Kinnard v. Commissioner of Social Security , 426 F. App'x 835 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                             [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    MAY 17, 2011
    No. 10-15227                    JOHN LEY
    Non-Argument Calendar                 CLERK
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cv-00628-SCB-AEP
    GEORGE KINNARD,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (May 17, 2011)
    Before HULL, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    George Kinnard appeals the order that affirmed the denial of his
    applications for disability insurance benefits and supplement security income from
    the Social Security Administration. 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 405
    (g), 1383(c)(3). Kinnard
    challenges the hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert. We affirm.
    Kinnard argues that the hypothetical question was incomplete because the
    administrative law judge did not mention that the claimant could tolerate frequent
    exposure to certain environmental conditions, but we disagree. A “hypothetical
    question[] adequately account[s] for a claimant’s limitations . . . when the
    question[] otherwise implicitly account[s] for the[] limitations.” Winschel v.
    Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    631 F.3d 1176
    , 1180 (11th Cir. 2011). The administrative
    law judge instructed the vocational expert that the hypothetical individual had “no
    significant environmental limitations,” which accounted for the minimal
    environmental limitations that the administrative law judge included in Kinnard’s
    residual functional capacity assessment.
    Kinnard also argues that the questions posed to the vocational expert did not
    account for his difficulty in maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace
    because of his depression and substance abuse, but again we disagree.
    “Concentration, persistence, or pace refers to the ability to sustain focused
    attention and concentration sufficiently long to permit the timely and appropriate
    completion of tasks commonly found in work settings.” 
    20 C.F.R. § 404
    , Subpt.
    P, App. 1. The administrative law judge credited the findings of Steven Kanakis, a
    2
    consultative psychologist, that Kinnard had logical and coherent thought
    processes, fair concentration and attention, and of Alfred Jonas, a psychiatrist, that
    Kinnard could complete and make judgments about simple matters, suffered no
    more than mild impairments in completing and making judgments about complex
    matters, and could interact with others and respond appropriately in usual work
    surroundings. Based on this evidence, the administrative law judge determined
    that Kinnard had “mild to moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, and
    pace,” and hypothetical questions asked by the administrative law judge and
    Kinnard’s attorney accounted for these limitations, see Winschel, 
    631 F.3d at 1180
    . The administrative law judge asked the vocational expert to determine what
    work could be performed by a claimant who was mildly limited in his ability to
    understand, remember, and execute complex instructions; mildly to moderately
    limited in his ability to make judgments on complex work-related decisions;
    mildly limited in his ability to interact appropriately with the public, supervisors,
    and coworkers; and mildly limited in his ability to respond appropriate to changes
    in a routine work setting. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1545
    (c) (the “limited ability to
    carry out certain mental activities” encompasses “limitations in understanding,
    remembering, and carrying out instructions, and in responding appropriately to
    supervision, co-workers, and work pressures in a work setting”). Kinnard’s
    3
    attorney later asked if a marked limitation in executing detailed instructions would
    eliminate any of the four jobs available to Kinnard, and the vocational expert
    responded that the limitation would not reduce the availability of the jobs because
    they were “simple, repetitive, one to three-step jobs.” See Simila v. Astrue, 
    573 F.3d 503
    , 521–22 (7th Cir. 2009) (“claimants who . . . are ‘mildly to moderately
    limited in [concentration, persistence, or pace]’ are able to perform ‘simple and
    repetitive light work’” (quoting Sims v. Barnhart, 
    309 F.3d 424
    , 431 (7th Cir.
    2002)). The vocational expert understood and considered all of Kinnard’s
    limitations.
    The denial of Kinnard’s application for benefits is AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-15227

Citation Numbers: 426 F. App'x 835

Judges: Hull, Pryor, Fay

Filed Date: 5/17/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024