United States v. Stacey C. Maloch ( 2018 )


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  •            Case: 17-13587   Date Filed: 07/03/2018   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-13587
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-00014-RWS-JCF-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    STACEY C. MALOCH,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (July 3, 2018)
    Before WILSON, MARTIN, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 17-13587     Date Filed: 07/03/2018    Page: 2 of 5
    Stacey Maloch appeals her 60-month sentence following her conviction for
    possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a) and (b)(1)(B). On appeal, she argues that the
    district court clearly erred when it applied a two-level firearm enhancement under
    U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) to her sentence based on a stolen, unloaded gun found on
    the scene. The government counters that Maloch invited any error that occurred,
    and that even if she did not, applying the enhancement was not clearly erroneous.
    After a careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
    I.
    A district court’s findings of fact under § 2D1.1(b)(1) are reviewed for clear
    error, while the application of those facts to the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed
    de novo. United States v. Pham, 
    463 F.3d 1239
    , 1245 (11th Cir. 2006) (per
    curiam). However, we cannot review or reverse challenges where invited error
    exists. United States v. Love, 
    449 F.3d 1154
    , 1157 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
    A party invites error when a party’s statements or actions induce the district court
    into making an error. 
    Id.
     We have applied the doctrine where the party
    affirmatively requested or specifically agreed with the challenged action of the
    district court. See United States v. Silvestri, 
    409 F.3d 1311
    , 1337 (11th Cir. 2005).
    II.
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    Under § 2D1.1(b)(1), a defendant may receive a two-level enhancement if a
    firearm, or dangerous weapon, was possessed in connection with a drug trafficking
    crime. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). In order to justify the enhancement, the
    government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the firearm was
    either (1) present at the site of the charged offense or (2) possessed by the
    defendant during conduct associated with the offense. United States v. Stallings,
    
    463 F.3d 1218
    , 1220 (11th Cir. 2006). Further, the applicable guideline
    commentary explains that the “enhancement should be applied if the weapon was
    present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the
    offense. For example, the enhancement would not be applied if the defendant,
    arrested at [his] residence, had an unloaded hunting rifle in the closet.” U.S.S.G.
    § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11(A) (emphasis added). And if the government successfully
    meets that initial burden to justify the enhancement, the burden shifts to the
    defendant to show that a connection between the weapon and the offense was
    “clearly improbable.” Stallings, 
    463 F.3d at 1220
    .
    We have held that a weapon may be “present” at the site of the charged
    conduct even if it is not in the same room where the offense conduct occurred, as
    long as it is at the same general location. See United States v. George, 
    872 F.3d 1197
    , 1204–05 (11th Cir. 2017). We have also held that an unloaded gun does not
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    per se defeat application of the enhancement. See Pham, 
    463 F.3d at 1241
    , 1245–
    46.
    III.
    As an initial matter, our review is not precluded by the doctrine of invited
    error. Although Maloch acknowledged that the objection to the firearm
    enhancement was likely moot, the objection was not withdrawn; rather, it was still
    made and argued. Therefore, Maloch did not invite any error. See Love, 
    449 F.3d at 1157
    ; Silvestri, 
    409 F.3d at 1337
    .
    Be that as it may, the district court did not clearly err in imposing the
    enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1). Maloch conceded that the weapon was present
    in the same house as the methamphetamine, and thus, the government met its
    initial burden of showing that the firearm was present at the site of the charged
    conduct. See Stallings, 
    463 F.3d at 1220
    ; George, 872 F.3d at 1204–05. The
    burden then shifted to Maloch to show that it was clearly improbable that there was
    a connection between the weapon and the offense; this burden was not met. Id.
    Although the stolen semiautomatic pistol was unloaded, and there was no
    ammunition at the scene, that does not automatically defeat application of the
    enhancement. See Pham, 
    463 F.3d at 1241
    , 1245–46. Furthermore, the situation
    here is distinct from the one described in the guideline application—it is not clearly
    improbable that a stolen semiautomatic pistol is connected to a crime, as opposed
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    to an ordinary hunting rifle found at a residence. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt.
    n.11(A). Accordingly, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
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