Siddiq B. Asad v. Jeb Bush , 170 F. App'x 668 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 14, 2006
No. 05-10306 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-00252-CV-4-RH-WCS
SIDDIQ B. ASAD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JEB BUSH,
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR.,
ORLESTER DICKENS,
ALEX TAYLOR,
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(March 14, 2006)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Siddiq Asad, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his civil rights complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Background
The events giving rise to the present controversy began with an April 2002
Islamic prayer service, at which several inmates at the Gulf Correctional Institution
questioned whether the service was offered at the proper time in light of daylight
savings time. Chaplain Thomas Burgess announced that, because he could not
change the time of the prayer service that week (though he would endeavor to do
so the following week), he would permit inmates to return to their quarters after
roll call to pray at the later time should they wish to do so. Although Asad, as a
religious leader, instructed worshipers to begin in the designated prayer area, six
other inmates entered into a verbal altercation with Burgess about the time change
and stated that they would wait until the proper time and conduct services
elsewhere. The exchange became heated.
Asad remained in the designated prayer area, and most inmates started the
service. Eventually, the six dissident inmates joined the prayer. Nevertheless,
2
Burgess became concerned about security and called a prison officer for assistance.
Officers ultimately handcuffed a group of prisoners, including Asad. As a result of
the incident, Asad received a disciplinary report for his alleged role in the
disagreement and was placed in administrative confinement. The disciplinary
report was rejected, but Asad remained in confinement. Burgess and two other
prison officials then issued another disciplinary report, and other officers found
Asad guilty following a hearing. According to Asad, the officers presiding over
the hearing failed to procure the presence of his witnesses and failed to properly
weigh fifteen witness statements. Asad received sixty days confinement. He filed
numerous grievances about the controversy and hearing, but each was denied.
Asad and three other inmates, proceeding pro se and In Forma Pauperis
(“IFP”), filed a class action civil rights complaint against Jeb Bush, Michael
Moore, James Crosby and 16 other defendants, alleging a wide-ranging conspiracy
taking place throughout the Florida Department of Corrections and its institutions,
whereby Muslim inmates were discriminated against through restrictions placed on
their religious observance and via improper disciplinary techniques.
Upon the magistrate judge’s recommendations, the district court dismissed
all of the plaintiffs except for Asad, dismissed various claims and twice ordered
Asad to amend his complaint to set forth a short, plain statement of the claim. The
3
district court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ IFP status precluded them from
proceeding as a class.
In Asad’s third amended complaint, he alleged that the defendants: (1)
violated his right to freely exercise his religion under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, the Florida Constitution, the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1, and
the Florida Religious Freedom Reform Act by interrupting a Muslim prayer
service; (2) violated his due process rights under the United States and Florida
Constitutions by filing a false disciplinary report and holding an improper hearing
into the allegations; (3) violated his right to privacy under the United States and
Florida Constitutions by searching Asad’s legal materials 1; (4) engaged in a
conspiracy to violate his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and Florida statutes by
filing and rescinding false disciplinary reports; (5) were liable for the actions of
their subordinates for violating the aforementioned rights; and (6) discriminated
against him based on his religion and race. Asad requested declaratory and
injunctive relief and monetary damages.
The magistrate judge reviewed the complaint and recommended dismissal
for, inter alia, failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Asad
1
Asad does not raise this issue on appeal. Therefore, it is waived. Narey v. Dean, 32
F.3d 1521, 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1994).
4
filed objections to the recommendation and moved for the appointment of counsel.
The district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation over Asad’s objections
without ruling on his motion for the appointment of counsel. Asad now appeals.
II. Discussion
We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as
true and granting the motion only if there is no set of facts that would entitle the
plaintiff to relief. Huges v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003); Marsh
v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1023 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc). “Pro se
pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys
and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148
F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
In order to state a claim under § 1983, Asad must establish two elements: (1)
that he suffered a deprivation of rights, and “(2) that the act or omission causing
the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of law.” Wideman v.
Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1987)
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
Free Exercise Claim
Asad argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claims under the
5
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the RLUIPA by applying
incorrect pleading standards to each. He further asserts that no legitimate
peneological interest justified the officials’ treatment of the worshiping inmates.
Inmates “clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment.”
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citing Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that
“[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of
many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying
our penal system.” Id.We give deference to the decisions of prison officials, and we employ a
“reasonableness” test to determine whether a regulation infringes constitutional
rights. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349. The Supreme Court has established four factors
to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a regulation: “(1) whether
the regulation has a valid, rational connection to a legitimate governmental interest;
(2) whether alternative means are open to inmates to exercise the asserted right; (3)
what impact an accommodation of the right would have on guards and inmates and
prison resources; and (4) whether there are ready alternatives to the regulation.”
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136 (2000) (citation omitted). The fourth
factor asks whether “a prisoner has pointed to some obvious regulatory alternative
6
that fully accommodates the asserted right while not imposing more than a de
minimis cost to the valid peneological goal.” Id.Here, Asad failed to state a First Amendment claim because the guards’
actions were reasonable and had a valid relationship to a legitimate peneological
interest, namely, the need to maintain control over the inmates and provide
security. Several inmates engaged in a heated discussion with prison guards and
insisted on holding their services under circumstances that were not approved by
the guards. By permitting inmates to conduct prayers at the requested time
individually, the guards offered an alternative that would enable the inmates to
exercise their rights.
