Edward Staley v. Brian Owens , 367 F. App'x 102 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-12141 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEBRUARY 24, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-00188-CV-CAR-5
EDWARD STALEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BRIAN OWENS,
Commissioner, G.D.C.,
FREDRICK HEAD,
Warden, Autry State Prison,
JANE DOE,
Sgt., Autry State Prison, 1st Shift,
JANE DOE, II,
Autry State Prison, 2nd Shift,
LATOYA KING,
Control Room Officer,
Defendants-Appellees,
RAYMOND HEAD,
Manager of Inmate Affairs Unit, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(February 24, 2010)
Before BARKETT, HULL and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Edward Staley, a Georgia prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s grant of summary in favor of defendants Fredrick Head, warden of Autry
State Prison, James E. Donald, Commissioner for Georgia Department of
Corrections, and Latoya King, a correctional officer at Autry State Prison, in his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action, alleging that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a
substantial risk of harm to him from another inmate, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. On appeal, Staley first argues that the district court abused its
discretion by construing a letter sent to the defendants as new discovery, rather
than a Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 discovery dispute letter. Second, Staley argues that the
district court erred in treating Defendants Donald and Head as movants for
summary judgment. Third, Staley argues that the district court abused its
discretion in allowing Defendant King to file a motion for summary judgment out
of time. Finally, Staley argues that the district court erred by granting summary
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judgment to the defendants because there was a genuine issue of material fact, and
the district court failed to consider the record.
I. Discovery
Staley argues that the magistrate judge erred by construing his discovery
letter as new discovery, rather than a Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 discovery dispute letter.
We review a district court’s discovery decisions for abuse of discretion.
Iraola & CIA, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 325 F.3d 1274, 1286 (11th Cir.
2003). “This means that a district court is allowed a range of choice in such
matters, and we will not second-guess the district court’s actions unless they reflect
a clear error of judgment.” Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 837 (11th
Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, we will not overturn a
discovery ruling unless the appellant demonstrates that it resulted in substantial
harm to his case. Iraola & CIA, 325 F.3d at 1286.
It was not error to construe Staley’s letter as a request for new discovery.
Although his intent may have been to clarify his previous requests, that was not the
operative effect of the actual requests in his letter. Defendants properly responded
or objected to Staley’s first set of interrogatories. The operative effect of Staley’s
letter was to place requests before the defendants that were clearly beyond the
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scope of his initial interrogatories. More importantly, Staley has not demonstrated
that the ruling resulted in substantial harm to his case. There is no indication that
had his letter been treated as a discovery dispute letter instead of a request for new
discovery he would now be in possession of information that would affect the
summary judgment ruling in this case. Because Staley has failed to show the
magistrate court’s construction of the letter was clearly erroneous or that the
court’s discovery decision resulted in substantial harm to his case, he has failed to
demonstrate an abuse of discretion.1
II. Proper Movants for Summary Judgment
Staley next argues that the district court erred by finding that Defendants
Donald and Head were movants for summary judgment because their counseled
motion stated that “Defendants Hall, Perry, and Lace move this Court to grant
summary judgment in their favor.”
Staley has failed to demonstrate that the typographical error in one portion
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Staley also claims (1) that the magistrate judge violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) by treating
his objection to the ruling as a motion for reconsideration instead of an objection to be heard
before the district court and (2) the district court misapplied that same rule by not initially ruling
on his objection. Defendants concede that the pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), Staley’s
objection should have been referred to and ruled on by the district court. However, any technical
misstep does not alter our ultimate disposition of the issue. In response to a motion for
reconsideration, the district court ultimately found that Staley was due no relief under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(a) because the magistrate judge’s decision was not clearly erroneous, the proper
standard under Rule 72(a).
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of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment otherwise harmed his case.
Although one sentence in the body of the motion referred to Defendants Hall,
Perry, and Lacy, the motion was entitled “Defendants Donald and Head’s Motion
for Summary Judgment.” Moreover, the defendants supported their motion with
filings entitled “Defendants Donald and Head’s Statement of Facts as to which
There Is no Genuine Issue to be Tried” and “Defendants Donald and Head’s
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.” Finally, the
magistrate judge issued an order entitled “Order Directing Response to Motion for
Summary Judgment,” in which he notified Staley that defendants Donald and Head
had filed a motion seeking summary judgment. Staley was clearly notified of the
proper movants and his later filings demonstrate that he understood that he was
responding to a motion on behalf of Defendants Donald and Head. Because Staley
has failed to show that he was harmed by the typographical error in the defendants’
motion for summary judgment, he has failed to show that the district court erred in
finding Defendants Donald and Head to be movants for summary judgment.
