[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-11346 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JANUARY 12, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 3:08-cv-01005-MMH-TEM
CURTIS ANTONIO WAY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
GALANTE PHILLIPS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
versus
JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Sheriff,
GORDON BASS, Director of Corrections,
TARA WILDES, Chief at PTDF,
Defendants-Appellees,
G. M. CARLTON, Lieutenant, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(January 12, 2012)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Curtis A. Way, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of Jacksonville Pre-trial Detention Facility employees
John H. Rutherford, Gordon Bass, and Tara Wildes (“PTDF”) in his
42 U.S.C. § 1983
action alleging a violation of his constitutional right of access to the courts. The
district court granted PTDF’s motion to dismiss, construed as a motion for summary
judgment, after concluding that Way had failed to provide evidence that PTDF’s
actions caused him to suffer an actual injury in a direct criminal appeal, habeas
petition, or civil rights case. The court also ruled that even if Way had provided
evidence of an actual injury, PTDF’s actions were constitutional because they were
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
On appeal, Way argues that the district court improperly granted summary
judgment in favor of PTDF, because: (1) PTDF has delayed, denied, impeded, or
hindered his pursuit of numerous nonfrivolous cases; (2) the closure of the larger law
library and opening of a smaller, overcrowded law library was constitutionally
inadequate; (3) as a result of PTDF’s actions, he has suffered actual injury, such as
dismissals with prejudice; and (4) PTDF did not have a reasonably related or
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legitimate government interest in restricting physical access to the law library. After
thorough review, we affirm.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all
evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
Shiver v. Chertoff,
549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008). Under Rule 56, summary
judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). The moving party bears the burden of production, and if this burden is met,
“the nonmoving party must present evidence beyond the pleadings showing that a
reasonable jury could find in its favor.” Shiver,
549 F.3d at 1343 (quotation omitted).
Furthermore, a court must enter “summary judgment against a party who fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Id. at 1344
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
Prisoners have a clearly established constitutional right of access to the courts.
Barbour v. Haley,
471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006). This “right of access to the
courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of
meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817,
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828 (1977). However, an inmate alleging a violation of this right must show an
actual injury. Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 349-51 (1996). To show an actual
injury, the inmate must demonstrate that “the prison officials’ actions . . . frustrated
or impeded the inmate’s efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim.” Bass v.
Singletary,
143 F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998). Moreover, that legal claim “must
be an appeal from a conviction for which the inmate was incarcerated, a habeas
petition, or a civil rights action.”
Id. (citing Lewis,
518 U.S. at 352-57).
A plaintiff cannot state a claim by simply alleging systemic denial of access to
a law library or legal resources. Wilson v. Blankenship,
163 F.3d 1284, 1291 (11th
Cir. 1998). “At the summary judgment stage, general factual allegations of injury will
not suffice.” Barbour,
471 F.3d at 1225. Instead, the plaintiff must set forth by
affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which will be accepted as true for purposes
of the summary judgment motion.
Id.
Even if a prison regulation impinges on an inmate’s constitutional rights, it is
nevertheless “valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
Turner v. Safely,
482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). To determine whether a prison regulation
is reasonable, we analyze the following factors: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational
connection” between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest
put forth to justify the regulation; (2) whether, under the restriction imposed,
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prisoners have alternative means for exercising the asserted constitutional right; (3)
the impact that accommodating the asserted constitutional right will have on prison
staff, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether the regulation
in question is an “exaggerated response” to prison concerns.
Id. at 89-91.
In this case, the district court properly granted summary judgment because Way
made only general factual allegations, and failed to provide specific evidence, that
PTDF’s actions caused him an actual injury in a particular nonfrivolous criminal
appeal, habeas petition, or civil rights claim. But even assuming arguendo that Way
had alleged an actual injury, PTDF’s actions did not violate his right of access to the
courts because they were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
PTDF closed the law library after an inmate brutally raped an officer inside. All pro
se inmates had alternative means of accessing library materials during the temporary
closure, and once the law library reopened, all inmates could physically visit the
library and conduct research using print materials and newly acquired computer
resources. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that the temporary
restrictions on the law library were reasonably related to penological interests.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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