James E. King v. Secretary, US Department of the Army , 652 F. App'x 845 ( 2016 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-13001
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-00193-JRH-BKE
JAMES E. KING,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, US DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(June 15, 2016)
Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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James King appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of John M. McHugh, the Secretary of the Department of the Army (“the Army”).
King argues on appeal the Army’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
charging him with being absent without leave (“AWOL”) was a pretext for
retaliation against his protected conduct.1 He argues that he did not violate the
appropriate sick leave policies and that his supervisor retaliated against him by
charging him with being AWOL. Additionally, he argues that the district court
improperly found facts in favor of the Army during summary judgment.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Holloman
v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2006). “A party seeking
summary judgment must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., 232 F.3d 836, 840 (11th Cir.
2000) (quotations omitted). In deciding a summary judgment motion, a district
court’s function is not to resolve issues of material fact, but rather to determine
whether there are any such issues to be tried. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 251, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511-12, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Moreover, when
1
In addition to his AWOL-related retaliation claim, King also alleged additional claims of
reprisal, racial discrimination, and a hostile work environment, which the district court
dismissed. Because King is not challenging the district court’s dismissal of his other claims on
appeal, we consider these claims abandoned. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385
F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004).
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ruling on a motion for summary judgment, any inferences must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Welch v. Celotex Corp., 951
F.2d 1235, 1237 (11th Cir. 1992). Additionally, “a mere scintilla of evidence in
support of the nonmoving party will not suffice to overcome a motion for summary
judgment.” Young v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004).
Title VII forbids a private employer from retaliating against an employee
because he has opposed “an unlawful employment practice . . . or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). While § 2000e-16 does not
specifically mention retaliation, we have noted that the provision expanded
coverage of Title VII to federal employees to the same extent as non-federal
employees. Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th Cir.
1998).
When a plaintiff presents only circumstantial evidence of retaliation, we
analyze his claim under the framework announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824-26, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). If
the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, and the employer articulates a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action, then the plaintiff bears
the burden of showing that the reason offered was merely pretextual. Rojas v.
Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 2002). After the employer has met its
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burden, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the reason offered was
merely pretextual. Id. To establish pretext, a plaintiff must come forward and
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the reason given by the employer
was not the real reason for the adverse employment decision, but was a pretext for
discrimination. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.
Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981).
“[A] reason cannot be proved to be ‘a pretext for discrimination’ unless it is
shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.”
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752, 125 L.
Ed. 2d 407 (1993) (emphasis in original). We have stated that if “the proffered
reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, an employee must meet
that reason head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply
quarreling with the wisdom of that reason,” or showing that the decision was based
on erroneous facts. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir.
2000) (en banc). An employer’s deviation from its established policies may be
evidence of pretext. See Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d
1286, 1299 (11th Cir. 2006). Additionally, while the burden of causation may be
met by showing close temporal proximity between a plaintiff’s protected activity
and an adverse employment action, temporal proximity, alone, must be “very
close.” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007).
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However, while close temporal proximity between the protected action and adverse
employment action is evidence of pretext, it is not necessarily sufficient alone to
establish pretext. Hurlbert, 439 F.3d at 1298.
An asserted “work rule” violation may be pretextual if the plaintiff proffers
evidence that he did not actually violate the rule or, if he violated the rule, other
employees who committed similar violations were not similarly treated. Damon v.
Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, 196 F.3d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999).
Nevertheless, “[a]n employer who fires an employee under the mistaken but honest
impression that the employee violated a work rule is not liable for discriminatory
conduct.” Id. at 1363 n.3. Thus, when an employer violates its own policies, it
does not necessarily indicate that the employer’s given reason is pretextual.
Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Group, Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1350 (race
discrimination case). Thus, whether an employment decision was prudent or fair is
irrelevant. Rojas, 285 F.3d at 1342. Ultimately, a plaintiff must show that his
protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the
employer. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533–34, 186
L. Ed. 2d 503 (2013).
The district court did not err in concluding that King failed to establish that
the Army’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for charging him with being
AWOL was pretextual. Although King’s AWOL charges were in close temporal
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proximity to his protected conduct, the only other evidence tending to show falsity
was the disputed nature of the leave policy. While a failure to follow established
policies can be evidence of pretext, in this case, King did not present evidence
showing that his supervisor’s true reason for charging him with being AWOL was
retaliatory. See Damon, 196 F.3d at 1363. Even if King followed leave
procedures, he presented no evidence outside of the temporal proximity and poor
relationship he had with his supervisor to suggest that his supervisor intended to
retaliate against him for engaging in protected conduct. Because a scintilla of
evidence is not sufficient to survive summary judgment, the district court did not
err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Army. See Young, 358 F.3d at
860. Additionally, the district court did not improperly find facts in favor of the
Army because the district court reached its verdict under the assumption that King
followed proper leave procedures. Therefore, King did not show either pretext or
that retaliation was the but-for cause of Peloquin’s actions, and we affirm. See
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533–34.
AFFIRMED.
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