United States v. Ronald LaJames Wooten , 253 F. App'x 854 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-12487 NOV 08, 2007
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-00208-CR-KD
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RONALD LAJAMES WOOTEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(November 8, 2007)
Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald LaJames Wooten appeals his conviction, after a jury trial, and 75-
month sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm, a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, Wooten argues that the government established
only that he was present in a car in which a shotgun was hidden (in the trunk) and
failed to prove he had actual or constructive possession of the shotgun. He also
asserts that the district court erred, at sentencing, by adding a four-level
enhancement to his base offense level for possessing the shotgun “in connection
with” another felony, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6). Wooten admits he
possessed marijuana at the same time that the shotgun was found in the car, but
contends that because he did not possess the weapon “in connection with” another
felony, the offense-level computation was erroneous.
Wooten preserved his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by
moving, in the district court, for a judgment of acquittal on that basis. We
therefore review that claim de novo, “view[ing] the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices
drawn in the government’s favor.” . See United States v. Byrd, 403 F.3d 1278,
1288 (11th Cir. 2005). “‘A conviction must be upheld unless the jury could not
have found the defendant guilty under any reasonable construction of the
evidence.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Chastain, 198 F.3d 1338, 1351 (11th Cir.
1999)).
“The district court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines is subject to
de novo review on appeal, while its factual findings must be accepted unless
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clearly erroneous.” United States v. Jordi, 418 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quotations and citations omitted). The district court’s determination that the
defendant used a firearm “in connection with” another felony offense is reviewed
for clear error. United States v. Whitfield, 50 F.3d 947, 949 n.8 (11th Cir. 1995).
The relevant facts are there. On September 28, 2006, Wooten was indicted
for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that the firearm described in the indictment
affected interstate commerce, and that the defendant had previously been convicted
of a felony.
At trial, Detective Aaron Tucker of the Prichard, Alabama Police
Department testified that on February 25, 2005, he saw a Blue Cadillac stopped in
the middle of a street in Prichard known for drug transactions. The Cadillac,
driven by Wooten, was blocking the roadway, and a man was standing beside the
car with his head leaning into the window of the car. When Detective Tucker
pulled behind the Cadillac, it turned on to a different street. Detective Tucker, who
was driving an unmarked car, followed Wooten’s Cadillac and attempted to pull
him over. Tucker turned on his unmarked car’s lights and siren, at which point
Wooten sped away. Tucker then requested backup, as Wooten drove
approximately 60 to 70 miles per hour on city streets, running red lights, until he
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was able to enter the interstate, where he led the police on a high-speed chase
through two separate jurisdictions. After Wooten exited the interstate, he
sideswiped one car and rear-ended another, causing minor injuries to one driver
and eventually disabling Wooten’s Cadillac.
Detective Tucker testified that a search of the unlocked trunk revealed a
loaded shotgun hidden behind car audio system components. According to
Detective Tucker, the shotgun was too long to be hidden in the passenger
compartment. The search also revealed marijuana, packaged for personal use, in
the passenger compartment of the Cadillac. A check of the ownership of the
Cadillac revealed that it belonged to Wooten’s mother.
Wooten’s mother, Janette Wooten, testified that the Cadillac came with
speakers when she bought it, but that her son installed additional car stereo
components, and she did not know about the stereo in the trunk. She said that she
had never owned or possessed a shotgun.
At the close of the government’s case, Wooten moved for a judgment of
acquittal, arguing that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed or
exercised control over the shotgun. The district court denied Wooten’s motion.
The jury found Wooten guilty and he proceeded to sentencing.
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The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) assigned Wooten a base offense
level of 14, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6)(A), because he was prohibited from
possessing a firearm. The PSI recommended a 4-level increase to Wooten’s base
offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6), because he possessed the firearm
in connection with another felony offense (possession of marijuana), and a 2-level
increase for the obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, because
Wooten endangered others by fleeing from the police. With a criminal history
category V and a total offense level of 20, Wooten’s guideline range was 63 to 78
months’ imprisonment.
Wooten objected to the PSI’s two-level adjustment for the obstruction of
justice, arguing that its application was improper in this case. (PSI Addendum).
Wooten also objected to the PSI’s four-level increase for using or possessing the
firearm in connection with another felony, arguing that the firearm was not actually
used or possessed during a felony offense. (Id.).
Over Wooten’s objection to the § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement, the district
court adopted the PSI’s recommendations, finding that the firearm provided
security and cover to facilitate Wooten’s participation in illegal drug activity.
After considering the circumstances of Wooten’s arrest and the sentencing factors
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found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, the court sentenced Wooten to a 75-month term of
imprisonment. This appeal followed.
