Richard Newkirk Wilder v. Sigma Nu Fraternity, Inc. , 390 F. App'x 910 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10996 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 3, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 7:06-cv-01774-RDP
RICHARD NEWKIRK WILDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SIGMA NU FRATERNITY, INC.,
THETA CHAPTER OF SIGMA NU,
SIGMA NU CHAPTER HOUSE CO., INC.,
KENNETH R. GIPSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(August 3, 2010)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, CARNES and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Richard Wilder appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
appellee organizations on his personal injury claims. An uninvited guest seriously
injured Wilder at a fraternity party, and Wilder sued the local, regional, and
national organizations alleging their negligent failure to protect him from the
injury. We conclude that the organization members owed Wilder no duty to
protect him from the criminal acts of third parties under Alabama law. As a result,
Wilder’s negligence, respondeat superior, negligent supervision, and wantonness
claims all fail. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Kenneth Gipson stabbed Wilder in the head following a Sigma Nu fraternity
party in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, causing Wilder serious injury. Wilder was a guest
attending the fraternity party. Gipson and Reginald Barnes, who were not invited
to the fraternity party, decided to enter the premises toward its conclusion. In his
brief, Wilder describes the initial confrontation between Gipson and members of
the fraternity:
Mobley [a fraternity officer], as he was exiting the front door of the
Fraternity House, observed Gipson and Barnes entering the Fraternity
House. Mobley was supsicious of Gipson and Barnes so he re-entered
the Fraternity House in order to observe them. . . .
Mobley solicited the help of McLin and Elmore [two other
fraternity officers] to remove Barnes and Gipson from the Fraternity
2
House. Mobley, Elmore and McLin confronted Gipson and Barnes in
the dining area of the Fraternity House. At that time, Barnes was
pulling two bottles of beer out of an icemaker. . . .
Mobley questioned Barnes and Gipson as to whose beers they
were taking and who, if anyone, they knew at the Fraternity House.
Mobley, Elmore and/or McLin used profanity and accused Gipson and
Barnes of stealing beer. Mobley, Gipson and Barnes exchanged
words, and the conversation became heated and everyone’s voices
started to escalate. . . .
Gipson then punched McLin in the neck, and a fight broke out
between the two of them. Elmore broke up the fight and pushed
McLin to the other side of the dining area. According to Gipson while
in the kitchen area one of the individuals who confronted and
represented himself as a member of the fraternity started using racial
slurs directed towards him . . . .
At some point in time during these events, Gipson pulled out
from his pocket and opened a butterfly knife (the “Knife”). Gipson
attempted to back away from the confrontation, using the Knife to
ward off the group of individuals in the dining area.
(Appellant’s Br. at 8–10 (record citations omitted)).
As Gipson and Barnes exited the house, they encountered more party-goers
who had exited the house but remained on the lawn. That group included Wilder.
Gipson issued general death-threats to those in hearing range as he walked toward
the street. Before their exit was complete, Barnes threw at least one beer bottle
toward fraternity members; the fraternity members returned in kind. Violence
erupted, and within moments Gipson stabbed Wilder in the head with his butterfly
knife.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
3
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Fanin v.
U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 572 F.3d 868, 871 (11th Cir. 2009). “[W]e view all
evidence and factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party,” as reflected in our reliance on Wilder’s filings with this court for the
recitation of facts above. See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs.,
358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004).
III. DISCUSSION
Wilder’s ability to recover against the local and national fraternity
organizations depends initially on his capacity to demonstrate that the fraternity’s
members acted negligently in allowing Gipson to assault him. See Ex Parte
Essary, 992 So. 2d 5, 9 (Ala. 2007) (explaining that, though wantonness and
negligence are distinct tort concepts, they both require the violation or omission of
some legal duty); Univ. of Ala. Health Servs. Found., P.C. v. Bush, 638 So. 2d 794,
799 (Ala. 1994) (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the master cannot be
liable unless one of the master’s servants has been found to be negligent.”);
Hathcock v. Mitchell, 173 So. 2d 576, 595 (Ala. 1965) (“[T]he master is not liable
for having employed incompetent servants unless their incompetency was the
proximate cause of the injury . . . .”). Foundational to the existence of a negligence
claim is a legal duty flowing from one to another. “It is the general rule in
4
Alabama that absent special relationships or circumstances, a person has no duty to
protect another from criminal acts of a third person.” Moye v. A.G. Gaston Motels,
Inc., 499 So. 2d 1368, 1370 (Ala. 1986).
