Leopold O v. Enwonwu v. Trans Union, LLC , 164 F. App'x 914 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-13695 JANUARY 31, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-00282-CV-ODE-1
LEOPOLD O.V. ENWONWU,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TRANS UNION, LLC,
d.b.a. Trans Union Consumer Relations,
EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, L.L.C.,
WINDING RIVER VILLAGE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,
INC.,
ALAN ARMSTRONG,
JOYCE WEEMS,
RICHARD M. HOWE,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(January 31, 2006)
Before DUBINA, CARNES and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Leopold O.V. Enwonwu owned a condominium in a development subject to
the articles and bylaws of the Winding River Village Condominium Association,
Inc. In October of 1996, Winding River filed suit against him in state court,
seeking $6,639 in unpaid association dues and other damages. The state court
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction in January of 1997. However, Trans
Union, LLC, listed the claim as a judgment against Enwonwu in his consumer
credit report, which it published to various entities.
In February of 1997, Winding River filed suit against Enwonwu on the same
claims in the appropriate state court. Enwonwu counterclaimed and Winding River
filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaims. In February of 1998, the state court
entered a judgment of $19,555 against Enwonwu. The judgment encompassed the
$6,639 sought by Winding River in its initial action.
In February of 2002, Richard M. Howe, counsel for the board of directors
for Winding River, filed a summons of continuing garnishment against Enwonwu
in state court, seeking to recover the February of 1998 judgment. Shortly
thereafter, Howe voluntarily dismissed the action. However, Equifax Information
Systems, LLC, included the garnishment in Enwonwu’s credit report, which it
2
published to various entities.
In 2001 and 2002, Enwonwu sought to purchase real property in three
unrelated transactions. Two of these transactions failed to close due to Enwonwu’s
inability to obtain satisfactory financing. The other transaction closed but
Enwonwu had to accept a high interest rate.
In December of 2002, Enwonwu requested copies of his credit reports from
Trans Union and Equifax. He discovered the listing of the $6,639 judgment in his
Trans Union report and informed the company that he had a dismissal order related
to that suit. In January of 2002, Trans Union sent Enwonwu a letter, stating that it
had verified the accuracy of the $6,639 judgment and would not remove it from the
report. Trans Union included a letter generally explaining that credit reports are
used by lenders to determine the risk in granting a consumer a loan and are used in
calculating credit scores.
In January of 2003, Enwonwu filed suit against defendants, Trans Union;
Equifax; Winding River; Alan Armstrong, chief executive officer of Winding
River; Joyce Weems, chief administrative officer of Winding River; and Howe,
alleging multiple violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §
1681, et seq. He claimed that Trans Union violated the FCRA by failing to take
reasonable steps to confirm the accuracy of information it published in his credit
3
report and by continuing to include the $6,639 judgment in his credit report after
he disputed the accuracy of the information. He alleged that Equifax violated the
FCRA by publishing inaccurate information in his credit report related to the
garnishment filed in 2002. He alleged that Winding River and Howe violated the
FCRA by accessing his credit report without his knowledge or consent in order to
confirm that Equifax had published information related to the garnishment.
Additionally, Enwonwu alleged that Trans Union and Equifax had committed libel
in violation of Georgia law because their credit reports had portrayed him as
unreliable to potential creditors. See O.C.G.A. § 51-5-1.
In March of 2003, Enwonwu filed a motion for partial summary judgment.
Later, having already amended his complaint once with leave of court, Enwonwu
filed a motion to further amend his complaint to assert additional claims against
Trans Union and Equifax and to assert libel claims against Winding River,
Armstrong, Weems, and Howe. He also filed motions to compel discovery, to
impose sanctions, and to issue subpoenas to compel third party disclosures.
In a November 20, 2003 order, the district court denied Enwonwu’s motion
for partial summary judgment and dismissed all of his claims except for his claim
against Trans Union under § 1681e(b). The court denied Enwonwu’s motion for
leave to further amend his complaint, concluding that an amendment would be
4
futile. The court granted the defendants’ motion for stay of discovery and denied
Enwonwu’s motions to obtain subpoenas, compel discovery, and for sanctions.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), Winding River, Weems, and Armstrong filed a
motion, asking the court to enter final judgment in their favor. On January 27,
2004, the district court granted the motion for final judgment under Rule 54(b) and
sua sponte entered final judgment with regard to all the other claims it dismissed in
its November 20, 2003 order.
Trans Union filed a motion for summary judgment or, alternatively for
sanctions. In an order entered on March 21, 2005, the district court granted Trans
Union’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Enwonwu had failed to
produce evidence supporting his claim that Trans Union’s inaccurate report had
caused him harm. Enwonwu filed a motion for a new trial, asking the court to set
aside the judgment in favor of Trans Union. Shortly thereafter, he filed a motion
for reconsideration, seeking relief from the January 27, 2004 judgment and from
the court’s denial of his motion to further amend the complaint in the November
20, 2003 order. The district court construed Enwonwu’s motion for new trial as a
motion to reconsider under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) because his case had never
proceeded to trial. The court denied both motions in an order entered on June 6,
2005.
