Edmond Cenolli v. U.S. Attorney General , 208 F. App'x 718 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                           [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    NOVEMBER 29, 2006
    No. 06-12366                      THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                     CLERK
    ________________________
    BIA No. A79-433-272
    EDMOND CENOLLI,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    _________________________
    (November 29, 2006)
    Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Edmond Cenolli, a native and citizen of Albania, petitions for review of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal,
    and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
    Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”). Cenolli challenges the
    BIA’s denial of his claims and also argues that he was denied a fair review of his
    appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision. For the reasons set forth
    more fully below, we deny the petition.
    Cenolli, a member of the opposition democratic party, alleged persecution
    by the police and members of the socialist party on account of political opinion.
    Cenolli testified that the only problem he had in Albania occurred during the June
    24, 2001 election. He explained that, during the election, he was an observer for
    the democratic party and, while waiting in line to vote, a socialist party member
    approached him and tried to convince him to change his vote. When he refused,
    the socialist party member called two members of the police, who hit and kicked
    him. Cenolli left Albania the next day.
    In addition to this incident, Cenolli testified that his father, a party member
    and local spokesman, was arrested three times by the police and socialist party
    supporters because of his support for the democratic party. On October 19, 1998,
    his father was detained for a week, mistreated, and not fed. In June 1999, he was
    detained for four days. In September 2001, he was detained for over a week.
    2
    The IJ denied asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief and ordered
    Cenolli removed to Albania and the BIA dismissed Cenolli’s appeal. The BIA
    found that the Cenolli’s encounter during the election did not amount to past
    persecution because he reported no significant injuries or the need for medical
    treatment, and was not subject to any harm or threats apart from this incident. The
    BIA further found that neither this incident, Cenolli’s father’s arrests, nor evidence
    of continuing human rights problems in Albania established a well-founded fear of
    persecution. The BIA also found that Cenolli did not meet his burden to establish
    eligibility under the CAT because he did not establish that he would more likely
    than not be tortured upon his return.
    Cenolli argues that, based on his beating at the election, his father’s arrests,
    and evidence of country conditions in Albania, the BIA erred in finding that he
    failed to establish past persecution, a well-founded fear of persecution, and
    eligibility for withholding of removal. He also argues that the BIA erroneously
    concluded that one incident alone does not establish past persecution. As to his
    CAT claim, Cenolli argues that the BIA erred by not independently reviewing his
    claim, as it failed to engage in a separate analysis of his testimony and evidence as
    to this claim.
    Because the BIA did not expressly adopt the IJ’s opinion and made its own
    findings, we review the BIA’s decision. See Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 
    257 F.3d 1262
    ,
    3
    1284 (11th Cir. 2001). We review factual determinations using the substantial
    evidence test. Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    401 F.3d 1282
    , 1286 (11th Cir. 2005).
    We will affirm if the decision “is supported by reasonable, substantial, and
    probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” 
    Id.
     (citation and
    quotation marks omitted). We review the record evidence in the light most
    favorable to the agency’s decision and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
    that decision. 
    Id.
     To conclude that the BIA should be reversed, we “must find that
    the record not only supports that conclusion, but compels it.” Fahim v. U.S. Att’y
    Gen., 
    278 F.3d 1216
    , 1218 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
    “[T]he mere fact that the record may support a contrary conclusion is not enough to
    justify a reversal of the administrative findings.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 
    386 F.3d 1022
    , 1027 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 
    544 U.S. 1035
     (2005). Legal
    and constitutional challenges are reviewed de novo. Lonyem v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
    
    352 F.3d 1338
    , 1341 (11th Cir. 2003); (constitutional challenges); Mohammed v.
    Ashcroft, 
    261 F.3d 1244
    , 1247-48 (11th Cir. 2001) (legal challenges).
    The Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security has discretion
    to grant asylum if an alien meets the INA’s definition of a “refugee.” See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(A), INA § 208(b)(1)(A). The asylum applicant carries the burden of
    proving statutory “refugee” status. Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1284. In order to carry
    this burden, the applicant must, with specific and credible evidence, establish
    4
    (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily listed factor, or (2) a “well-founded
    fear” that the statutorily listed factor will cause future persecution. 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.13
    (a), (b); Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    440 F.3d 1247
    , 1257 (11th Cir. 2006).
    Persecution is “an ‘extreme concept,’ requiring ‘more than a few isolated incidents
    of verbal harassment or intimidation,’ and . . . ‘[m]ere harassment does not amount
    to persecution.’” Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    401 F.3d 1226
    , 1231 (11th Cir.
    2005) (citing Gonzalez v. Reno, 
    212 F.3d 1338
    , 1355 (11th Cir. 2000)).
    Furthermore, “[n]ot all exceptional treatment is persecution.” Gonzalez, 212 F.3d
    at 1355.
    In the absence of past persecution, “the petitioner must demonstrate a
    well-founded fear of future persecution that is both subjectively genuine and
    objectively reasonable.” Ruiz, 
    440 F.3d at 1257
    . “The subjective component can
    be proved ‘by the applicant’s credible testimony that he or she genuinely fears
    persecution,’ while the objective component ‘can be fulfilled either by establishing
    past persecution or that he or she has a good reason to fear future persecution.’” 
    Id.
    (citation omitted). The applicant must present “specific, detailed facts showing a
    good reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for persecution on account of”
    a protected ground. Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1287 (quotation marks and citation
    omitted). An applicant who fails to establish eligibility for asylum on the merits
    necessarily fails to establish eligibility for withholding of removal or CAT relief.
