United States v. Onel Mendez , 378 F. App'x 921 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-14957 MAY 06, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 09-20387-CR-CMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ONEL MENDEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 6, 2010)
Before HULL, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
After pleading guilty, Onel Mendez appeals his 37-month sentence for
knowingly receiving, possessing, concealing and storing stolen goods, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2315. After review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
A. Offense Conduct
On April 15, 2009, a shipping container loaded with 12 million Newport
cigarettes was stolen from a truck yard in Concord, North Carolina. On April 16,
2009, a private investigator hired by the cigarette manufacturer spotted a tractor
trailer pulling the stolen container on a Florida road. The Florida Highway Patrol
(“FHP”) performed a traffic stop, identified Mendez as the driver and confirmed
that the stolen cigarettes were inside the container. During a search of the tractor
trailer, FHP found a receipt from a convenience store in Mebane, North Carolina, a
signed shipper’s declaration of dangerous goods with “Newport boxes” listed as
cargo, a global positioning system (“GPS”) device, a cell phone and a portfolio
containing driver’s logs.
After waiving his Miranda rights, Mendez gave conflicting statements
regarding how, when and where he came to be driving the tractor trailer and in
possession of the stolen container of cigarettes. The data from Mendez’s GPS
device and cell phone placed him at or near: (1) the manufacturer’s plant when the
cigarettes left the plant; (2) the truck yard where, and at the time when, the tractor
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trailer and container were stolen; and (3) a South Carolina truck stop where a truck
driver saw three men transfer the stolen container from a stolen rig to a tractor
trailer that matched the description of the tractor trailer Mendez was driving.
Further, Mendez later admitted that he had forged a signature on the bill of lading
and on log book entries for April 9 and 15, 2009. The log book also omitted any
stops along the route from North Carolina to Florida, including the stop Mendez
made in Mebane, North Carolina for which investigators had found a receipt.
B. Sentencing
The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) recommended: (1) a base
offense level of 6, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(2); (2) a 16-level increase,
under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I), because the intended loss, $2,129,448, was more
than $1,000,000, but less than $2,500,000; (3) a 2-level increase, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(12)(B), because the offense involved an organized scheme to
steal goods that were part of a cargo shipment; and (4) a 3-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. With an adjusted offense level of 21 and a criminal
history category of I, the PSI suggested an advisory guidelines range of 37 to 46
months’ imprisonment.
Among other things, Mendez objected to the PSI’s failure to make a minor-
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role reduction.1 Mendez argued he was not involved in planning the offense, was
the last of three drivers to possess the stolen container, had no equity interest in the
cigarettes and was not going to be compensated based on the wholesale price
ultimately obtained for them, and had no role in the ultimate sale of the cigarettes.
Mendez contended that others coordinated the theft and planned distribution and he
merely transported the container from South Carolina to Florida.
The government opposed a minor-role reduction because Mendez was being
held accountable for only his own conduct and not for the larger conspiracy. The
government pointed out that the undisputed facts from Mendez’s plea colloquy
showed that Mendez was involved throughout the duration of the crime and lied
repeatedly about his involvement once he was apprehended, all of which suggested
Mendez’s role was not minor. The government also noted that Mendez, who bore
the burden to show his minor role, had not offered any evidence of others involved
in the offense to compare culpability.
1
Most of Mendez’s PSI objections were addressed by the probation officer by revising
the PSI. Mendez objected to the factual accuracy of some of the offense conduct in the PSI,
specifically, the PSI’s (1) statement that the GPS device indicated the location of the container,
and (2) failure to include the fact that surveillance video showed at least two other drivers and
tractors trailers involved in the theft of the container in North Carolina hours before Mendez
took possession of the container in South Carolina. The revised PSI noted that this dispute was
unresolved, but that it did not affect guidelines calculations. At the sentencing hearing, Mendez
informed the court that all objections apart from the minor role reduction had been resolved.
Thus, Mendez abandoned these objections. In any event, the facts stated in this opinion were
drawn from the facts Mendez admitted in his plea colloquy.
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The district court overruled Mendez’s objection, concluding that it was “not
persuaded that this defendant’s role was minor in comparison to anyone else.” The
district court noted that Mendez was being held accountable for his own conduct.
The district court found that the adjusted offense level was 21, which, with a
criminal history category of I, yielded a sentence of 37 months at the low end of
the advisory guidelines range.
Mendez asked for an 18-month sentence because his role as truck driver was
limited and he participated in the offense to provide financial support for his
family. In his sentencing memorandum, Mendez also noted that the stolen goods
had been recovered and that his advisory guidelines range would have been
substantially lower had it been calculated using the actual loss. Mendez personally
addressed the court and explained that he was poor and was driven to commit the
offense to support his family.
The government asked for a sentence at the middle or high end of the
advisory guidelines range because Mendez had a prior fraud conviction and other
arrests for theft, he repeatedly lied to law enforcement during the investigation of
the offense, and he had not shown true remorse for his crime.
