Mulnix v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections , 254 F. App'x 763 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
November 16, 2007
No. 06-12110 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 03-00500-CV-T-30-MSS
MICHAEL MULNIX,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(November 16, 2007)
Before BLACK, HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In 1998, petitioner-appellant Michael Mulnix was convicted of second
degree murder. After completing his direct appeal, Mulnix filed a timely pro se
habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied the petition for
habeas relief. Although Mulnix had exhausted his state court remedies with
respect to a sufficiency of the evidence challenge under state law, the district court
concluded he had not fairly presented a federal sufficiency of the evidence claim
on direct appeal.
This Court issued a certificate of appealability on the question of whether
the district court erred in finding Mulnix’s claim procedurally barred. Having
reviewed the district court’s decision de novo, Atwater v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 799,
809 (11th Cir. 2006), we conclude that, under the particular facts and
circumstances of this case, Mulnix’s federal due process challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence was exhausted and thus is not procedurally barred.
Before bringing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
a prisoner is required to exhaust all available state court remedies, either on direct
appeal or in a state post-conviction motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). To exhaust
state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present” his federal claims to the state
court, providing it with “an opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the
facts bearing upon them.” Henry v. Dep’t of Corr., 197 F.3d 1361, 1366 (11 th Cir.
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1999) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 512 (1971)).
The reason for this rule is simple: “If state courts are to be given the opportunity to
correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must . . . be alerted to
the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States
Constitution.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66, 115 S. Ct. 887, 888
(1995).
Florida courts assess the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict
criminal defendants under a legal standard identical to the one used by federal
courts in deciding federal due process challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, Florida courts review whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact
could have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d 1100, 1111 (Fla. 2006). This is identical to
the federal standard for reviewing due process challenges based on the sufficiency
of the evidence, as set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 99 S. Ct.
2781, 2789 (1979 ) (standard is “whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”).1
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The Supreme Court held in In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073
(1970), that “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
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The Supreme Court has made clear that a prisoner does not exhaust federal
claims merely by raising similar state claims. Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78;
Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982). In this case,
however, Mulnix’s state and federal claims were not merely similar: they were
identical. The purpose of fair presentment is to permit state courts to efficiently
address prisoners’ challenges to their state court convictions, ideally providing a
single forum in which to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ rights under state
and federal law. In this case, the state court analyzed Mulnix’s due process
sufficiency of the evidence claim using a standard identical to the one required
under federal law. Under these circumstances, we conclude Mulnix’s federal claim
has been exhausted. Cf. Jackson v. Edwards, 404 F.3d 612, 619 (2d Cir. 2005).
Therefore, the district court’s order is vacated, and the case is remanded solely for
consideration under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) of Mulnix’s due process challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him in state court.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.” The Supreme Court later extended Winship to the habeas context, holding that a
prisoner challenging a state criminal conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is entitled to habeas
corpus relief under the Due Process Clause when the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient
to permit a rational trier of fact to find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 99 S.
Ct. at 2791-2792.
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