Townsend Powers v. Avondale Baptist Church , 393 F. App'x 656 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 19, 2010
No. 09-15278 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00363-CV-J-34MCR
TOWNSEND POWERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
AVONDALE BAPTIST CHURCH,
n.k.a. Grace Church of Avondale,
Defendant-Appellee,
Roger Stork, et. al.,
Rev.,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(August 19, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, CARNES and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Townsend Powers appeals pro se the entry of summary judgment for
Avondale Baptist Church, his former employer, on his racial discrimination and
hostile work environment claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Powers filed his complaint against the Church and several individually-
named defendants, alleging racial discrimination under Title VII, as well as
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and a provision of the
Jacksonville Municipal Code. The district court dismissed the ADA claim for lack
of exhaustion and dismissed all claims against the individually-named defendants.
The Church later moved for summary judgment, alleging that Powers could not
establish that it had the 15 or more employees necessary to qualify as an
“employer” under Title VII. The district court granted the Church’s motion on that
basis, and dismissed Powers’ Jacksonville Code claim after declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.
Powers appealed the district court’s entry of summary judgment.1 In his
brief, however, Powers does not mention or otherwise challenge the district court’s
conclusion that the Church was not an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII.
1
Based on Powers’ notice of appeal, we identify the Church as the sole appellee.
2
Instead, he appears to argue that he can receive punitive damages even though he is
ineligible for compensatory damages. In support, he cites a number of our prior
rulings on punitive damages, and specifies that he is proceeding under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b)(1), which permits a party to file a post-verdict motion for
judgment as a matter of law. The problem with Powers’ argument is that the
district court’s entry of summary judgment means that he is not entitled to any
damages—compensatory or punitive—for his Title VII claim.
“[P]ro se pleadings are held to a less strict standard than pleadings filed by
lawyers and thus are construed liberally.” Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252
(11th Cir. 2008). This liberal construction, however, “does not give a court license
to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient
pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla.,
132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Despite the liberal
pleading standard for pro se litigants, their failure to brief issues on appeal still
amounts to an abandonment of those issues. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870,
874 (11th Cir. 2008). Likewise, we will not consider arguments not presented to
the district court and raised for the first time on appeal. See Albra v. Advan, Inc.,
490 F.3d 826, 828 n.1 (11th Cir. 2007).
3
Powers did not even implicitly challenge the district court’s reason for
disposing of his Title VII claim against the Church in his brief to this Court.
Therefore, that ruling stands. Likewise, Powers has abandoned any potential
challenges to the district court’s disposition of his ADA claim, his Jacksonville
Code claim, and his claims against the individual defendants by failing to raise
them in his brief. The only issue that Powers did raise in his brief, his entitlement
to punitive damages, is meritless; he is not entitled to punitive damages because the
Church was not an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII.
AFFIRMED.
4