Wilder argues primarily that “special circumstances” arose on the night of
the fraternity party that created a legal duty on the part of the fraternity to take
affirmative action to prevent Gipson’s assault. In Alabama, these “special
circumstances” arise only when the defendant can foresee the probability of
conduct endangering the plaintiff. New Addition Club, Inc. v. Vaughn, 903 So. 2d
68, 73 (Ala. 2004). This foreseeability requires a three-part showing: “First, the
particular criminal conduct must have been foreseeable. Second, the defendant
must have possessed ‘specialized knowledge’ of the criminal activity. Third, the
criminal conduct must have been a probability.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Alabama Supreme Court “has rarely held that the danger to an
invitee posed by the potential criminal act of a third person was so imminent that
the premises owner should have foreseen the eventual consequence.” Hail v.
Regency Terrace Owners Ass'n, 782 So.2d 1271, 1274–75 (Ala. 1999).
Wilder argues that the question of duty, hinged on the issue of foreseeability,
is at least a factual question to be resolved by a jury. For the proposition, Wilder
relies on the appellate court decision in Whataburger, Inc. v. Rockwell, 706 So. 2d
5
1220 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997). In Whataburger, the plaintiff sued a restaurant for
failing to intervene or solicit aid for him before he was injured in a fight on the
premises. Three young men harassed the plaintiff, and despite the plaintiff’s
request that the manager summon the police, the manager simply told the group to
“take it outside.” Id. at 1222. The court held that the foreseeability of the
plaintiff’s physical injury was a factual question to be resolved by the jury. Id. at
1224.
We acknowledge that the decision in Whataburger implies a legal duty to
protect others when a premises owner has specific knowledge of probable physical
injury awaiting an invitee. But we are doubtful about the viability of its assertion
that debatable questions of foreseeability, and thus duty, are reserved for the jury in
light of more recent Alabama case law. “In Alabama, the existence of a duty is a
strictly legal question to be determined by the court.” Bryan v. Ala. Power Co., 20
So. 3d 108, 116 (Ala. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even when
addressing questions of foreseeability in the context of duties to third parties, the
Alabama Supreme Court has held that the question of duty “is a question of law to
be determined by the trial judge.” New Addition Club, 903 So. 2d at 73 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Owen, 729 So.
2d 834, 837–39 (Ala. 1998) (observing the conflicting Alabama case law regarding
6
whether the existence of a duty should be resolved by judge or jury and ultimately
holding “that the existence of a duty is a question of law to be determined by the
trial judge”). We think Alabama law sufficiently clarifies the court’s function as
the final arbiter of the foreseeability analysis in the context of determining legal
duty. Nevertheless, as we note below, even if Whataburger were controlling, our
result would be the same.
Wilder attempts to cast the fraternity members as the instigators of both
confrontations to argue that the fraternity members had a duty to defuse the
situation they created. In his brief, Wilder takes some liberty with the facts to
make this characterization—the same facts we quoted from above. Wilder
contends that “[t]he Sigma Nu members’ racial epithets led to a fight that was
serious enough that Gipson threatened the Sigma Nu members with a knife.” He
further argues that “[t]he evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to
Wilder, shows that one or more of the members called Gipson and Barnes
‘niggers,’ and incited the altercation with Gipson and Barnes.”
Wilder’s factual characterizations cross the line from a “favorable light” to
an alternate reality. By Wilder’s own admission in his brief, the physical
confrontation between Gipson and the fraternity members developed after Gipson
threw the first punch. Moreover, Wilder’s own sequence of events suggests that
7
Gipson did not hear the alleged racial epithets until after fraternity members had
intervened to break up the physical altercation. Wilder’s attempt to characterize
the fraternity members as the aggressors fundamentally ignores the fact that
Gipson and Barnes were trespassers who were confronted while stealing property,
a fact admitted by Wilder. At best for Wilder, all of the actors in the initial
confrontation were mutually responsible for the physical and verbal altercation.
