Daniel Lee Potter v. Progressive American Insurance Company ( 2022 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 21-11134      Date Filed: 07/07/2022   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 21-11134
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    DANIEL LEE POTTER,
    JOLENE POTTER,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cv-02204-JSM-TGW
    ____________________
    USCA11 Case: 21-11134            Date Filed: 07/07/2022   Page: 2 of 5
    2                      Opinion of the Court                  21-11134
    Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    This appeal involves a Florida third-party bad faith insurance
    claim. The question is whether, under Florida law, a final
    judgment stemming from a consensual settlement can qualify as an
    “excess judgment”—a necessary element for a bad faith insurance
    action. The district court held that a final judgment enforcing a
    settlement is not an excess judgment or its functional equivalent as
    a matter of law. The Potters, the injured parties and third-party
    plaintiffs, appealed.
    This Court recently decided a case involving a consent
    judgment in a bad faith insurance claim, concluding that a “final
    judgment that exceeds all available insurance coverage—regardless
    of whether it results from a consensual settlement or a jury
    verdict—constitutes an ‘excess judgment’ that can satisfy the
    causation element of an insurer-bad-faith claim under Florida law.”
    McNamara v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 
    30 F.4th 1055
    , 1057, 1063 (11th
    Cir. 2022). Because the insurance action here involved a settlement
    followed by a final judgment that could legally qualify as an excess
    judgment, the district court erred in dismissing the case. After
    careful review, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
    I.        Background
    This is a third-party bad faith insurance action brought by
    Plaintiffs Daniel Lee Potter and Jolene Potter against Defendant
    USCA11 Case: 21-11134         Date Filed: 07/07/2022     Page: 3 of 5
    21-11134                Opinion of the Court                         3
    Progressive American Insurance Company. The Potters allege that
    Progressive acted in bad faith in its handling of a bodily injury claim
    that the Potters asserted against Progressive’s insured, Ronald Dale
    Evans, arising from an automobile accident that occurred on
    November 10, 2016. At the time of the accident, Evans was insured
    under a Progressive policy that provided bodily injury liability
    coverage for up to $10,000 per person. The Potters sued Evans,
    and served proposals for settlement to Evans pursuant to 
    Fla. Stat. § 768.79
    , offering to settle the claims in exchange for Evans
    stipulating to a dismissal and agreeing to pay the Potters $125,000
    total.    Evans’s attorney who was hired by Progressive
    recommended that he take the settlement and told Evans that
    doing so would not waive any claims against Progressive for
    negligence or bad faith. Evans accepted and the Potters filed an
    action for bad faith against Progressive in state court that
    Progressive removed to federal court.
    In granting summary judgment in Progressive’s favor, the
    district court relied heavily on the district court’s decision in
    McNamara v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., No. 8:17-CV-3060-T-23CPT,
    
    2020 WL 5223634
    , at *3–4 (M.D. Fla. July 29, 2020), rev’d and
    remanded, 
    30 F.4th 1055
     (11th Cir. 2022), which relied heavily on
    our unpublished decision in Cawthorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,
    791 F. App’x 60 (11th Cir. 2019). In Cawthorn, we held that a
    consent judgment is not an excess judgment for third-party bad
    faith claims. 791 F. App’x at 65. Because an excess judgment is
    required before a bad faith claim can proceed, following Cawthorn,
    USCA11 Case: 21-11134          Date Filed: 07/07/2022   Page: 4 of 5
    4                      Opinion of the Court                21-11134
    the district court found that there was no excess judgment as a
    matter of law. The Potters appealed.
    II.      Standard of Review
    We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
    novo, “view[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    non-moving party.” Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 
    967 F.3d 1121
    , 1134 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quotations omitted).
    Summary judgment is proper if the materials in the record indicate
    “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
    movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
    56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of
    the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
    of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 248 (1986).
    III.   Discussion
    The Potters argue on appeal that Cawthorn’s holding that a
    consent judgment is not an excess judgment is inconsistent with
    Florida law on bad faith insurance claims. Under Florida law, a
    plaintiff who brings a bad faith claim against an insurer for failing
    to settle a lawsuit must prove that the insurer’s conduct caused the
    loss. McNamara, 30 F.4th at 1059. One way to do so is by showing
    an excess judgment—i.e., a judgment against the insured that
    exceeds his insurance coverage. Id. The Potters argue the final
    judgment in this case qualifies as an excess judgment and their case
    should have been able to proceed.
    USCA11 Case: 21-11134        Date Filed: 07/07/2022     Page: 5 of 5
    21-11134               Opinion of the Court                        5
    Our recent decision in McNamara v. Government
    Employees Insurance Co. resolves this appeal. In that case, we
    addressed whether consent judgments in excess of policy limits
    constitute excess judgments that could satisfy the causation
    requirements for bad faith claims under Florida law. Id. at 1057. In
    a published decision, we held that Cawthorn misinterpreted
    Florida law and that a consent judgment can qualify as an excess
    judgment. Id. We looked to Perera v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty
    Co., 
    35 So. 3d 893
     (Fla. 2010), and Fridman v. Safeco Insurance Co.
    of Illinois, 
    185 So. 3d 1214
     (Fla. 2016), in which the Florida courts
    noted that third-party bad faith claims should not be limited to
    judgments acquired after trial. 
    Id.
     at 1059–1060. We held that “[a]
    final judgment that exceeds all available insurance coverage—
    regardless of whether it results from a consensual settlement or a
    jury verdict—constitutes an ‘excess judgment’ that can satisfy the
    causation element of an insurer-bad-faith claim under Florida law.”
    
    Id. at 1063
    .
    Here, the Potters accepted a proposal for settlement and the
    judge entered a final judgment in the underlying action that
    exceeded the policy limits. This final judgment qualified as an
    excess judgment and the district court erred by granting summary
    judgment for Progressive on this issue. We reverse and remand
    for further proceedings.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-11134

Filed Date: 7/7/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/7/2022