William Roth v. Michael J. Astrue , 249 F. App'x 167 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
September 26, 2007
No. 07-11927 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00117-CV-CAR-5
WILLIAM ROTH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(September 26, 2007)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
William Roth appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Roth argues that
substantial evidence does not support the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ)
determination that no evidentiary weight should be given to an opinion by a
treating physician, Dr. Kazi, regarding Roth’s physical limitations.
We review the ALJ’s decision “to determine if it is supported by substantial
evidence and based on proper legal standards.” Crawford v. Comm’r, 363 F.3d
1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. Even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s
findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial
evidence.” Id. at 1158-59 (internal citation and quotation omitted). In conducting
this review, we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of
the ALJ. Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). However, we
review the Commissioner’s legal conclusions de novo. Lewis v. Barnhart, 285
F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002).
If a treating physician’s opinion on the nature and severity of a claimant’s
impairments is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques, and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in
2
the record, the ALJ must give it controlling weight. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2). If the treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to controlling
weight, we have held that “the testimony of a treating physician must be given
substantial or considerable weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.”
Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440
(11th Cir. 1997)). Further, we have found good cause and discounted a treating
physician’s report when the report “is not accompanied by objective medical
evidence or is wholly conclusory.’” Id. (quoting Edwards v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d
580, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1991)). Additionally, there is good cause where the treating
physician’s opinions are inconsistent with their own medical records. Lewis v.
Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Kazi’s opinion was not and should not be
assigned substantial weight because it was inconsistent with the record as a whole
and not supported by the doctor’s own medical records. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner’s denial of disability
insurance benefits.
AFFIRMED.
3