Nor did Asad state a claim under RLUIPA. Section 3 of RLUIPA
applies strict scrutiny to government actions that substantially burden
the religious exercise of institutionalized persons: No government
shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person
residing in or confined to an institution, . . . even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability, unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person– (1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Thus, the state must show that imposing the burden on
religious exercise furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
As the guards acted in the interest of securing the inmates and the prison
7
facility, and the guards did not prohibit the inmates from exercising their religion
in an alternative location, Asad has not stated a claim under RLUIPA.
Due Process Claim
Asad asserts that he stated a due process claim because the defendants filed a
false disciplinary report and held an improper hearing, ignoring his right to submit
evidence. He contends that the district court applied the wrong standard when it
considered only his loss of gain time as the basis for a constitutional violation.
This court has held that
a prisoner can be further deprived of his liberty such that due process
is required [when] . . . [1] a change in the prisoner’s conditions of
confinement is so severe that it essentially exceeds the sentence
imposed by the court . . . and [2] the state has consistently bestowed a
certain benefit to prisoners, . . . and the deprivation of that benefit
imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Punishing prisoners “effectuates prison management and prisoner
rehabilitation goals . . . [and] falls within the expected [parameters] of the sentence
imposed by a court of law.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995).
Florida law permits prison officials to place inmates in administrative
confinement for the purpose of control and supervision. Chandler v. Baird, 926
F.2d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 1991). Here, Asad was accorded procedural due
8
process, in the form of a disciplinary hearing, when he was placed in confinement.
His bare assertion that the hearing violated due process is insufficient to state a
claim. See Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984) (“In civil
rights actions, it has been held that a complaint will be dismissed as insufficient
where the allegations it contains are vague and conclusory.”).
Supervisory Liability
Because we have held that the defendants did not violate Asad’s due process
rights or his rights to freely exercise his religion, we hold that the district court
properly dismissed his claim against Senior Chaplain Taylor. Taylor cannot be
held liable for the conduct of the other chaplains under any theory of liability if the
conduct of the subordinate chaplains did not violate Asad’s rights.
Conspiracy Claim
Asad next argues that he stated a claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §
1985 because Burgess and two other prison officials conspired to violate his rights
when they rescinded a disciplinary report, did not release him from confinement
and later instituted a second disciplinary report. He alleges that the conspiracy is
part of a broader pattern of discrimination against African-Americans at the prison.
Section 1985(3) requires that a plaintiff show some racial or other
discriminatory animus in order to establish a conspiracy claim. See Park v. City of
9
Atlanta, 120 F.3d 1157, 1161 (11th Cir. 1997). To the extent that Asad challenges
the actions taken against him as a prisoner, that claim lacks merit. Prisoners are
not a protected class under § 1985(3). Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1224, 1229 n.7
(11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
To the extent Asad asserts the disciplinary procedures were racially
motivated, that claim also fails. His complaint does not allege a racial motivation,
and, as Asad alleges a racial motivation for the first time on appeal, we need not
consider that allegation. Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1994).
Discrimination Claims and RICO Violations
Asad argues that the defendants discriminated against him based on his race
and religion, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. However, § 1981 does not provide
for claims against state actors. Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 892-94
(11th Cir. 2000). To the extent Asad raises an equal protection claim, it fails
because he made only “vague and conclusory” allegations suggesting that similarly
situated people were treated more favorably. Fullman, 739 F.2d at 556-57.
Likewise, Asad’s RICO claim fails. To the extent Asad alleges a criminal
RICO violation, his claim fails because “a private citizen lacks a judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). To the extent Asad alleges a civil RICO
10
claim, he cannot succeed because he has not alleged the requisite injury to his
“business or property.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
Supplemental Jurisdiction Over State Claims
Asad’s argument that the court erred in failing to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over his state law claims also fails. We review a district court’s
decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims for an
abuse of discretion. Raney v. Allstate Insurance Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89
(11th Cir. 2004). Generally, a district court should “dismiss any remaining state
claims when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” Id. at
1089. Accordingly, the district court did not err in doing so in the instant case.
Class Certification
Because we affirm the district court’s order dismissing all of Asad’s claims,
we need not consider whether the court erred in refusing to certify the proposed
class in Asad’s first complaint.2
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
2
On appeal, Asad also claims that the court erred by dismissing his complaint without
ruling on his motion for appointment of counsel and before the defendants responded. Both
arguments are without merit. First, a plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel in a civil
case, Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 1999), and the district court should appoint
counsel only in exceptional circumstances. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir.
1992). Such circumstances are lacking here. See Bass, 170 F.3d at 1320; Fowler v. Jones, 899
F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990). Second, according to the statute governing IFP proceedings,
28 U.S.C. § 1915, a district court may dismiss a case “at any time,” including prior to the
defendants’ response. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
11