First, Wooten challenges the sufficiency of the government’s evidence on
his possession of the loaded firearm. Again, the government presented evidence
showing that, after a lengthy, high-speed pursuit, police arrested Wooten in a car
registered to, and owned by, his mother. The police found marijuana in the
passenger compartment and a loaded shotgun hidden behind stereo components in
the trunk. Wooten’s mother testified that she did not own any firearms and was
unaware of the existence of the stereo components.
In order to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must
show that (1) the defendant was a convicted felon; (2) the defendant knowingly
possessed a firearm or ammunition; and (3) the firearm or ammunition was in or
affecting interstate commerce. United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292, 1296-
97 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, the parties stipulated that Wooten was a convicted
felon, and that the firearm affected interstate commerce. Therefore, the only
element at issue is whether Wooten knowingly possessed the shotgun.
Possession may be either actual or constructive. United States v. Pedro, 999
F.2d 497, 500 (11th Cir. 1993). Constructive possession exists when a defendant
(1) “has knowledge of the thing possessed coupled with the ability to maintain
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control over it or reduce it to his physical possession even though he does not have
actual personal dominion,” or (2) has “ownership, dominion, or control over the
contraband itself or dominion or control over the premises or the vehicle in which
the contraband was concealed.” United States v. Derose, 74 F.3d 1177, 1185 (11th
Cir. 1996). Mere presence near contraband, or awareness of its location, is
insufficient to establish possession. United States v. Gardiner, 955 F.2d 1492,
1495 (11th Cir. 1992). However, “flight from custody, resistance to arrest,
concealment, assumption of a false name, and related conduct, are admissible as
evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself.” United States v.
Borders, 693 F.2d 1318, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
Here, a reasonable trier of fact readily could find that Wooten had
constructive possession of the shotgun. There is no dispute that the loaded shotgun
was found in the vehicle Wooten was driving, a vehicle over which he exercised
dominion and control. Although the vehicle belonged to Wooten’s mother, she
was unaware of the stereo components in the trunk, behind which the shotgun was
hidden, and she testified that she had never owned or possessed a firearm.
Additionally, the jury could reasonably infer knowledge of the shotgun, based on
the weapon’s concealment in the trunk and Wooten’s attempt to evade arrest.
Therefore, construing the evidence in favor of the government, there was ample
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evidence from which the jury would find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Wooten
constructively possessed the shotgun. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the conviction.
As for Wooten’s sentencing argument, section 2K2.1(b)(6) provides for a
four-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant used or possessed any firearm or
ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6).
In United States v. Rhind, 289 F.3d 690, 695 (11th Cir. 2002), we stated that the
phrase “in connection with” should be given its ordinary meaning. The phrase
appears throughout the Guidelines, and we have consistently held that it should be
given an expansive interpretation. See, e.g., id. Thus, in United States v. Jackson,
276 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2001), we noted that, in certain circumstances,
mere possession of a firearm can be enough to apply a sentencing enhancement
utilizing the “in connection with” language. According to its ordinary and natural
meaning, the phrase “in connection with” does not require proof that the firearm
actually facilitated the other felony offense. See Rhind, 289 F.3d at 695; see also
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6), cmt. n. 14(A) (noting the applicability of the section where
the firearm “had the potential of facilitating” another offense punishable by
imprisonment for a term of over one year) (emphasis added).
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We also have recognized that guns are the “tools of the drug trade,” as there
is a “frequent and overpowering connection between the use of firearms and
narcotics traffic.” United States v. Pham, 463 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2006).
In Rhind, we rejected the idea that the presence of firearms in the same vehicle as
counterfeiting supplies was “mere coincidence,” noting that “it would be
reasonable to conclude that the presence of the firearms protected the counterfeit
money from theft during the execution of the felony.” 289 F.3d at 695. Moreover,
contrary to Wooten’s suggestion, we have never required that a firearm be located
within arm’s reach for the enhancement to apply. See United States v. Flennory,
145 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 1998) (concluding that a firearm found in the
defendant’s vehicle was possessed in connection with a felony drug offense taking
place across the street, because it could be easily retrieved if necessary),
superseded on other grounds, United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir.
2003).
Here, the district court did not clearly err by determining that Wooten
possessed the shotgun “in connection with” his possession of marijuana, for
purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(6). The marijuana and the shotgun were in his possession
at the same time. The shotgun need not have facilitated the marijuana possession,
but here it did have the potential to do so. There is a strong connection between
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firearms and drugs. Moreover, the weapon, located in Wooten’s unlocked trunk,
was readily accessible to him if he needed its protection. Accordingly, we affirm
his sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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