’ statements during the hearing on his motion to reconsider,
Warner responded that the codefendants had “embellish[ed]” their stories. Warner
did not request a continuance to rebut his codefendants’ statements and, although
the district court said it would not rule on Warner’s motion to reconsider for a
couple of weeks, Warner did not file a supplemental pleading refuting the
statements.
Warner argues that the court erroneously relied on improper sentencing
factors in denying the motion to reduce, but “[n]othing in the text of the rule
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purports to limit what factors may militate against granting a Rule 35(b)
reduction.” United States v. Manella,
86 F.3d 201, 204 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis
omitted). Although Warner argues that the district court based its decision on his
education and socioeconomic status, the district court did not mention those factors
in its order denying the motion. The district court was entitled to consider the
statutory sentencing factors in making its decision,
id. at 204–05, and the district
court based its decision on the nature and circumstances of Warner’s offense, his
“history and characteristics,” and “the need for [his] sentence to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide punishment and
deterrence, and protect the public.” We cannot reweigh those factors.
Warner challenges the refusal of the district court to reduce his sentence, but
we will not review that discretionary decision. The denial of a motion to reduce is
an “otherwise final sentence” that can be reviewed only in four enumerated
circumstances: if it is “imposed in violation of law”; involved “an incorrect
application of the sentencing guidelines”; exceeds the “applicable guideline
range”; or is “imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline
and is plainly unreasonable.”
18 U.S.C. § 3742. Warner does not mention any of
these exceptions in his brief.
We AFFIRM the denial of Warner’s motion to reduce his sentence.
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