USCA11 Case: 22-10684 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2022 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10684
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HYRAM FRANKLIN PATTON,
Defendant-Appellant,
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cr-00006-ECM-KFP-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10684
Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Hyram Franklin Patton appeals his conviction for possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon. The government, in turn, moves
for summary affirmance and to stay the briefing schedule.
I.
In 2020, a grand jury charged Patton with one count of pos-
session of a firearm by a convicted felon,
18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Patton,
through counsel, initially pled not guilty. Patton then moved to
suppress all evidence gathered, and any statements made, during a
traffic stop, car search, and subsequent interrogation that took
place in January 2019 based on the officer unlawfully prolonging
the stop.
A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
finding that the officer did not unlawfully prolong the stop. The
report and recommendation advised parties that they could file ob-
jections within a period of time and warned them that a failure to
do so would waive their right to challenge on appeal any proposed
determinations except on grounds of plain error or manifest injus-
tice. Neither party objected, the district court adopted the report
and recommendation, and denied the motion to suppress.
Patton pled guilty and consented to enter a guilty plea be-
fore the magistrate judge. After the magistrate judge conducted a
change of plea hearing, the magistrate judge found that he entered
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22-10684 Opinion of the Court 3
a knowing and voluntary plea supported by an independent basis
of fact. The magistrate judge issued an oral report recommending
that the district court accept the plea, which it later did.
The district court ultimately sentenced Patton to 57 months’
imprisonment, followed by 3 years’ supervised release. Patton ap-
pealed his conviction.
On appeal, the Patton primarily argues that that the district
court plainly erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence
from the traffic stop. He does not expressly address the impact of
his guilty plea on his ability to present his arguments on appeal, nor
does he challenge the validity of his plea.
Rather than responding the government moves for sum-
mary affirmance and to stay the briefing schedule, arguing that Pat-
ton cannot challenge on appeal the district court’s denial of his mo-
tion to suppress because he entered an unconditional, knowing and
voluntary guilty plea that waived all non-jurisdictional defects.
II.
Summary disposition is appropriate, in part, where “the po-
sition of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that
there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case
. . . .” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis,
406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th
Cir. 1969). A motion for summary affirmance or summary reversal
shall postpone the due date for the filing of any remaining brief un-
til we rule on such motion. 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c).
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10684
Normally, we use a mixed standard of review when review-
ing denials of a motion to suppress. United States v. Dixon,
901 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 2018). We review findings of fact for
clear error and legal conclusions de novo.
Id. All facts are con-
strued in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below.
Id.
A party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recom-
mendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the
right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on un-
objected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed
of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal
for failing to object. 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In the absence of a proper
objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error
if necessary in the interests of justice.
Id.
Arguments not raised in an initial brief are abandoned.
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins., Co.,
739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir.
2014).
Generally, a voluntary, unconditional guilty plea waives all
non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings. United States v. Patti,
337 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2003). Therefore, when a defendant
enters an unconditional plea, he can ordinarily challenge on appeal
only (1) the district court’s jurisdiction over the case or (2) his sen-
tence. United States v. Pierre,
120 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 1997).
If a defendant wished to preserve a non-jurisdictional ground for
appeal, he would have had to have entered a conditional plea in
accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).
Id. A conditional plea
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22-10684 Opinion of the Court 5
needs to be consented to by the district court and the government.
Id.
Under Rule 11, before a court can accept a guilty plea, it
must inform the defendant of his rights should he plead not guilty,
the nature of the charges against him, the potential penalties, and
the court’s obligation to calculate his advisory guideline range. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(B)–(E), (G)–(M). The court must also ex-
plain that a guilty plea waives the defendant’s trial rights and en-
sure that the plea is entered voluntarily and is supported by a suffi-
cient factual basis. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(F), (b)(2)–(3). Fur-
ther, the court must explain that the defendant can be prosecuted
for perjury for testifying falsely under oath. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(1)(A).
In evaluating whether a Rule 11 error has affected a defend-
ant’s substantial rights, we have examined Rule 11’s three “core
principles,” which are ensuring that: (1) the guilty plea is free of
coercion; (2) the defendant understands the nature of the charges
against him; and (3) the defendant understands the direct conse-
quences of the guilty plea. Presendieu, 880 F.3d at 1238. Regarding
the first core principle, Rule 11(b)(2) elaborates that the court must
ensure that the plea did not result from force, threats, or promises
not included in the plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2).
