John Doe v. Officer Wooten ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-13707 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APR 26, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 07-02764-CV-RWS-1
JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
OFFICER WOOTEN, in his individual capacity,
WARDEN R. WILEY, in his individual and
official capacities,
Defendants,
HARLEY G. LAPPIN, in his official capacity as
Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
RICK STOVER, in his official capacity as
Federal Bureau of Prisons Senior Designator and
in his individual capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(April 26, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In 2007, “John Doe,” a federal prisoner, filed a complaint against several
Bureau of Prison (BOP) officials. Defendants Wooten, Wiley, and Stover were sued
in their individual capacities. Defendants Wiley, Stover, and Lappin were sued in
their official capacities. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Wiley, Stover, and Lappin
violated the Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment
by acting with deliberate indifference in failing to protect Plaintiff from retaliation
after he participated in the investigation of a Bureau of Prisons officer in Atlanta,
Georgia. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Wooten physically assaulted him in
retaliation for Plaintiff’s participation in the investigation. Plaintiff sought damages
and an injunction “permanently enjoining Defendants from transporting Mr. Doe to
or through any BOP facility in Atlanta” and prohibiting Defendants “from
incarcerating Mr. Doe in a high security BOP facility and requiring the transfer of Mr.
Doe to an appropriate and safe housing placement such as a medium or low security
BOP facility or a state correctional facility.” (R.1-1 at 18.)
The claims against Defendants Wiley and Wooten were dismissed with
prejudice.1 Those dismissals are not at issue in this appeal. In an order dated March
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30, 2009, the district court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over
Defendant Stover with respect to the claim brought against him in his individual
capacity and that Defendants Stover and Lappin were entitled to sovereign immunity
on the claim brought against them in their official capacities. For those reasons, the
district court granted summary judgment to Defendants Stover and Lappin. Plaintiff
appeals those judgments.
This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment by applying
the same legal standards used by the district court. See, e.g., Hilburn v. Murata Elecs.
N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is
appropriate where “‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)).
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant Stover
in his individual capacity. We agree with the district court that Defendant Stover’s
contacts with Georgia do not satisfy the minimum contacts analysis necessary for an
1
Initially, the claim against Defendant Wooten was dismissed by stipulation of the parties.
That dismissal did not specify whether it was with or without prejudice. After this court issued a
jurisdictional question, the district court vacated its prior order dismissing the claim against
Defendant Wooten and, on August 20, 2009, entered an order dismissing that claim with prejudice.
Given the August 20, 2009 order, we are satisfied that this court has jurisdiction to consider this
appeal.
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exercise of personal jurisdiction to comport with due process. Accepting all
uncontroverted allegations as true and granting Plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable
inferences, we find that Defendant Stover did not “purposefully avail [him]self of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum . . . , thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.” Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1546
(11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228,
1240 (1958)).
As to the claim against Defendants Lappin and Stover in their official
capacities, we agree with the parties that a plaintiff may be able to obtain injunctive
relief against a federal officer acting in his official capacity when the officer acts
beyond statutory or constitutional limitations. See Appellee’s Br. at 16-17 (citing
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 69 S. Ct. 1457(1949)); Saine v. Hosp. Auth., 502 F.2d 1033, 1036-37 (5th Cir. 1974).2 And, we hold
that the Eighth Amendment violations Plaintiff alleges are within the types of actions
by prison officials that may, if proved, warrant injunctive relief. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 850-51, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977, 1986 (1994).
2
Fifth Circuit decisions prior to September 30, 1981 are binding precedent in the Eleventh
Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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We vacate the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants Lappin and
Stover in their official capacities because, having determined that Plaintiff failed to
allege acts that may be enjoined, that court did not perform the balancing analysis
required by our precedent. On remand, the district court should determine “whether
the relief sought would work an intolerable burden on governmental functions,
outweighing any consideration of private harm.” See Saine, 502 F.2d at 1037(quotation omitted). The burden to be considered is the burden that the record
demonstrates would be imposed by the relief requested by this Plaintiff and the harm
to be considered is that harm that the record demonstrates this Plaintiff would suffer
absent the requested relief.
We note that Defendants Lappin and Stover argued that Plaintiff did not
exhaust his administrative remedies on the claim against them in their official
capacities. The district court did not analyze this defense, and we do not decide its
merit. On remand, the district court may consider that issue in the first instance.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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