Tina Castillo v. Federal Corr. Inst of Tallahassee ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
January 5, 2006
No. 05-12857 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00055-CV-4-RH
TINA CASTILLO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION OF TALLAHASSEE,
Respondent,
JOSE VAZQUEZ,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(January 5, 2006)
Before DUBINA, BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Federal prisoner Tina Castillo appeals the district court’s denial of her 28
U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking credit against her federal
sentence for time served prior to the imposition of her federal sentence. The
district court did not err, and we affirm.
In reviewing the denial of a habeas petition, we review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error and review de novo the court’s interpretation of a
statute. Rodriguez v. Lamer, 60 F.3d 745, 747 (11th Cir. 1995). Regarding the
BOP’s decisions concerning the award of credit for time served
the judiciary retains the final authority on matters of constitutionality
and statutory construction. Where an administrating agency’s
construction of a statute is at issue, however, a deferential two-step
process of review had been established. First, if congressional
purpose is clear, then interpreting courts and administrative agencies
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
A second level of review, however, is triggered when the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue. Where an
administrating agency has interpreted the statute, a reviewing court is
bound by the Chevron rule of deference. A court may not substitute
its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation by an administrating agency. Agency interpretation is
reasonable and controlling unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. Thus, we defer to an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering.
Id. (internal quotations, citations, and footnote omitted).
2
Section 3585(b) provides:
A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of
imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to
the date the sentence commences–
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was
imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was
arrested after the commission of the offense for which the
sentence was imposed;
that has not been credited against another sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). District courts are not authorized to compute a credit at
sentencing. United States v. Wilson, 112 S. Ct. 1351, 1354 (1992).
The district court did not err in denying Castillo’s petition because she was
not entitled to credit for time served. Pursuant to the clear terms of § 3585(b), a
defendant can receive credit for time served only if the specified time period has
not been credited against another sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Castillo does
not dispute the Iowa state court gave her credit against her state sentence for the
period of August 20, 2000, through November 20, 2001. Because this time period
was credited against another sentence, Castillo was not entitled to a second credit
3
against her federal sentence. See Wilson, 112 S. Ct. at 1355-1356 (stating
Congress made clear in § 3585 a defendant could not receive a double credit for his
detention time).
AFFIRMED.
4