United States v. Gerald Alphonse Joyner , 212 F. App'x 928 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DEC 29, 2006
No. 06-13638 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 02-00212-CR-1-CG
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GERALD ALPHONSE JOYNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(December 29, 2006)
Before BLACK, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gerald Alphonse Joyner appeals his 24-month sentence imposed for
violating the terms of his supervised release. After review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Joyner pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to 27 months’ imprisonment, to be
followed by three years’ supervised release. As a condition of his supervised
release, Joyner was to refrain from excessive use of alcohol and prohibited from
purchasing, possessing or using a controlled substance. Joyner was also required
to participate in alcohol and drug testing and a treatment program.
After serving his prison term, Joyner began his supervised release on March
7, 2005. Joyner repeatedly tested positive for either cocaine or ethanol. After
Joyner admitted to his probation officer that he had used cocaine, Joyner was
placed in a substance abuse program. When he again tested positive for ethanol on
three occasions, Joyner agreed to participate in a 90-day residential treatment
program. After completing the 90-day program, however, Joyner again tested
positive for cocaine and admitted that, because he had expected a positive
urinalysis, he had substituted someone else’s urine for his own. Joyner’s probation
officer petitioned the district court for revocation of Joyner’s supervised release.
At the revocation hearing, Joyner admitted his violations and to having a
“drug problem.” Based on his Grade C violations and a criminal history category
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of IV, Joyner’s advisory Chapter 7 guidelines range was 6 to 12 months’
imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). The statutory maximum term of
imprisonment was two years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(3)(3). Joyner requested that
he be sentenced to 6 months’ community confinement at a halfway house so that
he could receive drug treatment and maintain his ability to work. The government
made no recommendation as to sentence, but requested that Joyner not be put on
supervised release following his term of imprisonment because it believed Joyner
would be unable to comply with the terms of supervised release.
In sentencing Joyner, the district court expressly noted that it had
“considered the sentencing guidelines” as well as “Joyner’s background and
history,” and that, “[b]ased on his extensive criminal history and his unwillingness
to abide by the conditions of probation,” a guideline range sentence was not
appropriate. The district court further explained that Joyner had been using drugs
even after being permitted to participate in the 90-day drug program. Furthermore,
the court found that Joyner failed to “comply[] with the orders and directives of the
probation office,” and instead “actually attempt[ed] to deceive” the office. Based
on the above, the district court sentenced Joyner to 24 months’ imprisonment, with
an evaluation for potential drug abuse and participation in a treatment program if
necessary. Joyner objected to the sentence as unreasonable, but the court disagreed
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based on its evaluation of “all the circumstances.” This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Joyner argues that the district court failed to consider the factors
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in imposing his sentence and that, had the district court
properly considered the § 3553(a) factors, it would have concluded that
confinement in a community halfway house for drug treatment was the most
appropriate punishment under these circumstances.
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), we
review a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release for
reasonableness in light of the factors in § 3553(a). United States v. Sweeting, 437
F.3d 1105, 1106-07 (11th Cir. 2006). We have concluded that “nothing in Booker
or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly
considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005). Rather, an
indication that the district court has considered a defendant’s arguments and the §
3553(a) factors is sufficient. Id. at 1330.
Here, the district court did not explicitly mention the § 3553(a) factors.
However, the arguments of the parties before the district court and the district
court’s stated reasons for imposing a sentence above the guidelines range implicate
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several § 3553(a) factors. Specifically, the district court explicitly considered
Joyner’s background, criminal history and drug problem, his past unwillingness to
abide by the conditions of probation and his attempts to deceive the probation
office by substituting someone else’s urine sample. In other words, the district
court considered the history and characteristics of the defendant, the circumstances
of offense and the need for medical treatment and deterrence. See 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(1), (2)(B), (2)(D). Furthermore, we cannot say that Joyner’s 24-month
sentence was unreasonable under the factual circumstances of this case.
AFFIRMED.
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