United States v. Henry Lee White , 163 F. App'x 834 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                             [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT            FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-11965                   JANUARY 20, 2006
    Non-Argument Calendar              THOMAS K. KAHN
    CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 98-00106-CR-18JGG
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    HENRY LEE WHITE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (January 20, 2006)
    Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Henry Lee White appeals pro se the district court’s denial of his
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) motion to modify or reduce his term of imprisonment. In
    1998, White was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1), and using and carrying a firearm during and in
    relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c). He now
    argues that he is entitled to relief based on the change made by Amendment 591 to
    § 1B1.1(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines requiring that the applicable
    guideline section be determined by the offense of conviction. He claims that
    because no drug quantity was found by the jury in his case, his base offense level
    under the career offender provision, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, should be lowered because
    he should have been sentenced under the provision of § 841 which carries a 20-
    year statutory maximum.1
    We review a district court’s decision whether to reduce a defendant’s
    sentence pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) for abuse of discretion. United States
    v. Brown, 
    332 F.3d 1341
    , 1343 (11th Cir. 2003).
    “Under 
    18 U.S.C. §3582
    (c)(2), a district court has discretion to reduce the
    term of imprisonment of an already incarcerated defendant when that defendant
    1
    The government asks us to hold that discretionary rulings made under § 3582(c)(2) are
    unreviewable pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a), and to dismiss White’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    We refuse to hold as the government urges. We have jurisdiction over White’s appeal because it
    is a final order denying White’s motion for reduction of sentence. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We have also
    routinely handled § 3582 appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Vautier, 
    144 F.3d 756
     (11th Cir. 1998).
    2
    was sentenced based on a sentencing range that was subsequently lowered by the
    Sentencing Commission pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 994
    (o).” United States v. Bravo,
    
    203 F.3d 778
    , 780 (11th Cir. 2000). However, § 3582(c) does not grant the district
    court jurisdiction to reconsider all original sentencing determinations. Id. at 781-
    82. Pursuant to § 3582(c), the district court may not modify an imposed term of
    imprisonment upon motion of the defendant unless the defendant’s sentencing
    range was subsequently lowered by an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines.
    Id.
    Amendment 591 became effective on November 1, 2000, and is retroactively
    applicable. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c). Under the amendment, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(a)
    instructs the district court to “determine, pursuant to § 1B1.2 (Applicable
    Guidelines), the offense guideline section from Chapter Two (Offense Conduct)
    applicable to the offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 591.
    Furthermore, Amendment 591 changed U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a), instructing the
    sentencing court to “[r]efer to the Statutory Index (Appendix A) to determine the
    Chapter Two offense guideline, referenced in the Statutory Index for the offense of
    conviction. . . . For statutory provisions not listed in the Statutory Index, use the
    most analogous guideline.” Id. (amending U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a)). The amendment
    was designed to rectify confusion among circuits as to whether the sentencing
    3
    court should apply a guideline section referenced in the Statutory Index, rather than
    selecting the guideline section based on the defendant’s actual conduct, even if
    uncharged. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 591, “Reason for Amendment.” The
    Statutory Index indicates that U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 is the applicable guideline section
    for § 841(a) offenses. U.S.S.G. App. A.
    Amendment 591, however, only applies to the selection of the relevant
    offense guideline, not the selection of a base offense level within the applicable
    offense guideline; it “does not constrain the use of judicially found facts to select a
    base offense level within the relevant guideline.” United States v. Moreno, 
    421 F.3d 1217
    , 1219-20 (11th Cir. 2005).
    After reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we conclude that
    the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying White’s § 3582 motion.2
    White’s base offense level was initially determined by U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, which is
    the applicable guideline section for § 841(a) offenses. U.S.S.G. App. A. As the
    Statutory Index contains an applicable guideline section for White’s offense of
    conviction, there is nothing in the text of Amendment 591 that impacts his
    2
    The district court denied White’s motion in an endorsed order. We have, in the past, noted
    our disapproval of the district court’s use of endorsed orders. See In re Ford Motor Co., 
    345 F.3d 1315
    , 1317 (11th Cir. 2003) (admonishing district court not to enter summary orders and to provide
    “a meaningful explanation of its decision[s]”). However, the law, record, and briefs of the parties
    allow for meaningful appellate review in this case despite the endorsed order.
    4
    sentence. White argues that because the drug quantity in his case was not
    determined by a jury, he should have been sentenced pursuant to a different offense
    of conviction and, therefore, received a lower base offense level. However,
    Moreno is directly on point, and clearly rejected such an argument. Moreno, 421
    F.3d at 1220. Therefore, this portion of White’s argument is without merit.
    White was sentenced as a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
    Under § 4B1.1, if the offense statutory maximum is life, the offense level is 37
    while if the offense statutory maximum is 20 years, the offense level is 32. Even
    so, §4B1.1 does not appear in the Statutory Index. (See generally U.S.S.G. App.
    A). Moreover, the selection of § 4B1.1 was not based upon actual conduct which
    was uncharged, but upon White’s criminal history.
    Even if, as White argues, he should have been sentenced under the provision
    of § 841 which carries a 20-year statutory maximum, Amendment 591 would only
    affect selection of the proper base offense level guideline, not the selection of the
    correct base offense level within that guideline. Moreno, 421 F.3d at 1219-20.
    Moreover, even if the district court used the wrong statutory maximum in
    computing White’s base offense level under § 4B1.1, Amendment 591 does not
    address that error, but only addresses the improper consideration of actual, but
    uncharged, conduct in selecting the applicable guideline. Thus, Amendment 591
    5
    does not apply to the instant case, and provides no basis for a sentence
    modification pursuant to § 3582.
    Because Amendment 591 had no impact on White’s sentence, we hold that
    the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his § 3582 motion.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying White’s motion to
    modify or reduce his term of imprisonment.
    AFFIRMED.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-11965; D.C. Docket 98-00106-CR-18JGG

Citation Numbers: 163 F. App'x 834

Judges: Carnes, Dubina, Per Curiam, Tjoflat

Filed Date: 1/20/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024