United States v. Lizarraga-Caceres , 311 F. App'x 235 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEB 09, 2009
No. 07-14427 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00099-CR-T-23-TBM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSE ANTONIO GOVEO-ZARAGOZA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
No. 07-14554
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00099-CR-T-23-TBM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANDRES ESCOBEDO-ESTRADA,
a.k.a. ANDRES ESTRADA-ESCOBEDO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
No. 07-14632
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00099-CR-T-23-TBM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAFAEL BUESA-HERRERA,
a.k.a. Rafael Humberto Herrera-Bueso,
a.k.a. Rafael Bueso-Herrera,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
No. 07-14655
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00099-CR-T-23-TBM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
2
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ELEAZAR CAMACHO-MALDONADO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
No. 07-14656
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00099-CR-T-23-TBM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MIGUEL CRUZ-ACOSTA,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
No. 07-15313
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00099-CR-T-17-TGW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
3
versus
FRANCISCO PAUL VALDEZ-GONZALEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
No. 07-15444
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00099-CR-T-23TBM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JORGE ARMANDO LIZARRAGA-CACERES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(February 9, 2009)
Before DUBINA, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Jose Antonio Goveo-Zaragoza, Andres Estrada-Escobedo, Rafael
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Buesa-Herrera, Eleazer Camacho-Maldonado, Miguel Cruz-Acosta, Francisco Paul
Valdez-Gonzalez, and Jorge Lizarraga-Caceres appeal their sentences for drug
offenses. Valdez-Gonzalez also challenges his conviction. The seven
codefendants were indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of conspiring to
possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while onboard a
vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 46 U.S.C.
§§ 70503(a), 70506(a), (b), and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii), and possession with
intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while onboard a vessel
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation §§ 70503(a), 70506(a),
960(b)(1)(B)(ii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Each appellant pleaded guilty to the charges.
I. Goveo-Zaragoza
Goveo-Zaragoza was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment. On appeal,
he contends that the district court erred in denying him a safety-valve reduction, as
the government did not offer any evidence to demonstrate that his statements and
testimony were not truthful and complete. He also argues that, although he was an
operational officer on the boat, his sentence was unreasonable because many of his
codefendants with “greater or equal culpability” received lesser sentences, and this
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, Goveo-Zaragoza contends that
he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth
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Amendment, because officials deprived him of his heart medication for four days.
A. Safety-valve relief
We review a district court’s safety-valve fact-finding for clear error. United
States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1997). Under the safety-valve
provision, a district court shall impose a sentence without regard to any statutory
mandatory minimum if a defendant convicted of certain drug crimes satisfies
certain criteria established in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. Section 5C1.2(a) “requires a
defendant to both truthfully and fully disclose information within [his] knowledge
relating to the crime for which [he] is being sentenced.” United States v. Figueroa,
199 F.3d 1281, 1283 (11th Cir. 2000).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court did not clearly
err by failing to grant Goveo-Zaragoza a two-level safety-valve reduction because
it found that he withheld information regarding how much he knew about the scope
of the common scheme and how much compensation he would receive for his role
in the criminal activity.
B. Reasonableness
The Supreme Court has explained that the substantive reasonableness of a
sentence is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007). The district
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court must consider the following factors to determine a reasonable sentence:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to
protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of
sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent
policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to
avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide
restitution to victims.
United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)). While the district court must consider the § 3553(a) factors, it is not
required to discuss each factor. Id.
We have declined to review a claim that a sentence constituted cruel and
unusual punishment when the argument was not raised in the district court. See
United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1417 (11th Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, we
generally review a constitutional challenge to a sentence not raised in the district
court for plain error. United States v. Swatzie, 228 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir.
2000). To correct plain error, we first must find (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3)
that affects substantial rights. “If all three conditions are met, an appellate court
may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.
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Ct. 1544, 1548-49 (1997)).