    5
    Forgue, 
    401 F.3d at
    1288 n.4.
    As to past persecution, the BIA did not rely on the proposition that a single
    incident could not amount to persecution, but reasoned that this particular incident
    did not result in significant injuries or the need for medical treatment and that,
    aside from this incident, Cenolli had no other problems. This finding is supported
    by substantial evidence. Cenolli’s only problem was the incident during the
    election. Cenolli was not the only person asked to vote for the socialists; he
    testified that the person who approached him also approached “many other people”
    about changing their votes.
    Cenolli testified that he was beaten by the police after his refusal. At some
    unspecified point, eight democratic party members came to his aid. As a result of
    the altercation, he received a cut lip and “different marks on [his] body” that were
    no longer visible. Cenolli did not require any medical treatment or go to a doctor
    as a result of his injuries. Based on this evidence, we cannot conclude that the
    record compels the conclusion that this single beating rose to the level of
    persecution. See, e.g, Tawm v. Ashcroft, 
    363 F.3d 740
    , 742-43 (8th Cir. 2004)
    (finding no persecution where the petitioner was detained and beaten “lightly” in
    1994 and detained and beaten in 1998, after which he received an ointment for
    swelling and recovered fully within a week); Dandan v. Ashcroft, 
    339 F.3d 567
    ,
    573-74 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the record did not compel a finding of
    6
    persecution where petitioner was detained for three days during which time he was
    beaten, resulting in a “swollen” face).
    The BIA’s finding that Cenolli did not have a well-founded fear of
    persecution based on either his or his father’s support for the democratic party is
    also supported by substantial evidence. Cenolli became involved with the
    democratic party in 1996, but did not have any problems due to his party
    membership until the June 24, 2001 elections. Although Cenolli’s father was
    arrested two times while Cenolli was still living in Albania, there is no evidence
    that he had any problems due to these arrests or his father’s political activity.
    Cenolli’s only problem occurred within the context of election violence. Cenolli
    described a situation where a socialist party member was asking many people to
    vote for his party; Cenolli was not specifically sought out for this purpose. The
    record does not compel the conclusion that the police or socialist party supporters
    would still be interested in Cenolli as a result of this incident and, given that
    Cenolli had no other problems due to his or his father’s political activity or his
    father’s arrests, the last of which occurred almost three years before Cenolli’s
    hearing before the IJ, the record likewise does not compel the finding that his fear
    of being singled out for persecution on these grounds is objectively reasonable. Cf.
    Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231-32 (finding that the record did not compel conclusion
    that petitioner had a well-founded fear of being singled out for persecution
    7
    because, although she exercised leadership in the nonviolence movement, the
    evidence did not indicate that her notoriety as an activist would outlast her four-
    year absence from Colombia).
    While the background reports document abuses by the police and, despite
    some improvements, report continued serious problems with the government’s
    human rights record, they do not compel a finding that Cenolli has an objectively
    reasonable well-founded fear of being singled out for persecution on account of his
    political opinion. There were no political killings or confirmed cases of strictly
    political detention in 2003. As of the 2001 Profile, all political parties were active
    in most of the country without a pattern of mistreatment. Furthermore, the October
    2003 elections were an improvement over previous elections, with only a few
    isolated incidents of irregularities and violence, and campaigns were generally
    calm and conducted without the heated rhetoric that characterized past campaigns.
    While Cenolli may subjectively fear returning to Albania, substantial evidence
    supports the finding that Cenolli’s fear of being singled out for persecution on
    account of his or his father’s political opinion is not objectively reasonable.
    Because Cenolli failed to establish eligibility for asylum on the merits, he
    also failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal and relief under the
    8
    CAT.1 Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1288 n.4.
    In addition to challenging the merits of the BIA’s decision, Cenolli argues
    that he did not receive a fair review of his appeal by the BIA because the BIA
    failed to consider the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) failure to file a
    reply brief. He reasons that, because DHS’s failure to file a reply brief waived any
    objections to the issues he raised in his appeal, the BIA should have considered
    DHS’s failure to file a brief as non-opposition to these issues.
    We disagree. The regulations do not require DHS to file a reply brief on
    appeal to the BIA. 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.38
    (f) (“Briefs may be filed by both parties[.]”)
    (emphasis added). Moreover, subject to the standards governing its determination
    of cases, the BIA is instructed to resolve cases based on its independent judgment
    and discretion. 
    Id.
     § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii). Nor did the BIA violate Cenolli’s due
    process rights, as he was afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard.
    Sebastian-Soler v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    409 F.3d 1280
    , 1287 n.14 (11th Cir. 2005),
    cert. denied, 
    126 S.Ct. 1662
     (2006).
    1
    We find the BIA’s analysis of Cenolli’s CAT claim sufficient and, thus, do not remand
    for additional findings. Not only does the failure to establish asylum on the merits necessarily
    result in a failure to establish eligibility for CAT relief, Forgue, 
    401 F.3d at
    1288 n.4, but
    Cenolli based his CAT claim on the same arguments and evidence as his asylum claim and we
    have found a similar finding sufficient to permit review. See Huang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    429 F.3d 1002
    , 1007 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that BIA’s finding that, “[e]ven accepting the respondent’s
    claim as credible, she still would not meet her burdens of proof for asylum, withholding of
    removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture[,]” was sufficient to permit
    review).
    9
    In light of the foregoing, the petition for review is
    DENIED.
    10