Gracita Chang v. Carnival Corporation ( 2016 )


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  •             Case: 14-13228    Date Filed: 10/06/2016   Page: 1 of 10
    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 14-13228
    Non-argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-20822-UU
    GRACITA CHANG,
    Plaintiff–Appellant,
    versus
    CARNIVAL CORPORATION,
    a Panama Corp. d.b.a. Carnival
    Cruise Lines,
    Defendant–Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (October 6, 2016)
    Before HULL, MARCUS, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 14-13228      Date Filed: 10/06/2016    Page: 2 of 10
    This action involves a single maritime negligence claim. Plaintiff Gracita
    Chang alleged that she slipped and fell on Defendant Carnival Corporation’s cruise
    ship. More than a year after the incident, Plaintiff filed suit in federal court.
    Defendant moved for summary judgment based on the one-year limitation period
    for filing such suits set out in Plaintiff’s cruise ticket. Plaintiff acknowledged that
    she missed this deadline, but argues that this limitation period should be extended
    based on the doctrine of equitable tolling. The district court rejected this argument
    and agreed with Defendant that Plaintiff had untimely filed suit. The court entered
    judgment for Defendant. Plaintiff now appeals that order. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    For purposes of this appeal, the undisputed facts of this action are as follows.
    On December 9, 2012, while aboard Defendant’s cruise ship, Plaintiff slipped and
    fell. Plaintiff’s cruise ticket contains several restrictions governing Plaintiff’s right
    to sue Defendant. Most importantly, the ticket contains a time limitation within
    which to file suit and a forum-selection clause. The time-limitation provision
    disallows a suit filed more than one year after the date of the injury. The forum-
    selection clause requires Plaintiff to file suit in federal court—and specifically in
    the Southern District of Florida—so long as there is subject matter jurisdiction in
    federal court over Plaintiff’s claim. Only if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking in
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    federal court may Plaintiff file suit in state court, and then suit can be filed only in
    a court located in Miami-Dade County, Florida.1
    Plaintiff retained a California attorney to litigate her slip-and-fall claim
    against Defendant. Aware of the impending litigation, Defendant twice informed
    Plaintiff’s attorney (both on September 4, 2013, and on October 22, 2013) that it
    would not waive its rights under the forum-selection clause. 2 Less than a month
    later, on November 20, 2013, Plaintiff substituted Florida counsel for her
    California counsel. Then, on December 4 or 6, 2013—just a few days before
    expiration of the one-year deadline—Plaintiff filed her slip-and-fall claim in a
    Florida state court, not federal court, as she was required to do.
    On January 28, 2014, Defendant moved to dismiss the state-court action,
    asserting Plaintiff’s violation of the forum-selection clause. While this motion to
    dismiss was pending in state court, Plaintiff switched gears, and on March 4, 2014,
    1
    The ticket’s one-year limitation states, “Suit to recover on any [personal injury] claim shall not
    be maintainable unless filed within one year after the date of the injury . . . .” The ticket’s
    forum-selection clause states that any personal injury action must “be litigated, if at all, before
    the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Miami, or as to those
    lawsuits to which the Federal Courts of the United States lack subject matter jurisdiction, before
    a court located in Miami-Dade County, Florida, U.S.A. to the exclusion of the Courts of any
    other county, state or country.”
    2
    Both communications stated:
    All rights in equity, law, and those contained within the guest cruise ticket
    contract are expressly reserved, including the forum selection / venue provision
    requiring all passenger lawsuits against [Defendant] to be filed in the United
    States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Miami, Florida.
    [Defendant] will not waive its contractual defense if a lawsuit is filed in the wrong
    court. (Emphasis added).
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    before the state court resolved Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff filed this parallel
    federal action. The federal action, however, was filed almost three months after
    the one-year limitations period had elapsed.
    Defendant moved for summary judgment in federal court based on
    Plaintiff’s failure to file suit within the time limitation set out on the cruise ticket.
    Plaintiff agreed that the one-year limitation binds her, but argued that, by filing the
    state court action within a year of her injury, the limitation period had been
    equitably tolled. The district court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to justify any
    equitable tolling and therefore had run afoul of the limitation period. The court
    entered summary judgment for Defendant. Plaintiff appeals that ruling.
