Youn Mun Hee v. U.S. Attorney General ( 2010 )


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  •                                                              [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________          FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 09-14612         ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    MAY 3, 2010
    Non-Argument Calendar
    JOHN LEY
    ________________________
    CLERK
    Agency No. A098-946-377
    YOUN MUN HEE,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    _________________________
    (May 3, 2010)
    Before BLACK, HULL and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Youn Mun Hee, a citizen of South Korea, petitions for review of the Board
    of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal of the Immigration
    Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. After
    review, we deny the petition for review.
    I. BACKGROUND FACTS
    In June 2006, Hee was discovered in the United States after he was arrested
    by police in DeKalb County, Georgia. On June 27, 2006, an immigration official
    interviewed Hee and prepared a Form I-213 “Record of Deportable/Inadmissible
    Alien.” Hee admitted that he had entered the United States illegally by walking
    across the U.S. border with Canada, stated that he was amenable to removal and
    requested a hearing before an Immigration Judge. During the interview, Hee
    reported his address as 908 Glenridge Lane in Nashville, Tennessee.
    On the same day, Hee was served with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”)
    indicating that his hearing would be in Atlanta, Georgia at a date and time to be set.
    The NTA also listed Hee’s address as 908 Glenridge Lane in Nashville and
    indicated that his notice of the hearing would be sent to the address Hee had
    provided. The NTA warned Hee, inter alia, that: (1) he was “required to provide
    the [Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)], in writing, with [his] full
    mailing address and telephone number”; (2) if his address or telephone number
    changed during the course of immigration proceedings, Hee must “notify the
    2
    Immigration Court immediately by using Form EOIR-33”; (3) if Hee failed to
    submit Form EOIR-33 and did not “otherwise provide an address” at which he
    could be reached, the government was not required to provide him with written
    notice of his hearing; and (4) if Hee failed to appear at his hearing, the Immigration
    Judge might enter a removal order in his absence.
    On July 15, 2008, Hee’s wife, a naturalized United States citizen, submitted
    a Form I-130 “Petition for Alien Relative,” to the Department of Homeland
    Security (“DHS”) so that Hee could apply for an adjustment of status to that of a
    lawful permanent resident. Hee’s wife was represented by counsel in connection
    with the Form I-130 petition. On the form, Hee’s wife indicated that Hee’s address
    was 6734 Mimosa Circle in Tucker, Georgia and that he had lived at that address
    since October 2007. Hee’s wife also indicated on the form that Hee was in
    removal proceedings in Atlanta in May 2008. Nowhere on the form did Hee’s wife
    indicate that Hee’s Tucker, Georgia address was a change of address.
    On July 23, 2008, the Immigration Court mailed a Notice of Hearing
    (“NOH”) to Hee’s Nashville, Tennessee address, stating that Hee’s hearing would
    be held on September 17, 2008. The NOH was returned as “not deliverable.” The
    return envelope indicated that it could not be forwarded. When Hee failed to
    appear at his hearing, the IJ ordered Hee removed in absentia.
    3
    In December 2008, Hee moved the IJ to reopen his removal proceedings and
    rescind the in absentia removal order. Hee argued that he did not receive proper
    notice of the hearing because the NOH was not sent to his Tucker, Georgia address
    listed on the Form I-130. The IJ denied the motion, finding that the NOH was sent
    to the address Hee provided to immigration officials when he was apprehended, as
    indicated on the NTA. The IJ concluded that Hee had failed to notify the
    Immigration Court of his address change and, thus, was not entitled to have his
    removal order rescinded.
    Hee appealed to the BIA, arguing that he notified the Attorney General of
    his address change via the Form I-130 and that notice of a new address need not be
    on a Form EOIR-33 to be valid. The BIA dismissed Hee’s appeal. The BIA
    concluded that Hee had “failed to notify the Court of his change of address by
    filing a Form EOIR-33” and agreed with the IJ that notice of the hearing “was
    adequate because the NOH was sent to the last address of record.” Hee filed this
    petition for review.
    II. DISCUSSION
    An alien who seeks to reopen removal proceedings following the entry of an
    in absentia removal order must demonstrate either exceptional circumstances or
    that the alien did not receive proper notice under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1229
    (a)(1) or (2). INA
    4
    § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C).1 Hee does not contend that he has
    shown exceptional circumstances, but argues that his notice of the hearing was not
    proper under § 1229(a)(2).2
    Under § 1229(a)(1), an alien in removal proceedings must be provided with
    written notice of the time or place of the alien’s hearing. INA § 239(a)(1)(G)(i), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1229
    (a)(1)(G)(i). Pursuant to § 1229(c), this notice is effective if sent by
    mail “to the last address provided by the alien in accordance with subsection
    (a)(1)(F).” Id. § 239(c), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1229
    (c).