5
Enwonwu appealed from the district court’s June 6, 2005 order, challenging
not only that order but also three of the court’s previous orders. In an order entered
on October 4, 2005, this Court dismissed his appeal in part, stating that it lacked
jurisdiction to review Enwonwu’s challenges related to the district court’s
November 20, 2003 order and January 27, 2004 judgment because his notice of
appeal, filed on June 30, 2005, was untimely to appeal those orders. See Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). We stated that his appeal could proceed as to his challenge to
the March 21, 2005 order, granting Trans Union’s motion for summary judgment
on his § 1681e(b) claim, and as to his challenge to the June 6, 2005 order. As to
the June 6 order, however, we ruled that the appeal would be limited to a
determination of whether the district court had abused its discretion in denying
Enwonwu’s motions and would not extend to the validity of the underlying
January 27, 2004 judgment.
On appeal, Enwonwu contends that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motions to further amend his complaint, compel discovery, and issue
subpoenas, and by abridging discovery time to thirty days.1 Enwonwu also
contends that the district court erred in granting Trans Union’s motion for
1
In his reply brief, Enwonwu also challenges the district court’s June 14, 2004 order,
granting Trans Union’s motion to compel discovery. Enwonwu did not present this argument in
his initial brief. Accordingly, the issue is deemed waived. See Roger v. Noone, 704 F.2d 518,
520 n.1 (11th Cir. 1983).
6
summary judgment on his libel and §§ 1681(a)(1) and (6) claims against Trans
Union, and in granting the defendants’ motions for summary judgment on his
claims against Equifax, Winding River, Weems, Armstrong, and Howe. These
contentions relate to the district court’s November 20, 2003 order. In our October
4, 2005 order, we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the portion of Enwonwu’s
appeal challenging the district court’s November 20, 2003 order. We therefore will
not address those contentions.
Enwonwu contends that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of Trans Union on his § 1681e(b) claim. This challenge relates
to the district court’s March 21, 2005 order, which we have jurisdiction to review.
Enwonwu argues that Trans Union admitted reporting incorrect information in his
credit report and that there is a presumption that entities that obtained his credit
report used it to evaluate his credit applications.
We review a district court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment de
novo. Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins. Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002).
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show that
there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)) (internal
7
marks omitted). The evidence, and all inferences drawn from the facts, must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356
(1986).
Section 1681e(b) provides that “[w]henever a consumer reporting agency
prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about
whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). To establish a prima facie case of
a violation of § 1681e(b), a consumer must present evidence that a credit reporting
agency’s report was inaccurate and was a causal factor in the denial of his credit
application. Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156, 1161
(11th Cir. 1991). The FCRA, however, “does not make reporting agencies strictly
liable for all inaccuracies.” Id. “The agency can escape liability if it establishes
that an inaccurate report was generated by following reasonable procedures . . . .”
Id.Trans Union inaccurately reported that a judgment had been entered against
Enwonwu for $6,639. However, the only evidence of causation offered by
Enwonwu, other than his own allegations that Trans Union had caused him harm,
was a letter from Trans Union indicating in general terms that potential creditors
8
use credit reports and credit scores in evaluating credit applications, and his
own credit report reflecting that credit inquiries were made by potential creditors.
This evidence may support an inference that Trans Union’s report was considered
in evaluating Enwonwu’s credit applications, however it does not support an
inference that the inaccurate information included in the report was the cause of his
inability to obtain satisfactory financing in the three transactions given that there
were several other negative entries in Enwonwu’s credit report. Enwonwu has
failed to present any evidence that those other negative entries were inaccurate, or
that they would not have led to the same lending results even without Trans
Union’s error involving the $6,639 association dues matter. Because Enwonwu
has not created a genuine issue of material fact that the inaccurate information
reported by Trans Union caused him harm, he has failed to establish a prima facie
case of a violation of § 1681e. Consequently, the district court did not err in
granting Trans Union’s motion for summary judgment on his § 1681e(b) claim.
Enwonwu contends that the district court erred in denying his Rule 60(b)
motion for a new trial against Trans Union and motion for reconsideration of the
district court’s November 20, 2003 order and January 27, 2004 judgment. We
review the denial of Rule 60(b) motions only for an abuse of discretion. Waddell
v. Hendry County Sheriff’s Office, 329 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003). Rule
9
60(b) provides that upon motion, a court may relieve a party of a final judgment
for, among other things, mistake in the judgment and newly discovered evidence.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Additionally, Rule 60(b)(6) allows a court to grant relief
from a judgment for “any other reason justifying relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6). However, “[f]ederal courts grant relief under Rule 60(b)(6) only for
extraordinary circumstances.” Frederick v. Kirby Tankships, Inc., 205 F.3d 1277,
1288 (11th Cir. 2000).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Enwonwu’s motion
for a new trial against Trans Union, which the court had construed as a motion to
reconsider the judgment in favor of Trans Union. The motion’s grounds did not fit
within any of the specific circumstances set out in Rule 60(b)(1)–(5), nor did they
describe an extraordinary circumstance warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6), see
Frederick, 205 F.3d at 1288.
Similarly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Enwonwu’s motion for reconsideration. Enwonwu merely re-asserted the
arguments he previously presented in support of his motion for partial summary
judgment. His motion for reconsideration did not present an extraordinary
circumstance warranting relief.
AFFIRMED.
10