    DISCUSSION
    Plaintiff agrees that the one-year limitation binds her and that more than a
    year elapsed between her injury and the filing of this action.3 Nonetheless,
    Plaintiff argues that she should be deemed to have satisfied the one-year limitation
    because she filed suit in state court within a year and that filing equitably tolled the
    limitation. Defendant responds that Plaintiff’s filing of the state-court action failed
    to equitably toll the limitation because Plaintiff’s ticket contained a clause
    requiring the selection of a federal forum so long as there was federal jurisdiction;
    3
    The one-year limitation arises from a contract, not a statute, but that makes no difference here.
    Bailey v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 
    774 F.2d 1577
    , 1579 n.3 (11th Cir. 1985) (“There is ‘no
    essential difference between contractu[]al and statutory limitations.’”).
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    there clearly was federal jurisdiction over the claim; and Defendant had made clear
    to Plaintiff that it would insist on her compliance with the forum-selection clause.
    We agree. 4
    As to Plaintiff’s effort to excuse her untimely filing by invoking equitable
    tolling, “[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that tolling is an extraordinary
    remedy which should be extended only sparingly.” Justice v. United States, 
    6 F.3d 1474
    , 1479 (11th Cir. 1993). To be in a position to advance a tolling argument,
    due diligence is a necessary, though not sufficient, prerequisite that a plaintiff must
    satisfy. 
    Id. Further, a
    late filing based on “garden-variety” negligence is not
    sufficient to warrant tolling. 
    Id. at 1480.
    In addition, the interests of justice on
    which a tardy plaintiff relies do not support a plaintiff who has “not file[d] her
    action in a timely fashion despite knowing or being in a position reasonably to
    know that the limitations period is running.” 
    Id. at 1479.
    Finally, it is the
    plaintiff’s burden to show that equitable tolling is warranted. 
    Id. 4 The
    parties agree that “the question of whether equitable tolling applies is a legal one subject
    to de novo review.” Booth v. Carnival Corp., 
    522 F.3d 1148
    , 1149 (11th Cir. 2008). Our
    opinions on the standard of review however, are inconsistent. See, e.g., Arce v. Garcia, 
    434 F.3d 1254
    , 1260 (11th Cir. 2006) (reviewing the district court’s application of equitable tolling for an
    abuse of discretion). However, our earliest opinions on the issue engaged in de novo review.
    See, e.g., Bailey v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 
    774 F.2d 1577
    , 1578 (11th Cir. 1985). We must
    follow those opinions. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 
    323 F.3d 920
    , 929 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen
    circuit authority is in conflict, a panel should look to the line of authority containing the earliest
    case.”). In any event, a more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard would produce the same
    result in this appeal.
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    Notwithstanding the above, we have on, at least one occasion, found
    equitable tolling where a plaintiff subject to a forum-selection clause filed a federal
    suit late, having earlier filed, in the wrong forum, a timely state court action. In
    Booth v. Carnival Corporation, 
    522 F.3d 1148
    (11th Cir. 2008), a cruise passenger
    who was subject to the same forum selection clause present here timely filed his
    negligence action in state court (sixteen days prior to expiration of the limitations
    period) before later filing an action in the federal court dictated by the forum-
    selection clause; the federal action was filed past the one-year deadline. 
    Id. at 1149–50.
    The district court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. 
    Booth, 522 F.3d at 1149
    . We affirmed that court’s ruling, finding applicable equitable tolling on
    the particular facts before us. 
    Id. at 1150–53.
    In doing so, we focused on a
    combination of four factors. First, the “state court . . . possessed subject matter
    jurisdiction concurrently with the federal courts.” 
    Id. at 1153.
    Second, “the state
    suit was dismissed solely on grounds of improper venue.” 
    Id. Third, the
    defendant
    was aware prior to expiration of the limitation period that the plaintiff intended to
    file suit. 
    Id. Fourth, the
    plaintiff “was entitled to believe that his state filing might
    be sufficient given the fact that defendants can, and often do, waive their defense
    of improper venue.” 
    Id. 6 Case:
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    From all of the above, Booth concluded that the plaintiff had prosecuted his
    claim with the diligence necessary to warrant consideration of an equitable tolling
    claim and therefore the limitations period was properly tolled from the date on
    which he filed his state-court action. Id.at 1158. Although the parties seemingly
    agree that the first three factors identified above are present here, clearly the fourth
    factor is not. That is, prior to expiration of the limitations period, Defendant twice
    notified Plaintiff of its insistence that Plaintiff adhere to the forum-selection
    clause—that is, that Plaintiff file suit in the federal district court in the Southern
    District of Florida. Instead of complying with a provision of the contract that
    Defendant had explicitly and timely brought to Plaintiff’s attention, Plaintiff
    instead chose to file her suit in the wrong forum. This was not the conduct of the
    plaintiff in Booth. And, unlike in Booth, Plaintiff here could have been under no
    misapprehension that Defendant would decline to hold her feet to the fire.
