Donald Morris v. James Crosby , 141 F. App'x 794 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 04-14149 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar June 23, 2005
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 97-07382-CV-DLG
DONALD MORRIS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
JAMES CROSBY,
Secretary Florida Department of Corrections,
Respondent-Appellee.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(June 23, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Donald Morris, a state prisoner, through counsel, appeals the denial of his
petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Morris, who presently is serving two life sentences and two seven-year
sentences for his 1994 convictions for sexual battery and indecent assault,
represented himself at trial. Following exhaustion of his state remedies, Morris
filed the instant § 2254 petition, arguing, inter alia, that his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated when he was allowed to represent himself at trial.
On appeal, Morris argues that the statements that he made regarding his
desire to represent himself were equivocal, as he only was presented with a choice
between being represented by counsel from the Public Defender’s (“PD’s”) Office,
whom he felt was incompetent, and representing himself. Morris next argues that,
even assuming that he made an unequivocal request to represent himself, his
waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent for a
variety of reasons related to his education and lack of familiarity with the court
system.
We review de novo the denial of a § 2254 petition. Sims v. Singletary, 155
F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 1998). As amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214(1996), § 2254(d) forbids federal courts from granting habeas relief on claims that
previously were adjudicated in state court, unless the adjudication:
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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Even if the federal court concludes that the state court
applied federal law incorrectly, habeas relief is appropriate only if that application
also is objectively unreasonable. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843,
1850 (2002). Additionally, § 2254(e)(1) provides that “a determination of a
factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant
shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and
convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
“The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of [the] Constitution guarantee that
a person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to
the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by
imprisonment.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2527
(1975). The Sixth Amendment, however, also includes the right to self-
representation. Id. at 831-32, 95 S.Ct. at 2539-40. The Supreme Court has held
that, “[a]lthough a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a
lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he
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should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so
that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is
made with eyes open.” Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2451 (internal quotations and
citation omitted). Based upon Faretta, we have indicated that a defendant must
clearly and unequivocally assert the right to self-representation. Raulerson v.
Wainright, 732 F.2d 803, 808 (11th Cir. 1984). The Faretta standard is satisfied if
the trial record shows that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily elected to
represent himself. Nelson v. Alabama, 292 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002).
The district court correctly concluded that the state courts’ decisions related
to Morris’s representation of himself were not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of federal law, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented. Contrary to Morris’s assertions, he clearly and
unequivocally rejected counsel during the course of his trial, and asserted his right
to represent himself. The record reflects that the trial judge conducted a full
inquiry on the matter, repeatedly advised Morris of his right to counsel and
cautioned him about the danger of representing himself. Yet Morris would not
accept the appointment of any lawyer, including private counsel. Furthermore,
Morris informed the court that he had twelve years of schooling and a high school
diploma and that he had read several books about the law. Consequently, Morris’s
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Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated when the trial court
permitted him to represent himself at trial, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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