The district court stated that it had carefully considered the PSI, the parties’
memoranda and the information presented during the sentencing hearing, including
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Mendez’s repeated lies to law enforcement when he was apprehended. The court
noted its consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, namely Mendez’s
history and characteristics, the seriousness of the offense and the need to provide
deterrence. The district court declined to impose a downward variance based on
Mendez’s family circumstances, explaining that “most defendants who come to
court have family of some sort and that is not a sufficient basis.” The district court
imposed a 37-month sentence, at the low end of the advisory guidelines range of
37 to 46 months. Mendez appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we apply an abuse of
discretion standard using a two-step process. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d
1179, 1189-90 (11th Cir. 2008). First, we look at whether the district court
committed any significant procedural error, such as miscalculating the advisory
guidelines range, treating the guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence. Id. at 1190. Then, we look at whether the
sentence is substantively unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Id.
A. Procedural Reasonableness
Mendez argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the
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district court failed to properly calculate the advisory guidelines range when it
refused Mendez’s request for a minor role reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.2(b).2
Section 3B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level
decrease if the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). A defendant is a minor participant if he is less culpable than
most other participants, but his role cannot be described as minimal. Id. § 3B1.2
cmt. n.5. The defendant has the burden of establishing his role in the offense by a
preponderance of the evidence. De Varon, 175 F.3d at 939.
“Two principles guide the district court’s consideration: (1) the court must
compare the defendant’s role in the offense with the relevant conduct attributed to
him in calculating his base offense level; and (2) the court may compare the
defendant’s conduct to that of other participants involved in the offense.” United
States v. Alvarez-Coria, 447 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2006). When the relevant
conduct attributed to defendant is the same as his actual conduct, “he cannot prove
that he is entitled to a minor-role adjustment simply by pointing to some broader
scheme for which he was not held accountable.” Id.; see also De Varon, 175 F.3d
at 942-43 (concluding that“when a drug courier’s relevant conduct is limited to
2
We review for clear error a district court’s determination as to a defendant’s role in the
offense. United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 937 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
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[his] own act of importation, a district court may legitimately conclude that the
courier played an important or essential role in the importation of those drugs”).
As to the second prong, the district court is permitted to “measure the
defendant’s conduct against that of other participants” but only “where the record
evidence is sufficient.” De Varon, F.3d at 934. Furthermore, “[t]he fact that a
defendant’s role may be less than that of other participants engaged in the relevant
conduct may not be dispositive of role in the offense, since it is possible that none
are minor or minimal participants.” De Varon, 175 F.3d at 944.
Here, the district court did not clearly err in denying Mendez’s request for a
minor role reduction. Mendez’s relevant conduct matched his actual conduct; that
is, he was held accountable for receiving and transporting stolen cigarettes valued
at $2,129,448. The fact that Mendez received a 2-level enhancement for the
sophistication of the offense, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(12)(B), does not
change the result. Mendez’s offense was part of an organized scheme to steal the
cargo shipment, and Mendez played an integral role in that scheme as evidenced
by: (1) the GPS and cell phone data showing Mendez’s close proximity throughout
the offense; (2) the multiple participants; (3) the collaborative effort to load the
stolen container onto Mendez’s tractor trailer in South Carolina; and (4) Mendez’s
deliberate falsification of the bill of lading and driver’s logs. This evidence
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suggests Mendez was more than just a mere driver of the contraband.
Furthermore, although there is some evidence of other participants in the
offense, Mendez failed to present evidence of their respective roles such that the
district court could make a meaningful comparison and assess relative culpability.
The only specific evidence of other participants – the three men who transferred
the stolen container to Mendez’s tractor trailer at a South Carolina truck stop –
does not suggest Mendez was less culpable. Thus, Mendez has not shown that his
sentence is procedurally unreasonable.3
B. Substantive Reasonableness
Mendez also has not shown that his 37-month sentence, at the low end of the
advisory guidelines range, is substantively unreasonable. The party who
challenges the sentence has the burden to show it is unreasonable in light of the
record and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1351
(11th Cir. 2006).4 Although we do not apply a presumption of reasonableness, we
3
Mendez’s assertion that the district court treated the advisory guidelines range as
presumptively reasonable is not supported by the record. The district court determined
Mendez’s advisory guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments
with respect to them and concluded that a downward variance was not appropriate in Mendez’s
case.
4
The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for
deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the
Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9)
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ordinarily expect a sentence within the correctly calculated advisory guidelines
range to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008).
Mendez knowingly drove a tractor trailer from South Carolina to Florida
while pulling a stolen container holding over 12 million cigarettes valued at over
$2 million. Mendez also falsified trucking records and repeatedly lied to law
enforcement after he was caught. Finally, at the crucial times, Mendez was in
North Carolina near the manufacturing plant and later the truck yard, which
suggests Mendez’s involvement in the scheme did not begin in South Carolina and
that he was more than just a mere driver. Contrary to Mendez’s claims, the district
court heard and considered Mendez’s arguments in mitigation, including that his
motive was to help his family, that he was not one of the masterminds of the
scheme and that the actual loss was much less than the intended loss. The district
court concluded that these circumstances did not warrant a sentence below the
advisory guidelines range of 37 to 46 months. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in imposing a
37-month sentence.
AFFIRMED.
the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to
victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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