Luis Rivera Montero v. John E. Potter ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
March 31, 2006
No. 05-10132 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-22181-CV-JLK
LUIS RIVERA MONTERO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOHN E. POTTER, as Postmaster General
of the United States,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(March 31, 2006)
Before DUBINA, BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Luis Rivera Montero appeals the district court’s denial of his Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) motion for relief from summary judgment as to his
employment discrimination action, filed against John Potter, Postmaster General of
the United States (Post Office), under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). He asserts the district court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for relief from the judgment based upon “excusable neglect.” 1
We review the district court’s denial of relief under Rule 60(b) for abuse of
discretion. Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1304 n.4 (11th Cir.
2000). We consider only the denial of relief as to the motion filed under Rule
60(b), not the underlying judgment. Cavaliere v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1111,
1115 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
A party may file a motion for relief from a judgment or order based upon
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
To prevail on this ground, the appellant has the burden to demonstrate a
justification so compelling the court was “required” to vacate its order. Rice v.
Ford Motor Co., 88 F.3d 914, 919 (11th Cir. 1996). Generally, such relief “is an
extraordinary remedy which may be invoked only upon a showing of exceptional
1
Montero argues for the first time on appeal the district court erred in not setting aside the
summary judgment order underlying his Rule 60(b)(1) motion on the basis that his attorney
rendered ineffective assistance. We need not address this issue because we find the order
denying post-judgment relief should be vacated for the reasons set forth herein.
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circumstances.” Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 (11th Cir. 1984).
We have also held “where denial of relief [under Rule 60(b)] precludes
examination of the full merits of the cause, even a slight abuse may justify
reversal.” Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1981).2
In Seven Elves, we found the district court abused its discretion in failing to
grant a Rule 60(b) motion where doing so was necessary to “accomplish justice”
given the “truncated proceedings” that led to an entry of a judgment against the
appellants, who also “did not appear, either personally or through an attorney” at
the proceeding due to “unusual circumstances.” Seven Elves, 635 F.2d at 403-04.
The following factors were considered in reaching this determination:
(1) [t]hat final judgments should not lightly be disturbed; (2) that the
Rule 60(b) motion is not to be used as a substitute for appeal; (3) that
the rule should be liberally construed in order to achieve substantial
justice; (4) whether the motion was made within a reasonable time; (5)
whether if the judgment was a default or a dismissal in which there
was no consideration of the merits the interest in deciding cases on the
merits outweighs, in the particular case, the interest in the finality of
judgments, and there is merit in the movant’s claim or defense; (6)
whether if the judgment was rendered after a trial on the merits the
movant had a fair opportunity to present his claim or defense; (7)
whether there are intervening equities that would make it inequitable
to grant relief; and (8) any other factors relevant to the justice of the
judgment under attack.
2
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior
to close of business on September 30, 1981.
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Id. at 402.
Applying the factors set forth in Seven Elves to the circumstances of this
case, we find the district court’s denial of relief was sufficiently “misaligned with
the equities” as to warrant reversal. See id. at 402-03. First, Montero does not
seek to use the Rule 60(b) motion in this case as a substitute for appeal. See id. at
402. His motion was brought within a “reasonable time” after the denial of the
post judgment motion, as it was filed only seven days after the district court
ordered summary judgment. See id. Further, the summary judgment order was
entered in Montero’s absence, prior to the taking of evidence by him, and without
the requisite ten-day notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), such that
the extent to which he had an opportunity to present his case is at best unclear.
See id. Accordingly, the proceedings before the district court were “truncated”
such that “Rule 60(b) [should] be liberally construed in favor of trial on the full
merits of the case.” Id.
Finally, we note Hurricane Jeanne struck the area during the time the motion
was pending, and in denying Montero’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion, the district court
failed to explain why the hurricane was not a basis for “excusable neglect.”
Rather, it cited as the basis for its ruling, first, its desire to reach a timely
disposition of the case, and, second, its apparent determination that Montero’s
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failure to respond to the motion was the result of his attorney’s oversight. For the
foregoing reasons, we find that the district court’s denial of Montero’s Rule
60(b)(1) motion was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we vacate the district
court’s order that was entered on October 1, 2004, and remand for further
proceedings.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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