    If such written notice is provided, but the alien nonetheless fails to attend the
    hearing, that alien shall be removed in absentia if the government proves that
    notice was sent and that the alien is removable. INA § 240(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C.
    § 1229a(b)(5)(A). Due process is satisfied “so long as the method of notice is
    conducted in a manner reasonably calculated to ensure that notice reaches the
    1
    We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Anin v. Reno,
    
    188 F.3d 1273
    , 1276 (11th Cir. 1999). “In this particular area, the BIA’s discretion is quite
    broad.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review is limited to whether the exercise of
    discretion was “arbitrary or capricious.” Abdi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    430 F.3d 1148
    , 1149 (11th
    Cir. 2005). The BIA’s legal determinations are reviewed de novo. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y
    Gen., 
    446 F.3d 1190
    , 1195 (11th Cir. 2006). Where, as here, the BIA did not expressly adopt the
    IJ’s decision or reasoning, we review only the BIA’s decision. See Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 
    257 F.3d 1262
    , 1284 (11th Cir. 2001).
    2
    In the context of a motion to reopen an in absentia removal order, our jurisdiction to
    review is limited to: (1) the validity of the notice provided to the alien; (2) the reasons why the
    alien did not attend the proceeding; and (3) whether the alien is removable. INA § 240(b)(5)(D),
    8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(D). Thus, we have jurisdiction to review Hee’s claim that he failed to
    appear because he did not receive valid notice of the hearing.
    5
    alien.” U.S. Att’y Gen. v. Dominguez, 
    284 F.3d 1258
    , 1259 (11th Cir. 2002)
    (quotations marks omitted) (concluding that a handwritten note that an alien was
    “staying with” her cousin at a particular address did not satisfy the requirement to
    provide the Attorney General with written notice of a change of address). Thus,
    when the alien has failed to appear, “written notice by the Attorney General shall
    be considered sufficient . . . if provided at the most recent address provided under
    section 1229(a)(1)(F).” INA § 240(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A); see
    Dominguez, 
    284 F.3d at 1260-61
    .
    Section 1229(a)(1)(F)(ii) imposes upon the alien an affirmative duty to
    “provide the Attorney General immediately with a written record” of his change of
    address. INA § 239(a)(1)(F)(ii), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1229
    (a)(1)(F)(ii); Dominguez, 
    284 F.3d at 1260-61
    . The regulation implementing this statutory provision requires the
    alien to provide “written notice of the change of address on Form EOIR-33 to the
    Immigration Court where the charging document has been filed.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.15
    (d)(2).
    On appeal, Hee argues he satisfied his duty to inform the Attorney General
    of his change of address when his wife submitted the Form I-130 “Petition for
    Alien Relative,” to DHS and, therefore, his NOH should have been sent to his
    Tucker, Georgia address. We disagree.
    6
    Although the Form I-130 Hee’s wife submitted to DHS gave Hee’s Tucker,
    Georgia address, the form did not give any indication at all that the Tucker,
    Georgia address was a new address or that Hee’s address had changed since his
    removal proceedings began and he provided the Nashville, Tennessee address.
    Indeed, because the Form I-130 indicates that Hee has lived at the Tucker, Georgia
    address since October 2007 and incorrectly states that Hee’s removal proceedings
    began in May 2008 (when in fact they began in June 2006), from the face of the
    form it appears Hee’s address has not changed since removal proceedings began.
    For these reasons, even assuming arguendo a Form I-130 could be used to make
    the required change-of-address notification, the contents of the particular Form I-
    130 Hee’s wife submitted were insufficient to constitute a written record of an
    address change within the meaning of § 1229(a)(1)(F)(ii).3
    Given that the Immigration Court mailed the NOH to Hee’s address in
    Nashville, Tennessee, the last address Hee provided, the government’s notice was
    sufficient under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) and § 1229(c). Accordingly, there is no
    3
    Because we conclude that the contents of the particular Form I-130 Hee’s wife
    submitted were insufficient to notify the Attorney General of Hee’s address change, we need not
    address Hee’s argument that the BIA erred in requiring his change-of-address notification to be
    on Form EOIR-33 and that 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.15
    (d)’s requirement that aliens use Form EOIR-33
    goes beyond § 1229(a)(1)(F)(ii) and is an unreasonable interpretation of that statute. We
    likewise do not address the government’s argument that submitting the Form I-130 was
    insufficient to notify the Attorney General because it was sent to DHS, which is not a component
    of the Department of Justice or a delegate of the Attorney General.
    7
    basis to conclude that the BIA abused its discretion in denying Hee’s motion to
    reopen.
    PETITION DENIED.
    8