United States v. Brinson Allen ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APR 2, 2010
No. 08-16947 JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-00155-CR-2-CAP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BRINSON ALLEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(April 2, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Brinson Allen appeals his convictions and sentence for conspiring to commit
bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349, bank fraud, id. § 1344, and making false
statements in a credit application, id. § 1014. Allen’s convictions stem from his
participation as a straw borrower and purchaser in a fraudulent scheme operated by
his wife. Allen challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
convictions, the calculation of the loss that he intended to cause, the denial of his
request for a sentencing reduction based on his minor role in the offense, and the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. After careful review,
we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Allen’s wife, Adriene Newby-Allen, operated an extensive mortgage fraud
scheme in which she defrauded banks into loaning her millions of dollars to
purchase real estate in the Atlanta, Georgia, area at inflated sales prices. Allen
participated in the scheme as a straw borrower and purchaser; he purchased real
estate in his name by obtaining loans based on false qualifying information. Two
of the banks that Allen and Newby-Allen attempted to defraud became suspicious
and notified the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Agents worked with the banks to plan a sting closing for Allen’s attempted
purchase of the house at 320 Longvue Court, and agents arrested Allen at the
closing. Allen was indicted for conspiring to commit bank and wire fraud, 18
U.S.C. §§1343–44, 1349; four counts of bank fraud, id. § 1344; making false
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statements in a credit application, id. § 1014; and making false statements in a loan
application, id. At trial, the government presented evidence that Allen participated
in several fraudulent transactions, but only two transactions are relevant to this
appeal.
The government presented evidence that Allen attempted to purchase the
house at 320 Longvue Court. The list price for the house was $1.639 million, but
Allen and Newby-Allen entered into a contract to purchase it for $3.3 million. The
sales contract provided that the sellers would receive $1.65 million and that the
remaining $1.65 million would be placed in escrow to be used for repairs. Allen
applied for mortgage loans to fund the transaction. The loan applications falsely
represented Allen’s employment, income, and assets, and falsely reported that
Allen owned certain real estate. Allen testified that a loan officer, J. Lynn, who
was also a participant in the scheme, brought the loan applications to Allen’s
house, showed Allen where to sign and initial the applications, and left the
applications with Allen while Newby-Allen gave Lynn a tour of the house. Allen
reviewed the applications “very quickly” and signed them before Lynn returned
from the tour.
To facilitate the sting operation, Southstar Funding and Citibank approved
loans to Allen that totaled $2.475 million and scheduled a closing for March 13,
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2006. Both Allen and Newby-Allen attended the closing. Yetta Ellman, the
sellers’ agent, testified that the HUD-1 settlement statement that was prepared for
the closing incorrectly stated that the entire $3.3 million contract price would be
paid to the sellers. At the closing, Ellman mentioned the error and stressed that the
parties should not proceed with the closing until the HUD-1 settlement statement
was corrected to state that $1.65 million would be placed in escrow. Newby-Allen
responded that the sellers could write Allen a check for the excess amount after the
closing, but Ellman told her that transaction would be inappropriate.
Allen signed the errroneous HUD-1 settlement statement. He never asked
the closing attorney to correct the settlement statement or to place any funds in
escrow. Allen also signed the final loan applications after the closing attorney
advised him to make sure the numbers were “roughly right.” Allen testified that he
quickly reviewed the application documents before he signed them, but he denied
knowing that they contained false representations. He also testified that he
believed the excess loan proceeds would be used for “renovations” and “upgrades”
of the property.