“In non-capital cases, the Eighth Amendment encompasses, at most, only a
narrow proportionality principle.” United States v. Brant, 62 F.3d 367, 368 (11th
Cir. 1995). We “must make a threshold determination that the sentence imposed is
grossly disproportionate to the offense committed, and if it is grossly
disproportionate, the court must then consider the sentences imposed on others
convicted in the same jurisdiction and the sentences imposed for commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions.” United States v. Reynolds, 215 F.3d 1210, 1214
(11th Cir. 2000).
We conclude from the record that Goveo-Zaragoza’s sentence was
substantively reasonable because, despite the fact that he received a higher
sentence than some of his codefendants, he was not similarly situated to those
codefendants. Further, his sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment because, based on his role as an operation officer, as well as the
historic amount of cocaine involved and the severity of the offense in this regard, it
cannot be said that his sentence was “grossly disproportionate” to the offense.
C. Cruel and unusual punishment
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the
Eighth Amendment. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). This
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is a constitutional tort, which is properly brought through a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause
of action, and not on direct appeal. See Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678,
686 n.12 (11th Cir. 1985). Because Goveo-Zaragoza attempts to raise this claim
on direct appeal, as opposed to a proper § 1983 action, we will not consider the
claim. See id.
II. Estrada-Escobedo
Estrada-Escobedo was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. On appeal,
he first appears to contend that he should have received a minor-role reduction, as
the court should have taken into account the fact that he did not have any decision-
making authority, did not plan or organize the offense, and was only a
“rudimentary” participant. He also argues that his sentence was unreasonable,
because he was taken into custody in the United States, and, by no fault of his own,
he became an illegal alien in this country subject to deportation and exposed to
several disparate sentencing and confinement conditions.
A. Minor-role reduction
A district court’s determination of a defendant’s role in an offense
constitutes a factual finding to be reviewed only for clear error. United States v.
De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 937 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The defendant bears the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to a
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mitigating-role reduction. Id. at 939. The guidelines provide for a two-level
reduction for a minor participant, which is defined as a defendant “who is less
culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as
minimal.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 and cmt. (n.5). To determine whether this reduction
applies, a district court first should measure the defendant’s role against the
relevant conduct for which the defendant has been held accountable. De Varon,
175 F.3d at 940-41. The amount of drugs, in particular, is a material consideration
in assessing the defendant’s role, and “may be dispositive–in and of itself–in the
extreme case.” Id. at 943. Further, “when a drug courier’s relevant conduct is
limited to [his] own act of importation, a district court may legitimately conclude
that the courier played an important or essential role in the importation of those
drugs.” Id. at 942-43.
Although, in many cases, this first method of analysis will be dispositive, the
district court also may measure the defendant’s culpability in comparison to that of
other participants in the relevant conduct. Id. at 944-45. Two sub-principles guide
this application of the analysis: (1) the district court should look only to other
participants who are identifiable or discernable from the evidence; and (2) only
those participants who were involved in the relevant conduct attributed to the
defendant may be considered. Id. at 944. “The conduct of participants in any
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larger criminal conspiracy is irrelevant.” Id.Because the record demonstrates that Estrada-Escobedo’s role in the offense
was identical to his relevant conduct, and he failed to show that he was less
culpable than the other crew members in the relevant conduct of transporting the
cocaine, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err by finding that he did
not qualify for a minor-role reduction.
B. Reasonableness
We may review a sentence for procedural or substantive reasonableness. See
Gall, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 597; see also United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d
1180, 1182 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006). Although Estrada-Escobedo preserved his
reasonableness challenge, he did not raise below the specific argument regarding
his status as an illegal alien. Accordingly, review of this argument is for plain
error. See United States v. Gresham, 325 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2003). The
Supreme Court has explained that a sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if
the district court improperly calculates the guideline imprisonment range, treats the
guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the appropriate statutory factors, bases
the sentence on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to adequately explain its reasoning.