We now apply the relevant law to these facts to determine whether the
fraternity had a duty to protect Wilder from Gipson’s later actions. At bottom, we
must determine whether a premises owner, aware of a brief physical altercation on
his property, has reason to anticipate as probable another, nearly fatal altercation in
a different area of the property during the trespassers’ retreat. Alabama case law
leads us to conclude that Gipson’s assault on Wilder was not foreseeable.
In New Addition Club, the plaintiff’s estate sued a bar after a bar patron
murdered the plaintiff. The plaintiff attempted to show that the murder was
foreseeable to the bar by introducing evidence that the patron had previously
brandished a shotgun at the bar, had assaulted his girlfriend in the bar’s parking lot,
and was known as “hot tempered.” 903 So. 2d at 75. The Alabama Supreme Court
held that none of the evidence sufficiently established the foreseeability of the
particular murder. Id. at 75–76.
8
The facts in New Addition Club contrast with those in Whataburger, where
the plaintiff actually requested that the premises manager intervene and call the
police. 706 So. 2d at 1223. The plaintiff contended that the manager failed to call
the police before the fight broke out, despite his pleas. Id. This, the appellate court
concluded, raised the factual possibility that the manager could have foreseen the
imminent probability of harm awaiting the plaintiff. Id. at 1224.
In this case, the facts surrounding the fraternity member’s knowledge of the
dangerousness of the situation do not indicate that they were aware of the
probability of the specific harm that befell Wilder.1 In Whataburger, the premises
manager ignored the plaintiff’s pleas for intervention, but no such requests were
made here. Moreover, the manager in Whataburger had knowledge of the specific
circumstances that led to the plaintiff’s injuries because she observed both the
victim and the assailants interacting before the altercation occurred. Here,
however, the fraternity members might have observed a hostile trespasser, but they
had no reason to anticipate that his hostility would be taken out on a non-
participant in the initial confrontation.
The circumstances here are more like those in New Addition Club, where the
1
We note that, even applying the standard set forth in Whataburger, we do not believe
that a genuine issue of material fact exists about the foreseeability of Gipson’s violent assault on
Wilder.
9
bar owner had knowledge of the assailant’s hostile temperament and possession of
a firearm. Here, according to Wilder, the fraternity members were aware of both
Gipson’s aggression and possession of a weapon. But, as in New Addition Club,
knowledge about temperament and weapons does not create the probability of a
particular type of criminal activity. Any fraternity member’s knowledge that
Gipson was a hostile, armed individual does not indicate that he should have
known the probability that Gipson would stab a bystander in the head during
Gipson’s exit. Because there are no “special circumstances” based on which the
fraternity or its members should have foreseen the probability of Gipson’s assault,
we hold that neither the fraternity nor its officers and members owed a duty to
protect Wilder from Gipson’s criminal acts.2
Because no one at the fraternity party owed Wilder any legal duty to protect
him from the criminal acts of Gipson, no one acted negligently in failing to do so.
As a result, all of Wilder’s claims presented in this appeal must fail. Without
negligent conduct, there can be no direct claim for negligence or for vicarious
2
Wilder argues also that a “special relationship” existed between Wilder and the
fraternity because the fraternity incited the hostile situation but failed to intervene. As we
discussed above, Wilder’s contention that the fraternity incited the violence conflicts with his
own account of the facts. Moreover, under Alabama law the “special relationship” exception to
the duty rule appears to be too narrow to accomodate the facts here. See, e.g., Young v.
Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386, 1388–89 (Ala. 1992) (discussing a “dependence test” for the
“special relationship” exception and concluding that a hospital owes a duty of protection to an
anesthetized or sedated patient).
10
liability. In the absence of negligent conduct, any negligent hiring, training, or
supervision could not have caused Wilder’s injuries. Finally, in the absence of a
legal duty to protect Wilder, no claim against the organizations for wantonness can
survive.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rarely does a premises owner have a legal duty to protect others from the
criminal acts of a third party. In circumstances like this, only when the party
knows or should know that a particular type of crime is probable does it have a
duty to protects its guests. The facts in this case fail to create the kind of
foreseeability necessary to impose on the fraternity and its members a duty to
protect their guests. In the absence of a legal duty, there can be no negligence,
negligent training, vicarious liability, or wantonness. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees.
AFFIRMED.
11