Whether the court has complied with the second core principle de-
pends on a variety of factors, including the complexity of the of-
fense and the defendant’s intelligence and sophistication. Pres-
endieu, 880 F.3d at 1238–39. To comply with the third core
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10684
principle, the district court must inform the defendant of the rights
that he gives up by pleading guilty, the court’s authority to impose
certain punishments, and the possibility of a perjury prosecution
for false statements during the plea colloquy. United States v. Mo-
riarty,
429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(b)(1).
Ultimately, to show that an unpreserved Rule 11 error af-
fects substantial rights, a defendant “must show a reasonable prob-
ability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.”
United States v. Dominguez Benitez,
542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004); see also
United States v. Rodriguez,
398 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that the Dominguez Benitez requirement is a way to
show the third prong of the plain error test). We have indicated
that, for Rule 11 error to substantially prejudice a defendant’s
rights, it must be tantamount to the district court’s “total or almost
total failure to address a Rule 11 core concern,” as distinct from a
situation in which the court “adequately addressed the three core
concerns but slipped up and failed to cover explicitly one item in
the Rule 11 list.” United States v. Monroe,
353 F.3d 1346,
1355 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). If an error com-
mitted during a plea colloquy does not affect one of Rule 11’s core
principles, and it is clear that the defendant understands the plea
and its consequences, any error is harmless. United States v. Jones,
143 F.3d 1417, 1420 (11th Cir. 1998).
Here, we grant the motion for summary affirmance. As an
initial matter, Patton does not expressly challenge the validity of
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22-10684 Opinion of the Court 7
his guilty plea, meaning any arguments in that respect are aban-
doned. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.
However, even if Patton implicitly raised that argument, his
plea was still valid. The magistrate judge complied with Rule
11 and the first core principle by confirming that his guilty plea was
free from coercion. Presendieu, 880 F.3d at 1238. Patton con-
firmed that his plea had not been induced by any threats or prom-
ises, that he was satisfied with his trial counsel’s representation, and
that he had committed the acts stated in the factual basis for the
plea. Thus, there was no indication of coercion in the record.
Second, the magistrate judge confirmed that Patton under-
stood the nature of the charges against him. Presendieu, 880 F.3d
at 1238. Patton confirmed that he could read and write, had a GED,
and had read and understood the charges against him. He also con-
firmed that he was not under the influence of any drugs or medica-
tion and did not suffer from mental illness. The magistrate judge
explained to him the charges in the indictment and the elements
thereof, and he confirmed that he understood them. Further, the
factual basis his attorney recited was accurate. Thus, the colloquy
demonstrated that Patton understood the nature of the charges
against him.
Third, the magistrate judge confirmed that Patton under-
stood the consequences of his guilty plea. Presendieu, 880 F.3d at
1238. Patton confirmed that he understood the punishments he
could face. The magistrate judge informed him of the collateral
consequences of a felony conviction, the possibility of restitution,
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10684
and that any statements he made during the colloquy could be used
against him in a future prosecution for perjury or making a false
statement. The magistrate judge informed him that: (i) he had the
right to plead not guilty and (ii) the right to a trial by jury, (iii) the
government would have to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, (iv) he had the right to counsel at trial, (v) he could cross-
examine witnesses and call his own witnesses, (vi) he could testify
or not testify at trial, and (vii) if he chose not to testify that choice
could not be used against him. Additionally, the magistrate judge
noted that he could not challenge how the government had ac-
quired evidence. Further, even if the district court had omitted
things in its colloquy, he would not be able to show that but for
that error, he would not have pled guilty. Dominguez Benitez,
542 U.S. at 83; see Monroe,
353 F.3d 1346, 1355.
Because Patton entered a valid guilty plea, he waived all
non-jurisdictional arguments on appeal. Patti,
337 F.3d at 1320.
Further, there is no evidence in the record showing his plea agree-
ment was a conditional plea. See
id. Therefore, he waived his mo-
tion to suppress arguments, and we affirm the decision of the dis-
trict court based on that waiver.
Accordingly, because the government’s position is clearly
correct as a matter of law, we GRANT the government’s motion
for summary affirmance and deny its motion to stay the briefing
schedule as moot per 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c). Groendyke Transp., Inc.,
406 F.2d at 1162.