Gall, 552 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 597. “[T]here is a range of reasonable sentences
from which the district court may choose,” and “[a] district court may impose a
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sentence that is either more severe or lenient than the sentence we would have
imposed.” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). A court is
free to determine the appropriate weight to be given to each of the § 3553(a)
factors. See United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 2006), cert.
dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 3040 (2007).
Because we conclude from the record that the district court correctly
calculated the advisory guideline range and considered the factors enumerated in
§ 3553(a), and Estrada-Escobedo’s sentence was at the bottom of the guideline
range, we hold that the district court imposed a procedurally and substantively
reasonable sentence. Further, Estrada-Escobedo’s argument that the district court
erred by not considering the sentencing disparity between himself and a non-alien
is without merit because a sentencing court is not required to discuss each §
3553(a) factor, and the weight that the court assigned to each factor is within its
discretion. Accordingly, we affirm Estrada-Escobedo’s sentence.
III. Buesa-Herrera
Buesa-Herrera was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he
first contends that the district court clearly erred by failing to grant him a two-level
minor-role reduction, as he had no knowledge of the structure of the enterprise or a
clear understanding of the roles of others involved in the conspiracy, and he knew
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only a few hours before that he would be loading cocaine onto a ship. He also
argues that his sentence was arbitrary and procedurally unreasonable because the
district court considered only the amount of drugs involved in the offense, which
determined the guideline range, and it failed to consider the other § 3553(a)
sentencing factors.
A. Minor-role reduction
Because the record indicates that Buesa-Herrera’s role in the offense was
identical to his relevant conduct, and he failed to show that he was less culpable
than the other crew members in the relevant conduct of transporting the cocaine,
we conclude that the district court did not plainly err by finding that he did not
qualify for a minor-role reduction.
B. Reasonableness
Because the record supports the district court’s calculation of the advisory
guideline range, and it shows that the district court adequately considered the
factors enumerated in § 3553(a), we conclude that it imposed a procedurally
reasonable sentence. Accordingly, we affirm Buesa-Herrera’s sentence.
IV. Camacho-Maldonado
Camacho-Maldonado was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, he first contends that the district court clearly erred in not granting him a
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minor-role reduction, as there were “many” other people involved in the
conspiracy who played a far greater role than he did, and he was merely a courier
and the lowest-ranking member of the crew. He also argues that his sentence was
unreasonable, because the district court failed to consider the effect that his
imprisonment will have on his family in Mexico.
A. Minor-role reduction
Because the record demonstrates that Camacho-Maldonado’s role in the
offense was identical to his relevant conduct, and he failed to show that he was less
culpable than the other crew members in the relevant conduct of transporting the
cocaine, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err by finding that he did
not qualify for a two-level minor-role reduction.
B. Reasonableness
Because we conclude from the record that the district court correctly
calculated the advisory guideline range and adequately considered the factors
enumerated in § 3553(a), it imposed a procedurally reasonable sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm Camacho-Maldonado’s sentence.
V. Cruz-Acosta
Cruz-Acosta was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he
contends that the district court erred in denying him a minor-role reduction, as the
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court appeared to have concluded that, in “boat cases,” a defendant is precluded as
a matter of law from receiving this reduction, and the court considered only the
offense itself, without taking into account Cruz-Acosta’s actual role in it. He also
argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court
considered only the quantity of drugs that he transported in determining that he
was not eligible for a minor-role reduction.
A. Minor-role reduction
Because the record demonstrates that Cruz-Acosta’s role in the offense was
identical to his relevant conduct, and he failed to show that he was less culpable
than the other crew members in the relevant conduct of transporting the cocaine,
we conclude that the district court did not plainly err by finding that he did not
qualify for a two-level minor-role reduction.