    Specifically, before the district court, Defendant submitted an affidavit from
    its Senior Claims Representative, who averred (1) that “[o]n September 4, 2013,
    [he] drafted and mailed” the first communication to Plaintiff’s California attorney
    and (2) that “[o]n October 22, 2013, [he] drafted, telefaxed and mailed” the second,
    similar communication to Plaintiff’s California attorney. Defendant attached to the
    affidavit both communications, which clearly explain that Defendant would not
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    Case: 14-13228         Date Filed: 10/06/2016       Page: 8 of 10
    waive its forum-selection defense. There is no evidence that the letters were not
    mailed to the proper address.
    In response to the above evidence, Plaintiff provided nothing other than
    unsupported assertions suggesting the possibility that her California attorney might
    have failed to receive the communications or might have failed to advise Plaintiff
    or her Florida counsel of Defendant’s warning. But such assertions are not
    evidence. Travaglio v. Am. Exp. Co., 
    735 F.3d 1266
    , 1270 (11th Cir. 2013)
    (“Statements by counsel in briefs are not evidence . . . .”). 5 Moreover, “the burden
    is on the plaintiff to show that equitable tolling is warranted.” 
    Booth, 522 F.3d at 1150
    . With no evidence in opposition to that presented by Defendant, Plaintiff
    clearly failed to shoulder her burden. See Pines v. Warnaco, Inc., 
    706 F.2d 1173
    ,
    1178 (11th Cir. 1983) (rejecting a plaintiff’s similar arguments 6); 10B Charles
    5
    Even those unsupported assertions fail to squarely state that Plaintiff’s California attorney did
    not timely relay Defendant’s communications. Nor is it clear that it would make a difference if
    Plaintiff had offered such evidence. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 
    498 U.S. 89
    , 92
    (1990) (“Under our system of representative litigation, ‘each party . . . is considered to have
    notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.’”).
    6
    Pines held that a one-year limitation barred the plaintiff’s fraud claim because the plaintiff
    should have known of the underlying fraud more than a year before he sued. The Pines plaintiff
    had argued against summary judgment by asserting that the limitation should begin later. The
    Pines court rejected that contention.
    Although [the plaintiff] argues that there was a factual dispute whether he should
    have discovered the fraud more than a year before filing suit, mere allegations
    cannot defeat summary judgment. And [the plaintiff] can point to no evidence
    supporting his allegation that he was prevented from obtaining information [about
    the 
    fraud]. 706 F.2d at 1178
    (citation omitted).
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    Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2734 (3d ed.
    2015) (“[W]hen a summary-judgment motion is based on the running of the
    applicable statute of limitations and defendant shows that the prescribed period has
    elapsed, plaintiff may be able to defeat summary judgment by introducing facts, by
    affidavits or other evidence, raising a genuine issue whether the statute should be
    suspended. . . . But the motion should not be denied on the mere chance that there
    might be facts that would toll the statute.”).
    Here, Plaintiff was specifically warned by Defendant that the latter intended
    to enforce the forum-selection clause, but Plaintiff chose to ignore that warning by
    filing suit in an incorrect forum, which decision directly led to the need to file suit
    late in the correct forum. If, on these facts, a plaintiff could circumvent the forum-
    selection clause, the forum-selection clause would lose much of its force, leading
    to the unnecessary expenditure of resources by courts and litigants. See Carnival
    Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 
    499 U.S. 585
    , 593–94 (1991) (“[A] clause establishing
    ex ante the forum for dispute resolution has the salutary effect of dispelling any
    confusion about where suits arising from the contract must be brought and
    defended, sparing litigants the time and expense of pretrial motions to determine
    the correct forum and conserving judicial resources that otherwise would be
    devoted to deciding those motions.”)
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    CONCLUSION
    After having been warned by Defendant that it intended to enforce the
    forum-selection clause, Plaintiff nonetheless sued Defendant in the wrong forum.
    Plaintiff finally sued Defendant in the correct forum, but did so after expiration of
    the limitations period. We find that equitable tolling does not apply under these
    circumstances. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
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