III. Out-of-Time Motion for Summary Judgment
Staley next argues that the district court committed reversible error by
granting Defendant King’s motion for leave to file an out-of-time motion for
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summary judgment because King did not show “excusable neglect,” as required
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).2
Rule 6(b)(1)of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, when a
party files a motion after the time for doing so expires, a court may, for good
cause, extend the time “if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). The term “excusable neglect” appears in a number of
procedural rules. The Supreme Court has identified four factors to guide courts in
determining whether excusable neglect has occurred: “‘the danger of prejudice to
the [other party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial
proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the
reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.’”
Walter v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 181 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th
Cir. 1999) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507
U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 1498 (1993)). “In Pioneer, the Supreme Court
accorded primary importance to the absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party
and to the interest of efficient judicial administration in determining whether the
district court had abused its discretion.” Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp.,
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Appellant’s brief refers to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). Rule 6(b)(2) states that the a court
cannot extend the time to act under Rules 50(b) and (d), 52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e), and 60(b).
None of those rules are implicated in this case. However, appellant’s continued references to
“excusable neglect” indicate that he intended to invoke the requirements of Rule 6(b)(1)(B).
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71 F.3d 848, 850 (11th Cir. 1996). We have held that a district court may consider
an untimely motion for summary judgment if doing so is in the interest of judicial
economy. See Thomas v. Kroger Co., 24 F.3d 147, 149 (11th Cir. 1994)
(affirming district court’s decision to consider motion for summary judgment filed
24 days after the filing deadline).
Staley has not demonstrated that the decision to allow King to file her
motion for summary judgment after the deadline had passed was an abuse of
discretion. First, Staley has failed to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice or
harm. In fact, the magistrate judge granted Staley additional time to respond to the
motion. Second, the length of the delay was relatively short. The initial filing
deadline was June 2, 2008. King filed her motion June 20, 2008, a delay of less
than 3 weeks. Third, as noted by the magistrate judge’s order, allowing the out-of-
time motion was in the interest of the judicial economy. Finally, Staley has failed
to demonstrate that King was not acting in good faith. Given that Staley has not
suffered any prejudice from the out-of-time filing, King proceeded in good faith,
and allowing the out-of-time filing is in the interest of efficient judicial
administration, it was not an abuse of discretion to permit King to file her summary
judgment motion after the deadline had passed.
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IV. Summary Judgment
Staley argues that the district court erred in determining that he had not
demonstrated a substantial risk of harm because he had not notified the defendants
in advance of his fear of Inmate Brown—the inmate who assaulted him. He asserts
specifically that Defendant King showed deliberate indifference by: (1) allowing
the floor officer to leave the cell block, which was a violation of written policy and
resulted in the cell block being unsupervised at the time of the assault; (2) taking
no action for the three to four minutes during which Staley was spit on by Inmate
Brown and was calling for help; and (3) failing to stop the physical assault by
Inmate Brown. He asserts that Defendant Head showed deliberate indifference by:
(1) having knowledge of the widespread thefts and assaults at the prison, but
failing to do anything to stop them; and (2) failing to transfer Staley to a different
prison after the assault, but rather, placing Staley back in general population, which
resulted in him being robbed and threatened. He asserts that Defendant Donald
failed to classify and segregate prisoners properly based on age and
“incorrigibility,” in violation of O.C.G.A. § 42-5-52(a), thus resulting in an inmate
like Brown being housed with an inmate like Staley. Staley also argues that the
court committed reversible error in granting summary judgment because the court
plagiarized the defendants’ statement of facts, failed to consider and review the
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record, and failed to draw factual inferences in Staley’s favor.
We review pro se pleadings liberally, holding them to a less stringent
standard than those drafted by attorneys. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160
(11th Cir. 2003). We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, applying the same standard as the district court and viewing all evidence
and factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Burton v. Tampa Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 1274,
1276-77 (11th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c).
In a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must first “identify
those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Fitzpatrick v. City of
Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks and alterations
omitted). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary
judgment, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with specific
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facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 1116. “[M]ere
conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a
summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir.
2005). This Court may affirm the district court’s decision on any ground
supported by the record. Parks v. City of Warner Robins, Ga., 43 F.3d 609, 613
(11th Cir. 1995).
In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1974 (1994), the
Supreme Court held that “[a] prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a
substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.”
“[P]rison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of
other prisoners.” Id. at 833, 114 S. Ct. at 1976 (quotation marks and alterations
omitted). A constitutional violation occurs “when a substantial risk of serious
harm, of which the official is subjectively aware, exists and the official does not
respond reasonably to the risk.” Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1028
(11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). In order to
prove a claim of deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the
plaintiff must show that: (1) there was substantial risk of serious harm (the
objective component); (2) the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to that
risk (the subjective component); and (3) the defendants’ wrongful conduct caused
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the injury. See Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2003). A
substantial risk to a prisoner’s safety may arise not only out of his individual
situation, but out of an environment of longstanding and pervasive attacks to which
all prisoners in his situation are exposed, and it may come from single or multiple
sources. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43, 114 S. Ct. at 1981-82. Nevertheless, a
defendant may avoid liability by showing that: (1) he was unaware of the
underlying facts indicating a substantial risk; (2) he “believed (albeit unsoundly)
that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent”; or (3) he
“responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.”
