United States v. John Sanders, Jr. , 149 F. App'x 929 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                            [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT            FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    SEPTEMBER 16, 2005
    No. 04-14095
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar
    CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 04-00048-CR-LAC
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JOHN SANDERS, JR.,
    a.k.a. Bubba,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (September 16, 2005)
    Before ANDERSON, DUBINA and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant John Sanders, Jr. appeals his 135-month sentence for conspiracy
    to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine
    and 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1),
    (b)(1)(A)(ii), (iii) and 846. On appeal, Sanders argues that, in light of United
    States v. Booker, 543 U.S. __, 
    125 S. Ct. 738
    , 
    160 L. Ed. 2d 621
     (2005) and
    Blakely v. Washington, 
    542 U.S. 296
    , 
    124 S. Ct. 2531
    , 
    159 L. Ed. 2d 403
     (2004),
    the district court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in enhancing his
    sentence based on the determination that he was accountable for 4.8 kilograms of
    crack, a drug quantity that was found by the district court and was not charged in
    the indictment or expressly admitted to by Sanders. Sanders notes that the district
    court stated at sentencing that it would apply the guidelines regardless of whether
    they were mandatory.
    We review a defendant’s preserved constitutional challenge to his sentence
    de novo on appeal but will reverse only for harmful error. United States v. Paz,
    
    405 F.3d 946
    , 948 (11th Cir. 2005). There are two harmful error standards, one
    that applies to constitutional Booker errors and one that applies to statutory Booker
    errors. United States v. Mathenia, 
    409 F.3d 1289
    , 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2005).
    "[C]onstitutional errors are harmless where the government can show, beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendant's ultimate
    sentence. . . ." 
    Id. at 1291
    . However, "[a] non-constitutional [statutory] error is
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    harmless if, viewing the proceedings in their entirety, a court determines that the
    error did not affect the [sentence], or had but very slight effect. If one can say with
    fair assurance. . . that the [sentence] was not substantially swayed by the error, the
    [sentence] is due to be affirmed even though there was error." 
    Id. at 1292
    .
    (internal quotations omitted). The government has the burden of proof under both
    standards. 
    Id. at 1291-92
    . A constitutional Booker error has been committed when
    a judge enhances an individual's sentence based solely on judicially found facts
    pursuant to a mandatory guideline system, in violation of that individual's Sixth
    Amendment right to trial by jury. Paz, 
    405 F.3d at 948
    . A statutory Booker error
    has been committed "when the district court sentences a defendant ‘under a
    mandatory [g]uidelines scheme, even in the absence of a Sixth Amendment
    enhancement violation.'" Mathenia, 
    409 F.3d at 1291
    . (quoting United States v.
    Shelton, 
    400 F.3d 1325
    , 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2005)).
    In the present case, the record demonstrates that the district court sentenced
    Sanders using a base offense level of 38, relying on a finding in the Presentence
    Investigation Report (“PSI”) that Sanders was accountable for a drug quantity of
    4.8 kilograms of crack, rather than using a base offense level corresponding to the
    amounts that Sanders contends he admitted to in his plea colloquy. Sanders argues
    that he objected to the PSI's conclusion both in the PSI and at the sentencing
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    colloquy; however, the record shows that he only objected on the basis of Blakely.
    Neither time did he explicitly state that he was only responsible for a lesser
    amount of cocaine or crack. Because Sanders only objected to the district's court
    use of the 4.8 kilograms of crack in calculating his sentence – and not the facts
    supporting that drug quantity – he is deemed to have admitted to those facts.
    United States v. Shelton, 
    400 F.3d 1325
    , 1330 (11th Cir. 2005). Because Sanders
    admitted to the underlying facts, the district court did not commit a constitutional
    Booker error in enhancing Sanders's sentence based on the 4.8 kilograms of crack
    for which he was found to be accountable. However, the district court still
    committed statutory Booker error when it sentenced Sanders under the then-
    mandatory guidelines scheme. Mathenia, 
    409 F.3d at 1291
    .
    When the district court commits a statutory Booker error, the government
    must prove that, when the proceedings are viewed in their entirety, the error did not
    affect the sentence or had but a slight effect on the sentence. 
    Id. at 1292
    . Here, the
    district court stated that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of
    whether the sentencing guidelines were mandatory or advisory. The court added
    that it found that this sentence "meets the goals of punishment and will act,
    hopefully, as a deterrent to others who might consider similar criminal conduct."
    We have held that when a district court announces an alternative sentence that
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    would have been imposed if the district court had treated the guidelines as
    advisory, then we know "with certainty beyond a reasonable doubt what the district
    court would do upon remand." United States v. Robles, 
    408 F.3d 1324
    , 1328 (11th
    Cir. 2005). When the alternative sentence is identical to the sentence under the
    mandatory guidelines, the error would not change the ultimate sentence, and
    therefore it is harmless. 
    Id.
     See also Unites States v. Petho, 
    409 F.3d 1277
    , 1279-
    80 (11th Cir. 2005). In Robles, we applied the higher standard necessary to show
    harmless error for a constitutional Booker error. Robles, 
    408 F.3d at 1327
    . Like in
    Robles, the district court here explicitly stated that even if the guidelines were
    advisory, it would impose an identical sentence. If the more stringent standard of
    harmless error is satisfied, then the less stringent standard necessary for statutory
    Booker errors will also be satisfied. This then is harmless error. Accordingly, we
    affirm Sanders’s sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
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