Michael W. McWilliams v. Escambia Charter School , 144 F. App'x 840 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 15, 2005
No. 04-15603 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 04-00289-CV-3-RV-EMT
MICHAEL W. MCWILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ESCAMBIA CHARTER SCHOOL,
ESCAMBIA SCHOOL DISTRICT,
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(August 15, 2005)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael W. McWilliams, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. McWilliams initiated the present action against Escambia Charter
School (“ECS”), his former employer; Escambia County School District (“School
District”), identified as ECS’s sponsor; AmStaff Human Resources, Inc.
(“AmStaff”), identified as co-administrator of ECS and McWilliams’s co-
employer; Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”), ECS’s
insurance carrier; and Charles J. Crist, Jr. (“Crist”), Florida Attorney General. As
a result of actions taken by the defendants allegedly resulting in the
discontinuation of his worker’s compensation benefits, the denial of his
unemployment claim, and the dismissal of a lawsuit he filed in Florida state court,
he asserted two general claims against ECS, the School District, AmStaff, and
Liberty Mutual: (1) violation of his First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights based on the defendants’ participation in a conspiracy against
him (“conspiracy-based claims”); and (2) violation of his Due Process rights as a
result of the defendants’ individual negligence (“negligence-based claims”).
Additionally, McWilliams has raised conspiracy-based claims against Crist.
Liberally construing McWilliams’s brief on appeal, he argues that the
district court’s conclusion that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction was not based
on the facts in his complaint, and that the court rendered its decision before
directing him to file a memorandum of law or evidence to support his claims. He
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contends that the court failed to make a proper factual inquiry in dismissing his
complaint, instead finding that ECS, AmStaff, and Liberty Mutual were private
parties. He asserts that because a grant from the State of Florida paid their salaries
or “contracts to operate,” ECS, Amstaff, and Liberty Mutual were acting under the
color of state law. He argues that ECS asserted a defense of governmental
immunity during the state civil proceedings, and Florida statutes provide that ECS
is a public school. He maintains that he is not attempting to re-litigate the claims
presented in his state action, but is relying on those facts to support his claim that
the appellees violated his constitutional rights.
We review a district court’s jurisdictional decision de novo. Barnett v.
Bailey, 956 F.2d 1036, 1039 (11th Cir. 1992). “Federal subject matter jurisdiction
exists if a complaint states a claim arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties
of the United States even though, on the merits, the plaintiff has no federal right.”
Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342, 344 (5th Cir. 1977). A district court can
sua sponte raise a jurisdictional defect at any time. Barnett, 956 F.3d at 1039. “In
determining whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, we respect
the important distinction between the lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Ala. v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347, 1351-1352 (11th Cir. 1998).
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“[A] claim alleged to arise under federal law should not be dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction if ‘the right of the petitioners to recover under
their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States
are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another.’” Id. at
1352 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685, 66 S. Ct. 773, 777, 90 L.Ed.939
(1946)). “[A] federal court may dismiss a federal question claim for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction only if: (1) the alleged claim under the Constitution or
federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction; or (2) such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
“In determining the substantiality of a federal claim . . . , [we] must
determine whether the cause of action alleged is so patently without merit as to
justify the court’s dismissal for want of jurisdiction.” Barnett, 956 F.2d at 1041
(internal quotations and ellipses omitted). “A federal claim will be deemed
without any legal merit if the claim has no plausible foundation, or [if] the court
concludes that a prior Supreme Court decision clearly forecloses the claim.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted) (brackets in original).
There are three different questions pertaining to the defendants in this suit.
We address each in turn.
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A. Charles Crist
The claim against defendant Charles Crist was dismissed on the grounds
that it was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. “[T]he eleventh amendment
partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,
399 (11th Cir. 1986) (internal quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has held
that, absent a legitimate waiver by the State or abrogation by Congress, the
Eleventh Amendment is an absolute bar to suit by an individual against a state in a
federal court. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 1355-56,
39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974). A suit against a state official in his official capacity
constitutes a suit against the State itself. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989). And, a court may raise
an Eleventh Amendment issue on its own motion. McClendon v. Ga. Dep’t of
Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Whiting v. Jackson
State University, 616 F.2d 116, 126 n. 8 (5th Cir.1980)). Thus, the district court
did not err dismissing the claim against Charles Crist.
B. ECS, AmStaff, Liberty Mutual
There are two claims against these parties, a claim of conspiracy and a claim
of negligence. Because Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 S. Ct. 662,
663, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986), clearly forecloses McWilliams’s negligence-based
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claims in this § 1983 action, the claims are wholly insubstantial and frivolous. See
Sanders, 138 F.3d at 1352. As a result, the district court did not err in finding that
it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims.
However, the district court erred in finding that it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over McWilliams’s conspiracy-based claims against ECS, AmStaff,
and Liberty Mutual. The basis of the district court’ s ruling was that these were
private parties, and therefore were not subject to claims under § 1983. However,
private defendants can be held liable in a § 1983 action if they act in concert with
the state officials depriving a plaintiff of constitutional rights. Dennis v. Sparks,
449 U.S. 24, 27-28, 101 S. Ct. 183, 186, 66 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1980). “[N]othing more
than an ‘understanding’ and ‘willful participation’ between private and state
defendants is necessary to show the kind of joint action that will subject private
parties to § 1983 liability.” Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 469 (11th Cir.
1990).
The claims here have a plausible foundation in the complaint, as ECS,
AmStaff, and Liberty Mutual may still be held liable under § 1983 as private
parties. Additionally, no prior Supreme Court case clearly forecloses his claim.
As a result, his claims are not “so patently without merit” as to deprive the district
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court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, the district court erred in dismissing
this claim.
C. School District
Similarly, there is both a negligence and a conspiracy claim against the
School District, which is a public party. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328, 106 S.Ct. at
663, likewise bars the negligence claim against the School District, and the district
court did not err in dismissing that claim. The court, however, did not address
McWilliams’s remaining conspiracy-based claims that the School District violated
his First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Because
McWilliams is alleging a deprivation of his constitutional rights by the School
District, which acts under the color of state law, his claims have a plausible
foundation. His claims also are not clearly foreclosed by a prior Supreme Court
decision and, therefore, are not “so patently without merit” so as to deprive the
district court of jurisdiction. See Barnett, 956 F.2d at 1041. As a result, the
district court erred in finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
McWilliams’s conspiracy-based claims against the School District.
For the above stated reasons, we affirm the district court’s finding that the
claim against Crist was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and that it lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over McWilliams’s negligence-based claims against
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ECS, AmStaff, Liberty Mutual and the School District. We, however, vacate and
remand the district court’s order dismissing Williams’s conspiracy-based claims
against ECS, AmStaff, Liberty Mutual, and the School District for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction.
We emphasize that all we have before us and are deciding at this time is
whether these claims by McWilliams against the remaining defendants are so
frivolous that they cannot support federal jurisdiction. We decide that they are
not. We do not in any way decide whether the claims could survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action if such a motion is
filed by the defendants. See Southpark Square Ltd. v. City of Jackson, 565 F.2d
338, 343 n.7 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting the well-established doctrine that a claim
might be substantial enough to support federal jurisdiction yet not substantial
enough to state a cause of action); see also Karnak Educ. Trust v. Bowen, 821
F.2d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1987) (disagreeing with the district court’s conclusion
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, but affirming nonetheless because the
plaintiff failed to state a cause of action); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 649,
83 S. Ct. 1441, 1444 (1963).
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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