United States v. Guerra , 391 F. App'x 812 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 10, 2010
No. 10-10049 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:05-cr-20144-PCH-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ISABEL GUERRA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(August 10, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Isabel Guerra appeals from the district court’s order denying her motion to
correct her sentence pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a) and (36). Guerra argues that
the court erred in denying her motion because her 70-month sentence, imposed on
remand, is vindictive. She further argues that her sentence violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment because it is
disproportionate to the nature of her underlying crimes of health care fraud and
money laundering. She also indicates that her sentence violated the Supreme
Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147
L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), but does not explain why or how this violation occurred. In
her reply brief, Guerra argues that the district court had jurisdiction to reduce her
sentence because we previously had “reversed” her sentence by holding that the
district court erred in calculating her guideline range. She further contends that
her motion under Rule 35(a) was timely, because she filed this motion several days
after the court remanded her into custody to serve her sentence.
Guerra also argues that the district court’s criminal forfeiture order violates
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines, as the amount that she
was ordered to forfeit was disproportionate to the gravity of her offenses. In her
initial brief and in her reply brief, Guerra raises various arguments as to why the
court had jurisdiction to vacate or modify its forfeiture order, and as to why we
should consider her arguments regarding the forfeiture order on appeal.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, and dismiss in part.
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I.
In June 2005, Guerra was convicted of the following offenses: (1) 1 count
of conspiracy to defraud the United States, to commit health care fraud, and to pay
kickbacks, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (“count 1”); (2) 15 counts of health care
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1347 and 2 (counts 2, 4, 6-7, 9-13, 15-20); (3) 1
count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(h) (“count 21”); and (4) 3 counts of money laundering, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2 (“counts 24, 27-28”). The district court entered a
preliminary order of forfeiture, directing that Guerra forfeit real and personal
property to the United States, including a monetary sum of $9,405,114.90. The
court subsequently entered a judgment sentencing Guerra to a total term of 99
months’ imprisonment.
In May 2007, we entered an opinion vacating Guerra’s convictions as to the
health care fraud offenses charged in counts 2, 4, and 7. See United States v.
Medina, 485 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2007). In addition, we remanded for
resentencing, as the district court had failed to make specific factual findings in
support of its determination of the loss amount used to calculate Guerra’s
guideline range. See id. at 1303-05. Shortly after we entered our decision, Guerra
was released from prison on bond.
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On remand, the court calculated Guerra’s guideline range based on the
money laundering guidelines set forth in U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1. Applying these
guidelines, the court found that Guerra’s base offense level was 6, and that this
offense level should be increased by 14 levels pursuant to § 2S1.2(a)(2), because
Guerra was responsible for more than $400,000 in laundered funds. After
applying additional increases and adjustments, the court determined that Guerra’s
total offense level was 26, which, when combined with her criminal history
category of I, produced a guideline range of 63 to 70 months’ imprisonment.
In February 2008, the court entered an amended judgment, in which it
adjudicated Guerra guilty as to counts 1, 6, 9-13, 15-21, 24, and 27-28. The court
resentenced Guerra to a total term of 70 months’ imprisonment. In addition, the
court amended the preliminary order of forfeiture to specify that Guerra would
forfeit a monetary sum of $7,641,968.98. The court further specified that, if the
ordered forfeiture amount was later found to be incorrect, a maximum fine of
$1,300,000.00 would be imposed.
Guerra again appealed from her convictions and sentences. See United
States v. Guerra, 307 Fed.Appx. 283 (11th Cir. 2009). In January 2009, we
entered an opinion in which we noted that, in calculating Guerra’s guideline range,
the district court incorrectly had applied the guidelines applicable to money
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laundering offenses, under § 2S1.1, instead of the guidelines applicable to
Guerra’s underlying offenses of health care fraud, under § 2B1.1. Id. at 287. We
explained that, because the court had erred in applying the money laundering
guidelines, it had erred in increasing Guerra’s offense level by 14 levels pursuant
to § 2S1.1(a)(2). We further noted that, under the health care fraud guidelines,
Guerra’s correct total offense level was 12, with a resulting guideline range of 10
to 16 months’ imprisonment. Id. Nevertheless, we held that the district court’s
error in calculating Guerra’s guideline range was harmless, because: (1) the record
showed that the court would have imposed the same sentence even if it had
calculated Guerra’s guideline range correctly, and (2) a 70-month sentence was
reasonable in this case. Id. at 287-88. The mandate issued in April 2007. Guerra
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. See Guerra v. United States, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 58,
175 L.Ed.2d 23 (2009).
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the government filed a motion to
remand Guerra into custody. The court granted the government’s motion, ordering
that Guerra be remanded into custody to serve the remainder of her sentence.
