Jackson v. Farmers Insurance Group/Fire Insurance Exchange ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-15904 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 12, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 09-00114-CV-WS-N
CORLA JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP/FIRE
INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(August 12, 2010)
Before HULL, MARCUS and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Corla Jackson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), of her federal pro se
complaint. After review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. State Court Action
On September 16, 2005, Jackson, pro se, filed a complaint in Alabama state
court against her insurance company, Farmers Insurance Group/Fire Insurance
Exchange (“Farmers”), which had issued her a homeowners insurance policy.
Jackson’s complaint alleged that Farmers refused to pay her claims for damage to
her home caused by Hurricanes Ivan and Katrina, as required by her homeowners
policy. The Alabama trial court granted summary judgment to Farmers, and
Jackson appealed. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Jackson v.
Farmers Ins. Grp. / Fire Ins. Exch., 26 So. 3d 1276 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008). Jackson
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Alabama Supreme Court, which was
denied.
B. Federal Court Action
In 2009, Jackson, pro se, filed a complaint in federal district court against
Farmers, alleging, inter alia, violations of the “Alabama Insurance Code”; civil
conspiracy to violate the “Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act”; Ala. Code §§ 8-19-1 et seq.; breach of contract; bad faith;
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negligent misrepresentation; and fraud based upon Farmer’s alleged failure to pay
benefits in full for damages Jackson sustained in Hurricanes Ivan and Katrina, as
required by her homeowners insurance policy.
Jackson filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and the district court
ordered Jackson to submit additional information regarding Jackson’s action
against Farmers in Alabama state court. After Jackson submitted various records
from the proceedings in Alabama state court, the district court granted Jackson’s
request to proceed in forma pauperis but dismissed Jackson’s suit as frivolous
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The district court concluded that the
relief Jackson sought in federal district court was the subject of her state court
lawsuit and therefore the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
Jackson’s complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1
Jackson appealed and filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which this
Court denied.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sua Sponte Dismissals
The district court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint at any time if
it determines that the action “is frivolous or malicious.” 28 U.S.C.
1
See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923); Dist. of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983).
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§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint “is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827,
1831-32 (1989). We also have stated that a case is frivolous if the factual
allegations are “clearly baseless,” or if it is based on an “indisputably meritless”
legal theory. Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotation
marks omitted). In addition, a district court may sua sponte consider subject matter
jurisdiction at any stage in the litigation and must dismiss a complaint if it
concludes that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3);
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506, 514, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1240 (2006).
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted
by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts “do not have
jurisdiction to act as appellate courts and [are] preclude[d] . . . from reviewing final
state court decisions.” Green v. Jefferson County Comm’n, 563 F.3d 1243, 1249
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 199 (2009). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
confined to cases that are “[1] brought by state-court losers [2] complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments [3] rendered before the district court
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proceedings commenced and [4] inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,
284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521-22 (2005); see also Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266,
1272-74, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that, after Exxon Mobil, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is limited and applied narrowly). “The doctrine applies
both to federal claims raised in the state court and to those ‘inextricably
intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment.” Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258,
1260 (11th Cir. 2009). “A claim is inextricably intertwined if it would effectively
nullify the state court judgment, or it succeeds only to the extent that the state court
wrongly decided the issues.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Furthermore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only when the state court
proceedings ended before the federal action was filed. Nicholson, 558 F.3d at
1275, 1277 n.11.
After liberally construing Jackson’s pro se complaint, we find no reversible
error in the district court’s sua sponte dismissal with prejudice.2 On appeal,
Jackson’s arguments are far from clear. Jackson appears to make several
2
This Court reviews a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for frivolity under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for abuse of discretion. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir.
2003). A district court’s determination that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s
claims in light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is reviewed de novo. Nicholson, 558 F.3d at
1270.
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arguments as to why the Alabama trial court’s decision was illegal, why she should
have been granted a default judgment, how Farmers deceived the Alabama trial
court judge, and how the Alabama judicial system discriminated against her on the
basis of her race. Jackson specifically requests a trial by jury against Farmers as
well as an order from this Court granting her relief under Alabama Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b), which provides the circumstances under which an Alabama court
may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding. Ala. R. Civ. P.
60(b). Jackson makes no argument on appeal regarding the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, which underlies the district court’s dismissal of her complaint.
After review, we conclude the district court correctly determined that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Jackson is a state court loser complaining of
injuries caused by a state court judgment. In her federal complaint, Jackson claims
that she should have received a judgment in her favor in the state court proceedings
but was unlawfully deprived of a favorable result due to the actions of Farmers and
various other state government actors. She also reargues the merits of the claims
she brought in the Alabama trial court. Jackson is clearly seeking federal court
review and rejection of the judgment of the Alabama courts. Therefore, Jackson’s
claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgment, and granting
Jackson’s claims would “effectively nullify” the state court judgment. See Exxon
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Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 283-84, 125 S. Ct. at 1521 (noting that the federal
complaints in the Rooker and Feldman cases “invited federal courts of first
instance to review and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments.”); Casale, 558
F.3d at 1260-61.
Moreover, because the Supreme Court of Alabama denied her writ of
certiorari prior to her filing suit in federal district court, it is clear that the state
court proceedings ended prior to the filing of her federal court proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
Jackson's motion to reconsider the denial of her motion for appointment of
counsel is DENIED. For the reasons given above, we affirm the district court’s
order dismissing Jackson’s complaint.
AFFIRMED.
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