B. Reasonableness
Because the record demonstrates that the district court correctly calculated
the advisory guideline range and considered the factors enumerated in § 3553(a),
and Cruz-Acosta’s sentence was at the bottom of the guideline range, we conclude
that the district court imposed a procedurally and substantively reasonable
sentence. Accordingly, we affirm Cruz-Acosta’s sentence.
VI. Valdez-Gonzalez
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After entering his guilty plea, Valdez-Gonzalez moved to withdraw the plea,
arguing that he was misinformed by his attorney regarding his options in going to
trial versus pleading guilty. The court denied this motion and subsequently
sentenced Valdez-Gonzalez to 245 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Valdez-
Gonzalez first argues that his guilty plea was invalid and must be withdrawn,
because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert trial defenses and
improperly advising him about the application of the guidelines, such that his
decision to plead guilty was misinformed. He also contends that the district court
erred in imposing two-level captain enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1(b)(2)(B), because there was no evidence presented to establish that the
object of the conspiracy was to import or distribute drugs in this country. In other
words, the Government did not show a jurisdictional nexus to the United States.
A. Guilty plea
We review the denial of a request to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of
discretion, reversing only if the court’s ultimate conclusion is “arbitrary or
unreasonable.” United States v. Freixas, 332 F.3d 1314, 1316, 1318 (11th Cir.
2003). Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d), a court may permit a defendant to
withdraw his plea before the court imposes sentence for a “fair and just reason.”
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(B). In determining whether a defendant has shown a “fair
16
and just reason,” the court evaluates the totality of the circumstances, including:
(1) whether the defendant had close assistance of counsel; (2) whether his plea was
knowing and voluntary; (3) whether judicial resources would be conserved; and
(4) whether the government would be prejudiced by the withdrawal. Freixas, 332
F.3d at 1318 (citing United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 472 (11th Cir. 1988)).
We conclude from the record here that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in not allowing Valdez-Gonzalez to withdraw his guilty plea because he
did not establish a fair and just reason for the withdrawal. Accordingly, we affirm
Valdez-Gonzalez’s conviction.
B. Captain enhancement
We review a district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application
of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Cartwright, 413 F.3d 1295,
1298 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1116 (2006). The guidelines
provide for a two-level enhancement in a defendant’s offense level “[i]f the
defendant unlawfully imported or exported a controlled substance under
circumstances in which . . . the defendant acted as a pilot, copilot, captain,
navigator, . . . aboard any craft or vessel carrying a controlled substance.”
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B). We have not adopted a rigid definition of the term
“captain,” but rather, look to the facts of each case to determine whether the
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enhancement was properly applied. See Cartwright, 413 F.3d at 1298. In United
States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1229-31 (11th Cir. 2003), we rejected the
appellant’s arguments that, in order for the captain enhancement to apply, the
controlled substance actually must be imported, and because there was no actual
importation into the United States and no evidence that the cocaine was destined to
be delivered to the United States, the enhancement could not be applied.
Because Valdez-Gonzalez was the captain of a vessel carrying a controlled
substance that was intended to be unlawfully imported or exported, we conclude
that the district court did not clearly err in applying the captain enhancement here.
Accordingly, we affirm Valdez-Gonzalez’s sentence as well.
VII. Lizarraga-Caceres
Lizzaraga-Caceres was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment. On appeal,
he contends that the district court erred in denying him a mitigating-role reduction,
as he was nothing more than a “mule” here, and the court should have considered
that he: (1) was not going to receive any of the proceeds from the drugs; (2) did not
own or package the drugs: and (3) did not plan the trip or book the vessel.
Because the record demonstrates that Lizarraga-Caceres’s role in the offense
was identical to his relevant conduct, and he failed to show that he was less
culpable than the other crew members in the relevant conduct of transporting
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cocaine, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err by finding that he did
not qualify for a mitigating-role reduction. Accordingly, we affirm his sentence.
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm Valdez-Gonzalez’s conviction and
all of the defendants’ sentences.
AFFIRMED.
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