United States v. Maydel Castellanos , 417 F. App'x 831 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JAN 27, 2009
No. 08-11418 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-20771-CR-PAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MAYDEL CASTELLANOS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(January 27, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Maydel Castellanos appeals her 37-month sentence, imposed following her
guilty plea for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA”), in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and 846.
According to the factual proffer admitted at the change-of-plea hearing,
Castellanos and her boyfriend, Evelio Calzada, met with an undercover agent and
arranged to sell 1,000 MDMA pills to the agent in exchange for $6,500. When
Castellanos and Calzada met the officer to make the exchange, the undercover
agent requested additional pills. Calzada reached under Castellanos’s passenger
seat and produced a bag containing an additional 1,000 pills from which he gave
the agent 10 pills. Castellanos cautioned Calzada to close the bag of pills securely
before replacing it under the seat so the pills would not spill out in the car. She
also checked the bag herself to ensure it was completely closed. The undercover
agent later arranged for another purchase, this time for 5,000 pills. Castellanos and
Calzada were arrested at this second exchange following a brief chase.
The probation officer determined Castellanos’s guideline range to be 46 to
57 months’ imprisonment. The calculations included a reduction for minor role in
the offense. At sentencing, the court applied a safety-valve reduction, which
reduced the guideline range to 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment. Castellanos
requested the court impose house arrest due to her minor role in the offense, her
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lack of criminal history, and her desire to pay off her education loans. After
considering the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court concluded that
Castellanos’s serious crime required incarceration. Accordingly, the district court
denied Castellanos’ request to serve her sentence under house arrest instead of
imprisonment and imposed a sentence of 37 months’ imprisonment. Castellanos
made no objections to the sentence imposed. This appeal followed.
Castellanos argues that the district court should have imposed house arrest
instead of imprisonment because she had a minor role in the charged offenses. She
further contends, for the first time on appeal, that house arrest was sufficient
punishment because: (1) as a recent immigrant from Cuba, she did not realize that
most Americans obey the drug laws; (2) imprisonment for drug offenses is
discriminatory against women; (3) eight days before she entered her plea, her
boyfriend entered a plea and “absolved” her of her “role of ‘co-conspirator;’”
(4) she complied with her pretrial release conditions; and (5) during sentencing, the
government stated that she had a bigger role in the conspiracy than she actually
did.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under a “deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 591, 169 L.Ed.2d. 445
(2007). Issues raised for the first time on appeal, however, are subject to plain
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error review. United States v. Aguillard, 217 F.3d 1319, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000).
Under plain error review, there must be (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that
affects the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. When these three factors are met, we
may then exercise our discretion and correct the error if it seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).
Here, the only issue Castellanos preserved was her claim that her minor role
in the offense entitled her to house arrest. Her remaining arguments, raised for the
first time on appeal, are reviewed for plain error. Upon review, we conclude these
claims have no merit and the district court did not plainly err by rejecting these
arguments.
A sentence must be both procedurally and substantively reasonable. United
States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1090 (11th Cir. 2008). Here, Castellanos does
not contend that there was an procedural error in her sentence; rather, she contends
her sentence was substantively unreasonable. A sentence is substantively
unreasonable “if it does not achieve the purposes of sentencing stated in [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a).” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008).
Castellanos bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable.
United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).
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Section 3553(a) provides that district courts must consider, inter alia, (1) the
applicable guideline range; (2) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (3) the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (4) the need for the sentence imposed
to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense; (5) the need for adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct; (6) protection of the public from further crimes of the defendant;
and (7) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
“The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the
sound discretion of the district court, and we will not substitute our judgment in
weighing the relevant factors.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th
Cir. 2007) (quotations and alterations omitted).
Upon review, we conclude Castellanos’s sentence was substantively
reasonable. The sentence fell at the low end of the applicable guideline range and
the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors, including the seriousness of the
offense and the need to punish defendants similarly. Moreover, Castellanos’s
offense was a Zone D offense and thus the guidelines do not authorize a sentence
without a term of imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.1(f); see also Pugh, 515 F.3d
at 1200. Castellanos has not shown that her sentence was unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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