Id. at 844, 114 S. Ct. at 1982-83.
In Carter, we affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
defendants where the plaintiff, who suffered an attack by a cellmate, established
that the defendants knew his cellmate was a “problem inmate” with a
well-documented history of prison disobedience and was prone to violence. 352
F.3d at 1349. We noted that the plaintiff had not indicated that the cellmate had
made a clear threat or that he was afraid of the cellmate, and we held that a
defendant’s “mere awareness of [an inmate’s] generally problematic nature” does
not amount to knowledge of a substantial risk. Id. at 1349-50. “The known risk of
injury must be a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility[,] before a guard’s
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failure to act can constitute deliberate indifference.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d
1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (quotation marks omitted).
“It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable
under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of
respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360
(11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). Supervisory liability under § 1983
occurs only when “the supervisor personally participates in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between the actions
of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. The
necessary causal connection can be established “when a history of widespread
abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged
deprivation, and he fails to do so.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th
Cir. 1999). Alternatively, a causal connection may be established when a
supervisor’s improper custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to
constitutional rights. Id.Staley’s only allegation against Defendant Donald is that he failed to
properly segregate prisoners in violation of O.C.G.A. § 42-5-52, which provides
for the classification and separation of inmates with respect to “age, first offenders,
habitual criminals and incorrigibles, diseased inmates, mentally diseased inmates,
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and those having contagious, infectious, and incurable diseases.” According to
Staley, Donald’s violation of the statute caused his exposure to Brown, which in
turn, caused his injuries. Staley has failed to demonstrate that Donald adopted a
policy in violation of O.C.G.A. § 42-5-52. There is no indication that housing
Staley with an inmate such as Brown violates the statute. Moreover, there is no
indication that the general housing policy in the prison resulted in deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights, as is necessary to impute supervisory liability
to Donald.
Staley alleges that Defendant Head exhibited deliberate indifference by
failing to respond to the assaults and thefts at the prison and by placing Staley back
in general population after he was assaulted. Based on the record, Staley’s
discussion with Defendant Head focused mainly on the problem of theft in the
prison. Nothing in that discussion indicates that Staley was alerting Head to a
substantial risk of serious violence either generally or specific to Staley or that
Head understood the discussion as such. To the extent Staley argues supervisory
liability based on a “history of widespread abuse” at the prison, he has failed to
establish such a pattern existed. On that point, Staley presents his own statement
and that of two other inmates. At most, those statements establish that several
isolated assaults or thefts may have occurred over an eight year period at the
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prison. That is not sufficient evidence to establish that there was a history of
widespread abuses that supervisors failed to reasonably respond to. Turning to
Staley’s allegation that Head was deliberately indifferent in placing him back in the
general population after his assault and thus exposing him to theft and threats,
Staley has produced no evidence indicating that, in the wake of his assault, he was
exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm or that Head was aware of any
substantial risk to him and ignored it. Moreover, it is unclear exactly what injury
Staley complains of in relation to being placed back in the general population.
Finally, Staley concedes that the day after he returned to the general population he
stated a fear of harm, at which point he was put into protective custody.
Staley alleges that Defendant King exhibited deliberate indifference through
her inadequate supervision or control of the floor officer at the time of the assault
and her failure to respond to the assault. First, it is clear that King, in the control
room, had no control over the floor officer’s actions. Therefore, to the extent that
Staley looks to premise liability of King’s failure to control the floor officer, that
theory must fail. Furthermore, Staley has produced no evidence indicating that
King delayed in responding to the assault. More generally, Staley has produced no
evidence indicating that King acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial
risk of harm to Staley. Taken in the light most favorable to Staley, the facts
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indicate that King may have been aware of a risk to Staley from another inmate,
Haywood, and that King did nothing to aid Staley between the time Brown initially
spat on Staley and the eventual assault. Although an inmate does not necessarily
have to identify the particular source of risk, in this case, there is no evidence that
Staley’s fear of reprisal at the hands of Haywood based on a specific incident
between them alerted King to a substantial risk of harm to Staley from Brown, or
any other inmate. In retrospect, any failure on King’s part to intuit that Brown
spitting on Staley was a precursor to physical violence is at most negligent. That
being the case, any failure on her part to call for assistance immediately upon the
initial spitting incident cannot constitute deliberate indifference.
Contrary to Staley’s contention, there is no indication that the district court
failed to review the record or draw reasonable inferences in Staley’s favor.
Because Staley failed to present triable facts showing that defendants were
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to him, the district court did
not err by granting summary judgment to the defendants.
Based upon a review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we find no error.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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