Craig Cook v. Thurbert Baker , 139 F. App'x 167 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                              [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                      FILED
    ________________________
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 04-15021
    JUNE 23, 2005
    Non-Argument Calendar               THOMAS K. KAHN
    ________________________                   CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 04-02275-CV-BBM-1
    CRAIG COOK,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    THURBERT BAKER,
    JAMES DONALD, et al., in their
    individual capacity of his/her duties,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (June 23, 2005)
    Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Craig Cook, a Georgia state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court
    order dismissing as frivolous his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action because Cook’s claim
    attacks his conviction and the duration of his sentence rather than the conditions of
    his confinement and thus should have been filed pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    .
    Construed liberally, Cook seems to be challenging the propriety of his conviction
    and sentence as well as the parole board’s retroactive application of a policy
    allegedly requiring Cook to serve ninety percent of his punishment.
    Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court shall review, as soon as
    possible, a prisoner’s complaint in a civil action against a government entity to
    identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
    complaint, if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
    which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a),(b). Because §§ 1915A(b)(1)
    and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) both require the district court to review a prisoner’s civil
    complaint and dismiss the case if it finds the claims frivolous, it stands to reason
    that the standard of review is the same under both provisions.1 Thus, because we
    review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint,
    brought in forma pauperis, as frivolous under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(i), we
    will also review for abuse of discretion the district court’s dismissal of a complaint
    1
    The difference between the two statutes is that § 1915A applies to all civil complaints
    filed by prisoners, whereas § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is applicable only if the prisoner has been granted
    leave to proceed IFP. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and § 1915(a), (e)(2).
    2
    as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Napier v. Preslicka, 
    314 F.3d 528
    , 531
    (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
    124 S.Ct. 1038
     (2004). Moreover, an action is
    considered frivolous if it is "without arguable merit either in law or fact." Bilal v.
    Driver, 
    251 F.3d 1346
    , 1349 (11th Cir. 2001).
    A state prisoner seeking to challenge his conviction or confinement files a
    “petition for writ of habeas corpus” pursuant to § 2254. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (a).
    Claims challenging the fact of conviction or duration of the sentence “fall within
    the ‘core’ of habeas corpus,” while claims challenging the conditions of
    confinement may be brought in a civil rights action under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .
    Nelson v. Campbell, 
    541 U.S. 637
    , ___, 
    124 S.Ct. 2117
    , 2122, 
    158 L.Ed.2d 924
    (2004); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 
    411 U.S. 475
    , 500, 
    93 S.Ct. 1827
    , 1841, 
    36 L.Ed.2d 439
     (1973) (holding that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very
    fact or duration of his physical imprisonment and the relief he seeks is a
    determination that he is entitled to immediate release or speedier release from that
    imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus”). Thus, a civil
    rights action under § 1983 is the appropriate relief when a state prisoner
    constitutionally challenges the conditions of his confinement, but not the fact or
    length of his incarceration. Preiser, 
    411 U.S. at 499
    , 
    93 S.Ct. at 1841
    .
    3
    An action under § 2254 may be filed in either “the district court for the
    district wherein such person is in custody or in the district court for the district
    within which the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2441
    (d); see also Dobard v. Johnson,
    749 F.2d 1503
    , 1504 (11th Cir.
    1985) (noting that a state prisoner may file a petition for habeas corpus in the
    federal judicial district in which he is in custody or in the district in which the
    court that convicted and sentenced him was located).
    The district court properly dismissed Cook’s 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action as
    frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because Cook’s exclusive remedy for his
    claim is to file a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     since his
    claim challenges the propriety of his conviction and sentence, as well as the
    execution of his sentence, rather than the conditions of his confinement.2
    For the above stated reasons, the district court’s dismissal of Cook’s
    complaint is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.3
    2
    Cook’s argument assailing the Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole’s adoption of the
    “90%” policy adopted in 1997, and applied retroactively, has been rendered moot by the Board’s
    decision abandon the policy. See News Release, Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole, March
    10, 2005.
    3
    Cook’s motions for entry of default judgment and summary judgment are denied.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-15021; D.C. Docket 04-02275-CV-BBM-1

Citation Numbers: 139 F. App'x 167

Judges: Anderson, Barkett, Birch, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 6/23/2005

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024