United States v. Mejia , 87 F.3d 454 ( 1996 )

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-2485.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Rodrigo MEJIA, Romero Eduardo Grau, Defendants-Appellants.
Oct. 21, 1996.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. (No. 93-43-CR-FTM-17), Lee P. Gagliardi,
District Judges
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, BARKETT, Circuit Judge, and OAKES*,
Senior Circuit Judge.
BARKETT, Circuit Judge:
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(a), the
panel hereby grants the government's petition for rehearing,
withdraws the previous panel opinion dated July 9, 1996, and
substitutes the following opinion:
Rodrigo Mejia appeals his convictions for possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess cocaine
with intent to distribute. Romero Eduardo Grau appeals his
convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute,
conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute,
importation of cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.
Grau argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion for mistrial in which he argued that the government provided
incorrect information regarding the prior criminal activity of its
*
Honorable James L. Oakes, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the
Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
key witness against him. We find Grau's argument to be without
merit and affirm his convictions without further discussion. See
11th Cir. Rule 36-1. Mejia argues on appeal that the evidence
presented was insufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that he knowingly possessed cocaine with the
intent to distribute it or that he knowingly and voluntarily
participated in a cocaine conspiracy. We affirm.
The evidence presented to the jury indicated that a Victor
Yepes intended to purchase fifty kilograms of cocaine from
undercover DEA agents posing as drug smugglers in Fort Myers,
Florida. When Yepes drove from Miami to Fort Myers, Mejia was a
passenger in the car. Upon arrival, Yepes drove to a Wendy's
restaurant, got out of the car, went inside and met with the
undercover agents. Mejia, who remained in the car, was not present
for these discussions. Some time later, Yepes returned to the car
and Mejia and Yepes followed the agents to a warehouse. Mejia
remained in the car while Yepes went into the warehouse and gave
the undercover agents $47,000.
The agents had concealed about 20 kilograms of cocaine under
the back seat of a car that was located in the warehouse. The
agents drove the car containing the cocaine back to Miami, and
Yepes and Mejia followed. At an Amoco station near Miami, the
agents got out of their car. Mejia asked the agents for the keys
to their car, but did not suggest he had any knowledge that the car
contained cocaine. After an agent gave Mejia the keys, Mejia drove
to an apartment where he parked the car, got out, and went inside.
After Mejia returned to the car and started to drive away, DEA
agents arrested him. Mejia told the agents that he was to receive
$5,000 to "unload the car," but did not refer in any way to cocaine
or other narcotics.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, we review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo to
determine whether, based on the evidence presented, a reasonable
jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Mejia was
guilty of the crimes charged. United States v. Lopez-Ramirez, 68
F.3d 438, 440 (11th Cir.1995). To sustain a conviction for
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly
possessed the cocaine and that he intended to distribute it. Id.To prove conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute,
the government must establish three elements: (1) that a
conspiracy to possess cocaine existed; (2) that the defendant knew
of the goal of the conspiracy; and (3) that the defendant, with
knowledge, voluntarily joined it. Id. United States v. Guerrero,
935 F.2d 189, 192 (11th Cir.1991). Where the government's case is
circumstantial, "reasonable inferences, and not mere speculation,
must support the jury's verdict." Id.In light of these standards, we find the evidence sufficient
to support the conclusion that Mejia knowingly possessed cocaine.
In United States v. Gomez, 905 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir.1990), we held
that, to sustain a conviction for possession with intent to
distribute a controlled substance, the government need not prove
that a defendant had knowledge of the particular drug involved, but
the government did need to prove that he knew he was dealing with
a controlled substance. Id. at 1514 (emphasis added). We have
also stated that "all of the circuits, including this one, require
something more than mere presence in [a car in which drugs are
hidden] to sustain a [drug possession] conviction." United States
v. Stanley, 24 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir.1994). But we have upheld
convictions when presence is combined with other evidence from
which guilt can be inferred. Id. In this case, the government
presented no evidence that Mejia saw or touched the cocaine.
Nevertheless, Mejia's presence was combined with other evidence
from which a jury could reasonably infer that Mejia knew the car
contained drugs. Mejia asked for the keys to the agents' car
containing the hidden cocaine and drove it to an apartment.
Moreover, there was some evidence that Mejia drove the car in a
manner consistent with how someone would drive in order to detect
surveillance. Mejia also admitted in his post-arrest statement
that he was to be paid $5,000 to "unload the car." Accordingly, we
sustain Mejia's cocaine possession conviction.
We likewise find the evidence sufficient to prove that Mejia
knew of the goal of the conspiracy and, with such knowledge,
voluntarily joined it. The goal of this conspiracy was to possess
cocaine with intent to distribute. As with the possession count,
a jury could infer that Mejia knew the goal of the conspiracy was
to possess a controlled substance with the intent to distribute it
from evidence that Mejia asked for the keys to the car containing
the hidden cocaine, drove the car in a sometimes circuitous
fashion, and, after arrest, said that he was to be paid to "unload
the car." There also was evidence that Mejia rode with Yepes from
Miami to Fort Myers and back. Although the government presented no
evidence that Mejia was involved in or present for any negotiations
for the purchase of cocaine, Mejia's extensive presence, combined
with the other evidence of guilt, was support a conclusion that he
participated in a conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to
distribute. See United States Lyons, 53 F.3d 1198, 1202 (11th
Cir.1995).
For the foregoing reason, we affirm the convictions of Rodrigo
Mejia and the convictions of Romero Eduardo Grau.
AFFIRMED.