Several days after the court entered this order, Guerra, through counsel, filed a
motion to correct her sentence, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a) and 36. In her
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motion, Guerra asserted that, in our January 2009 opinion, we “reversed” the 14-
level increase to her offense level under § 2S1.1(a)(2), and held that her correct
guideline range was 10 to 16 months’ imprisonment. Guerra also asserted that her
70-month sentence constituted a 700% upward variance from her correct guideline
range, and stated that, in the event that this variance “was the result of an
arithmetical error,” she requested that the court correct the error, as it resulted in
an unreasonable sentence. In addition, Guerra asserted that the court had imposed
a fine of $1,300,000, and stated that, if the $1,300,000 fine resulted from an
arithmetical error, she requested that it be corrected.
On the following day, Guerra, again represented by counsel, filed a separate
motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), requesting that the court vacate the amended
$7,641,968.98 forfeiture order. She argued that the amount was inequitable, and
that the court had jurisdiction to modify or vacate its forfeiture order.
The government responded, arguing, among other things, that the court
lacked jurisdiction to grant relief based on Guerra’s motions under Fed.R.Crim.P.
35(a) and 36 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), because we had affirmed her convictions and
sentence, and the doctrine of res judicata barred her attempt to relitigate
sentencing issues. After the parties filed additional pleadings related to Guerra’s
motions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 35(a) and 36, and Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), the court held a
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hearing to allow Guerra to clarify the grounds on which she sought post-judgment
relief.
At the hearing, Guerra reasserted her argument that we reversed her 70-
month sentence in our January 2009 opinion. The court stated that it believed that
a 70-month sentence was appropriate, and that, even if it were to resentence
Guerra based on a guideline range of 10 to 16 months’ imprisonment, it again
would impose a 70-month sentence. The court also found that, because we had
affirmed Guerra’s sentence, it lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence. The
court added that it found that the government’s argument— that the doctrine of res
judicata barred Guerra’s attempt to relitigate sentencing issues— was persuasive.
The court stated that it would deny “both motions” because it lacked jurisdiction
to grant the relief that Guerra requested. During the hearing, the parties and the
court did not specifically mention Guerra’s motion to vacate or modify the
forfeiture order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
On December 17, 2009, the court entered an “Order Denying Defendant’s
Rules 35(a) and 36 Motion for Correction of Sentence.” In its order, the court
stated that it had reviewed Guerra’s “motions” to correct her sentence under Rules
35(a) and 36, and specified the docket number for Guerra’s motion under Rules
35(a) and 36. In its order, the court did not mention Guerra’s separate motion
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under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), nor did it refer to the docket number for this motion. In
her notice of appeal, Guerra stated that she appealed “from the district court order
of December 17, 2009, denying [the] [d]efendant’s Rules 35(a) and 36 Motion for
[C]orrection of [S]entence and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief [f]rom Forfeiture
Judgement.”
II.
We review de novo the issue of whether a district court possesses
jurisdiction to resentence a defendant. United States v. Diaz-Clark, 292 F.3d
1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002). We review a district court’s application of the law-
of-the-case doctrine de novo. United States v. Bobo, 419 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th
Cir. 2005).
Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, “an appellate decision binds all
subsequent proceedings in the same case.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d
823, 829-30 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). “An appellate decision binds all
subsequent proceedings in the same case not only as to explicit rulings, but also as
to issues decided necessarily by implication on the prior appeal.” United States v.
Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir. 1996). Pursuant to the mandate rule,
which is an application of the law-of-the-case doctrine, a district court may not
vary an appellate court’s mandate, nor may it “examine [the mandate] for any
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other purpose than execution; or give any other or further relief; or review it, even
for apparent error, upon a matter decided on appeal; or intermeddle with it, further
than to settle so much as has been remanded.” Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 830.
(quotation omitted). There are three exceptions to the applicability of the law-of-
the-case doctrine and the mandate rule: “(1) a subsequent trial produces
substantially different evidence, (2) controlling authority has since made a
contrary decision of law applicable to that issue, or (3) the prior appellate decision
was clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice.” Id. (quotation and
alteration omitted).
“The authority of a district court to modify an imprisonment sentence is
narrowly limited by statute.” United States v. Phillips, 597 F.3d 1190, 1194-95
(11th Cir. 2010). Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) provides that a district court
“may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed” unless one of
the following situations applies: (1) the Director of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons
moves to reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment; (2) a modification
otherwise is expressly permitted by statute, or by Fed.R.Crim.P. 35; or (3) the
defendant was sentenced based on a guideline range that subsequently was
reduced by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, and a reduction is consistent with
the Commission’s policy statements. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); Phillips, 597 F.3d at
9
1195. “The unambiguous language of § 3582(c)(1)(B) indicates that, absent other
express statutory authority, modification of an imprisonment sentence can only be
done pursuant to Rule 35.” Phillips, 597 F.3d at 1195. Outside of the parameters
set forth by federal sentencing statutes and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a district court may not invoke an “inherent power” to correct a
sentence, even where the sentence is illegal. Diaz-Clark, 292 F.3d at 1315, 1319.
At the time that Guerra filed her motion under Rules 35(a) and 36, Rule
35(a) provided that, “[w]ithin 7 days after sentencing, the court may correct a
sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.”
Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a).1 This seven-day time period is jurisdictional, and, as a result,
a court’s attempt to amend a sentence under Rule 35(a) after the prescribed time
period is a “legal nullity.” Phillips, 597 F.3d at 1196.
Rule 36 provides that, “after giving any notice it considers appropriate, the
court may at any time correct a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of
the record, or correct an error in the record arising from oversight or omission.”
1
Effective December 1, 2009, Rule 35(a) provides that a court may correct a sentence
within 14 days after sentencing. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a) (2009). Guerra filed her motion under
Rules 35(a) and 36 on November 28, 2009, a couple of days before the 2009 amendments to Rule
35(a) took effect. At the time that the court entered its order disposing of this motion, however,
the 2009 amendments had taken effect. Nevertheless, even if the 2009 amendments applied in
this case, Guerra filed her motion under Rules 35(a) and 36 more than a year after resentencing,
well beyond the time period prescribed by either version of Rule 35(a).
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Fed.R.Crim.P. 36. “Rule 36 may not be used to make a substantive alteration to a
criminal sentence.” United States v. Portillo, 363 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir.
2004).
Here, the district court correctly found that it lacked jurisdiction to grant
relief based on Guerra’s motion to correct her sentence under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a)
and 36. We affirmed Guerra’s sentence in our January 2009 opinion, and the
mandate did not provide the court with authority to modify Guerra’s sentence. See
Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 830. Guerra’s contention that we reversed her sentence is
erroneous, as we affirmed her sentence, expressly holding that the district court’s
error in calculating Guerra’s guideline range was harmless, and that her 70-month
sentence was reasonable. See Guerra, 307 Fed.Appx. at 287-88. Although Guerra
argues that the criminal judgment in her case has resulted in manifest injustice, we
implicitly rejected this argument by holding that her sentence was reasonable. See
Tamayo, 80 F.3d at 1520. In her pleadings below and on appeal, Guerra has not
identified intervening controlling authority or new evidence that would
demonstrate that an exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine and the mandate rule
applies, nor has she demonstrated that our January 2009 decision was “clearly
erroneous” or may result in “manifest injustice.”
Moreover, Guerra has failed to identify any applicable statute or rule that
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provided the court with jurisdiction to modify her sentence. While Guerra relied
on Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a), this rule did not provide a jurisdictional basis for the court
to reduce her sentence, because she filed her motion well over a year after her
resentencing, and the court thus did not act within seven days of sentencing. See
Phillips, 597 F.3d at 1196. Although Guerra contends that her motion was timely
because she filed it several days after the court remanded her into custody, Rule
35(a) expressly provides that its limitations period is triggered by the date of
sentencing, and Guerra does not cite to any authority in support of her argument
that the date that a defendant is remanded into custody may serve as the triggering
date. Rule 36 likewise did not provide a jurisdictional basis for the court to
modify Guerra’s sentence, as Guerra’s request that the court reduce her 70-month
sentence constituted a request to substantively alter the court’s judgment. See
Portillo, 363 F.3d at 1164. Finally, Guerra does not assert, nor does the record
demonstrate, that any of the other bases for a sentence reduction set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c) are applicable in this case.
Because Guerra has failed to identify a jurisdictional basis that would have
permitted the court to modify her sentence, we affirm as to this issue, and need not
address Guerra’s arguments that her sentence was vindictive, and that it violated
the Eighth Amendment as well as the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi.
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III.
We are obligated to address questions concerning our jurisdiction sua
sponte. Thomas v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass’n, 594 F.3d 823, 828 (11th Cir.
2010). Our “jurisdiction is ordinarily limited to appeals from final decisions of the
district courts.” Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We have explained that:
In postjudgment proceedings, the meaning of a “final decision” [may not
be] clear because the proceedings necessarily follow a final judgment.
Postjudgment decisions are themselves subject to the test of finality . . .
[a] postjudgment order is final for purposes of section 1291 only if the
order disposes of all issues raised in the motion.
Id. (quotations omitted). “If a post-judgment order is apparently the last order to
be entered in the action, it is final and appealable.” Delaney’s Inc. v. Ill. Union
Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 1990).
Although neither party contests our jurisdiction to consider Guerra’s
arguments regarding her motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), we sua sponte consider
this issue and dismiss this portion of Guerra’s appeal. See Thomas, 594 F.3d at
828. Because the court did not enter an order disposing of Guerra’s separate
motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), there is no final decision by the district court
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In denying Guerra’s motion under
Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a) and 36, the court stated that it was denying Guerra’s
“motions,” but expressly referred only to Guerra’s motion under Rules 35(a) and
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36, and did not mention the docket number for her motion under Rule 60(b). As a
result, the court’s order denying Guerra’s motion under Rules 35(a) and 36 cannot
also be construed as a final order disposing of her Rule 60(b) motion. Because the
record does not include a final order disposing of Guerra’s Rule 60(b) motion, we
dismiss this issue for lack of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART.
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