USCA11 Case: 19-11048 Document: 66-1 Date Filed: 12/14/2022 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 19-11048
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
CARL RICHARD SAMSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent- Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket Nos. 1:16-cv-22521-RNS,
1:10-cr-20855-RNS-1
USCA11 Case: 19-11048 Document: 66-1 Date Filed: 12/14/2022 Page: 2 of 3
2 Opinion of the Court 19-11048
____________________
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES
Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Carl Samson, a counseled federal prisoner, previously ap-
pealed from the district court’s dismissal of his authorized second
or successive
28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, correct, or set
aside sentence, and we affirmed. Samson v. United States, 851 F.
App’x 950 (11th Cir. 2013). However, the U.S. Supreme Court sub-
sequently granted certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded
the case for us to reconsider our decision in light of United States
v. Taylor,
142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022). Samson v. United States,
142 S.
Ct. 2858 (2022). Samson and the Government filed a joint motion
for summary reversal, asserting his attempted Hobbs Act robbery
conviction no longer qualifies as a predicate “crime of violence” for
his
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction.
Given the Government's waiver of procedural default, we
agree with the parties. In United States v. Davis,
139 S. Ct. 2319
(2019), the Supreme Court held that § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause
is unconstitutionally vague, and, in Taylor, the Court ruled that at-
tempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a predicate “crime of violence”
under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. See Davis,
139 S. Ct. at
2336; Taylor, 142 S. Ct. at 2019-21. Accordingly, the parties’ joint
motion for summary reversal is GRANTED. See Groendyke
USCA11 Case: 19-11048 Document: 66-1 Date Filed: 12/14/2022 Page: 3 of 3
19-11048 Opinion of the Court 3
Transp., Inc. v. Davis,
406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969) 1 (explain-
ing summary disposition is appropriate where “the position
of . . . the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can
be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case”).
We therefore vacate Samson’s Count 3 conviction and con-
secutive 120-month sentence, and remand to the district court for
entry of a new judgment. Consistent with our ordinary practice,
we also vacate Samson's entire sentence and remand for resentenc-
ing on Counts 1 and 2. See United States v. Fowler,
749 F.3d 1010,
1017 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that, when a conviction is set
aside, we presume that “sentences on each count of a multi-count
indictment are part of a package that may ... be revisited to ensure
that the overall sentence on the surviving counts is consistent with
the district court's intentions, the guidelines, and the § 3553(a) fac-
tors”); id. (“[S]entences that include a mandatory consecutive term
of imprisonment ... are particularly well suited to being treated as
a package because they are inherently interdependent.” (quotation
marks and alteration omitted)).
REVERSED, VACATED and REMANDED.
1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.
