Case: 12-10956 Date Filed: 07/24/2012 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-10956
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-01769-CAP
GREGORY C. KAPORDELIS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
EDWARD CARNES,
GERALD B. TJOFLAT,
J.L. EDMONDSON,
STANLEY F. BIRCH, JR.,
JOSEPH M. HOOD,llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(July 24, 2012)
Before BARKETT, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Case: 12-10956 Date Filed: 07/24/2012 Page: 2 of 4
PER CURIAM:
Gregory Kapordelis, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s dismissal of his Bivens action brought against five defendants, all appellate
judges, as frivolous on absolute immunity grounds. On appeal, Kapordelis argues
that the district court erred by: (1) extending judicial immunity to his suit seeking
only declaratory relief; and (2) failing, upon his motion, to recuse the district and
magistrate judges from considering the case. After review, we affirm.
I.
We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for frivolity
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for abuse of discretion. Bingham v. Thomas,
654 F.3d
1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). A claim is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.”
Id. We will not disturb a district court’s decision on
abuse of discretion review if its decision falls within a range of permissible
choices, and it is not influenced by a mistake of law. Zocaras v. Castro,
465 F.3d
479, 483 (11th Cir. 2006).
Here, Kapordelis has alleged that two separate appellate panels abused
judicial process in deciding his appeals. The first panel affirmed his criminal
convictions for child pornography. He argues that the panel denied him due
process when it declined to consider key facts. He also alleges that the panel was
2
Case: 12-10956 Date Filed: 07/24/2012 Page: 3 of 4
motivated by a desire to protect the U.S. Attorney’s Office. The second panel
decided his appeal from a dismissal of a separate Bivens action.
This Court has indicated that, in a Bivens action, a federal judge retains
absolute immunity against injunctive relief, and § 1983 “limit[s] the relief
available to plaintiffs to declaratory relief.” Bolin v. Story,
225 F.3d 1234,
1241-42 (11th Cir. 2000). We need not reach this issue, however, because
Kapordelis is not entitled to declaratory relief, as he possesses an adequate remedy
at law: Kapordelis may pursue Supreme Court review of the challenged decisions.
See Bolin,
225 F.3d at 1242-43 (“plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief
[when] there is an adequate remedy at law”). Furthermore, Kapordelis’s
conclusory allegations of bias against the circuit judges and visiting district judge
who heard his prior appeals are insufficient to make out a constitutional violation.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kapordelis’s
Bivens claim as frivolous.
II.
We review a judge’s failure to recuse himself for an abuse of discretion.
McWhorter v. City of Birmingham,
906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990). When
reviewing a failure to recuse under
28 U.S.C. § 455(a), the test is whether an
“objective, disinterested, lay observer . . . would entertain a significant doubt about
3
Case: 12-10956 Date Filed: 07/24/2012 Page: 4 of 4
the judge’s impartiality.” McWhorter,
906 F.2d at 678 (quotation omitted). A
judge’s rulings in the same or a related case generally may not serve as the basis
for recusal, absent a showing of “pervasive bias and prejudice.” McWhorter,
906
F.2d at 678.
Here, pervasive bias has not been shown. Kapordelis’s arguments that
recusal was required are based solely on decisions rendered in a previous case.
Further, his allegations of prejudice are wholly conclusory. The conclusory
allegations fail to meet the objective standards for recusal under either
28 U.S.C.
§ 144 or § 455(a). McWhorter,
906 F.2d at 678. It was therefore not an abuse
of discretion for the district court to deny the recusal motion.
AFFIRMED.
4