The government also presented evidence that Allen guaranteed a $50,000
line of credit from Bank of America for Newby-Allen’s shell company, F&R
Computer Solutions. Allen testified that he agreed to guarantee the line of credit
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because he knew that Newby-Allen would be unable to qualify on her own and he
believed Newby-Allen would make all necessary payments on the loan. The
application information that Newby-Allen provided to Bank of America contained
several misrepresentations about F&R Computer Solutions. A representative from
Bank of America testified that its policies require the guarantor to be physically
present at the closing, to provide two forms of identification, and to sign the
promissory note. Bank of America scheduled and held a closing, and the final
promissory note purportedly was signed by Allen, on behalf of F&R Computer
Solutions. Allen testified that he did not know the application contained false
statements, that he did not attend the closing, and that he never signed the
promissory note. Allen also testified that he and Newby-Allen agreed to pay a
broker $10,000 for his assistance in obtaining the loan.
After a two-week trial, the jury convicted Allen of conspiring to commit bank
fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349; one count of bank fraud (based on his attempted
purchase of the house at 320 Longvue Court), id. § 1344; and making false
statements in a credit application, id. § 1014. The jury acquitted Allen of two
counts of bank fraud and of making false statements in a loan application. The jury
was unable to reach a verdict on a third count of bank fraud.
The district court sentenced Allen to 37 months of imprisonment on each of
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his three convictions, to run concurrently, as well as five years of supervised
release. The advisory guidelines provided a sentencing range of 37 to 46 months
of imprisonment. The sentencing range included an enhancement of 14 levels to
Allen’s base offense level of seven because the district court found that Allen
intended a loss on the Longvue Court transaction of $825,000. See United States
Sentencing Guidelines § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H) (Nov. 2008). The district court denied
Allen’s request for a reduction in his offense level based on his minor role in the
offense. See id. § 3B1.2.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We apply four standards of review in this appeal. First, we review de novo
whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction. United States v. Silvestri, 409
F.3d 1311, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005). We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, and we make all reasonable inferences and credibility
determinations in favor of the government. Id. “A conviction must be upheld
unless the jury could not have found the defendant guilty under any reasonable
construction of the evidence.” United States v. Chastain, 198 F.3d 1338, 1351
(11th Cir. 1999). Second, we review for clear error determinations under the
Guidelines as to the amount of actual or intended loss. United States v. Grant, 431
F.3d 760, 762 (11th Cir. 2005). Third, we review for clear error findings as to a
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defendant’s role in the offense. United States v. Griffin, 945 F.2d 378, 385 (11th
Cir. 1991). Fourth, we review a sentence for procedural and substantive
reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Livesay,
587 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009).
III. DISCUSSION
Allen presents four arguments on appeal. We discuss each argument in turn.
All of Allen’s arguments fail.
A. Sufficient Evidence Supports Allen’s Convictions.
Allen’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions for bank fraud and conspiracy to commit bank fraud fails. To prove
bank fraud under section 1344, “the Government must prove specific intent to
defraud.” United States v. Goldsmith, 109 F.3d 714, 716 (11th Cir. 1997). Allen
concedes that a scheme to defraud existed, but he contends that the government
failed to prove that he was a knowing and intentional participant in that scheme to
defraud. A reasonably jury could have found from the circumstances of the
Longvue Court transaction that Allen knew that the loan applications he signed
contained materially false representations and that Allen intended to further the
scheme through his participation. See United States v. Williams, 390 F.3d 1319,
1325 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that “circumstantial evidence may prove knowledge
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and intent”). Additionally, the jury could have disbelieved Allen when he testified
that he neither knew about the false representations on the loan applications nor
shared his wife’s fraudulent intent. See United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314
(11th Cir. 1995).
