Larry Haynes v. Sacred Heart Hospital ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 30, 2005
No. 05-10840 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00419-CV-MRC/MD
LARRY HAYNES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SACRED HEART HOSPITAL,
F. E. NORA,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(August 30, 2005)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Larry Haynes, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Haynes does not challenge
the district court’s findings regarding the deficiencies of his complaint, rather, he
argues that it was an abuse of discretion to give an eleven-year-old child adult
Lasix, citing to non-binding case law dealing with medical malpractice, personal
injury, and negligence.
We reviews questions of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. See Milan
Express, Inc. v. Averitt Express, Inc., 208 F.3d 975, 978 (11th Cir. 2000). Subject-
matter jurisdiction in federal court can be found under either 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
federal question, or 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity jurisdiction. For federal question
jurisdiction, Haynes must allege a violation of his constitutional rights or a right
created under a federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For diversity jurisdiction, Haynes
must allege that he and the defendants are citizens of different states and that the
matter in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In this case, Haynes is
proceeding under federal question jurisdiction pursuant to § 1983.
In order to prevail on a civil rights action under § 1983, a plaintiff must
show that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color
of state law. Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001).
State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the
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exercise of some right or privilege created by the States or by a rule of conduct
imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible,” and that
“the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to
be a state actor.” Patrick v. Floyd Med. Ctr., 201 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir.
2000). This is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Nail v. Community Action Agency of
Calhoun County, 805 F.2d 1500, 1501 (11th Cir. 1986). If we conclude there is no
state action, we must dismiss the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn
v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001).
Only in rare circumstance may a private party be viewed as a state actor for
§ 1983 purposes. Id. at 1347. To hold that private parties are state actors, we must
conclude that one of the following conditions is met: (1) the state coerced or at
least significantly encouraged the action alleged to violate the Constitution (state
compulsion test); (2) the private parties performed a public function that was
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state (public function test); or (3) the
state had so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private
parties that it was a joint participant in the enterprise (nexus/joint action test). Id.
Because Haynes did not allege a constitutional violation by a state actor, he
fails to meet the jurisdictional prerequisites to bring an action under § 1983.
Haynes did not allege any other basis for federal jurisdiction, and thus, the district
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court properly dismissed his civil complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.
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