Leann Brown v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart , 158 F. App'x 227 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 05-13666 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 9, 2005
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 04-00506-CV-CB-L
LEANN BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(December 9, 2005)
Before BLACK, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Leann Brown appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), and supplemental security income, 42 U.S.C. § 1393(c)(3).
Brown asserts the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred by failing to consider
her subjective complaints of pain and all of her impairments in combination. We
affirm the Commissioner’s denial of benefits.
We review a social security case to determine whether the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal
standards were applied. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997).
We require a claimant who seeks “to establish a disability based on testimony of
pain and other symptoms” to show: “(1) evidence of an underlying medical
condition; and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence confirming the severity of
the alleged pain; or (b) that the objectively determined medical condition can
reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284
F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, “credibility determinations are the
province of the ALJ.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005).
We do not require the ALJ to “specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his
decision,” so long as the decision is sufficient to allow this Court to conclude the
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ALJ considered the claimant’s medical condition as a whole. Dyer v. Barnhart,
395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Brown failed to
show objective medical evidence confirming the severity of her alleged pain or that
any objectively determined medical condition can reasonably be expected to give
rise to the claimed pain. Although Brown periodically complained of pain to her
treating physician, the medical evidence showed she was able to walk
independently, even at a slight grade, and lift up to 25 pounds above her head.
When Brown saw Dr. Crompton on February 27, 2001, Dr. Crompton noted she
had a mild limp but was “definitely improving.” While Brown complained of pain
in her right shoulder, Dr. Brockington, who repeatedly examined Brown’s right
shoulder, noted Brown’s shoulder showed “significant improvement.”
Furthermore, according to Brown’s own testimony, she was able to perform a
variety of daily activities, including some housework and grocery shopping with
assistance. She also continued to drive. In sum, there is substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s finding that Brown had not established a disability based on her
subjective testimony of pain.
Brown next argues the ALJ did not consider the combined effect of her
thyroiditis, carpal tunnel syndrome, tendonitis of her right shoulder, traumatic
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calcification of her right hip, and adjustment disorder, when making his residual
functional capacity determination. Brown failed to raise this argument before the
district court. Therefore, we do not need to consider this claim. Kelley v. Apfel,
185 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Brown was not
disabled due to her complaints of pain. We affirm the Commissioner’s denial of
benefits.
AFFIRMED.
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