Allen’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
for making false statements in a credit application also fails. Section 1014 makes it
a crime to “‘knowingly mak[e] any false statement or report . . . for the purpose of
influencing in any way the action’ of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
insured bank.” United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 489–90, 117 S. Ct. 921,
926–27 (1997) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1014). Allen contends that the government
failed to prove that he signed any documents in connection with the application for
the line of credit or that he knew that the documents contained false
representations. The government, however, presented evidence that Bank of
America requires the guarantor of a loan physically to attend the closing and
present two forms of identification, that a closing was held, and that the promissory
note for the line of credit purported to contain Allen’s signature. A reasonable jury
could have found from this evidence that Allen attended the closing and signed the
promissory note. A reasonable jury also could have found that Allen knew the
credit application contained false qualifying information because Allen was aware
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that his wife had paid a broker an exorbitant fee in exchange for his assistance in
obtaining the loan. See Williams, 390 F.3d at 1325. Additionally, the jury could
have disbelieved Allen when he testified that he never signed any documents to
obtain the line of credit and that he did not know the application contained false
representations. See Brown, 53 F.3d at 314.
B. The District Court Did Not Clearly Err in Calculating the Loss Amount.
Allen argues that the district court erred when it found by a preponderance
of the evidence that he intended to cause a loss of $825,000, which is the
difference between the amount of the loans and the value of the collateral for the
loans, on the Longvue Court transaction and increased his offense level under
section 2B1.1(b) on that basis. Allen contends that he did not intend to cause any
loss on the Longvue Court transaction because he and Newby-Allen planned to use
the excess loan proceeds to improve the property, which would have increased the
value of the collateral for the loans. We disagree.
The district court did not clearly err when it found that Allen intended a loss
of $825,000. Although the sales contract provided that $1.65 million would be
placed in escrow for repairs, the HUD-1 settlement statement, which Allen signed
at the closing, provided that the sellers would receive $3.3 million. Neither Allen
nor Newby Allen corrected the settlement statement or asked the closing attorney
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to make sure the excess loan proceeds would be placed in escrow. Quite the
contrary, Newby-Allen told the sellers that they could write Allen a check after the
closing to settle the difference. The district court did not clearly err in finding that
Allen intended to pocket the excess loan proceeds, not use the proceeds to improve
the property.
C. The District Court Did Not Clearly Err by Denying Allen a Sentencing
Reduction Based on His Minor Role in the Offense.
Allen contends that the district court clearly erred by denying his request for
a reduction in his offense level of at least two levels under section 3B1.2(b). In
determining whether a defendant is entitled to a reduction for his mitigating role in
the offense, the district court should “measure the defendant’s role against the
relevant conduct for which []he was held accountable at sentencing,” and then the
district court should “measure the defendant’s role against the other participants . .
. in that relevant conduct.” United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930,
939 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
The district court did not clearly err by denying Allen a reduction under
section 3B1.2(b). At sentencing, Allen was held accountable only for the Longvue
Court transaction and the line of credit from Bank of America. Although his role
in those transactions was less substantial than that of Newby-Allen or Lynn, his
participation nonetheless was integral to the success of the scheme. See United
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States v. Boyd, 291 F.3d 1274, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 2002). “[T]he fact that a
particular defendant may be least culpable among those who are actually named as
defendants does not establish that he performed a minor role in the conspiracy.”
United States v. Zaccardi, 924 F.2d 201, 203 (11th Cir. 1991).
D. Allen’s Sentence is Reasonable.
Allen contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the
district court incorrectly determined the amount of intended loss, denied his
request for a minor-role reduction, and treated the Guidelines as mandatory instead
of advisory. Allen’s first two arguments fail for the reasons explained above. His
third argument also fails.
After careful review of the record, we are satisfied that the district court had
a reasoned basis for imposing the sentence that it did. The district court did not
treat the Guidelines as mandatory. Treating the Guidelines as mandatory
constitutes procedural error, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586,
597 (2007), but the district court need only “set forth enough to satisfy the
appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007).
Allen also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. In
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reviewing whether a sentence is substantively reasonable, we “take into account
the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the
Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597. Because Allen’s
sentence of 37 months of imprisonment is within the guidelines range, we “may,
but [are] not required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness.” Id. We easily
conclude that Allen’s sentence of 37 months of imprisonment—a sentence at the
bottom of his guidelines range—is substantively reasonable.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM Allen’s convictions and sentence.
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