Dwight Edman v. Jeffrey A. Marano , 177 F. App'x 884 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
FILED
No. 05-13322 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar April 19, 2006
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 97-06825-CV-JIC
DWIGHT EDMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JEFFREY A. MARANO,
ANTHONY FERNANDEZ, individually,
CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, a Florida Municipal Corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 19, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and RONEY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 false arrest case is before this Court for the third
time. The issues on this appeal involve alleged errors in the retrial as to damages
only, and in the amount of damages allowed by the trial court. Neither party
requests oral argument. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the district court’s
$225,000 damages judgment in favor of plaintiff Dwight Edman.
On January 31, 1996, Edman was arrested outside a hotel by Hollywood
police officers Jeffrey Marano and Anthony Fernandez, who were conducting a
reverse drug sting operation. After Edman was handcuffed and arrested, the
officers escorted Edman to a hotel room Edman told them he had rented. While in
the hotel room, Edman was allegedly subjected to a “battery/unnecessary use of
force.”
Subsequent to the arrest, the officers filled in pre-sworn affidavits reporting
what had happened during Edman’s arrest. The affidavit that was sworn/signed by
the officers at an earlier date was actually blank. After those previously sworn
affidavits were completed by the officers, they were then notarized by a city
employee who worked in the police department’s case filing unit. This process
resulted in the officers never contemporaneously swearing to the truth of the
report regarding Edman. In part because of the lack of properly executed incident
affidavits, the charges against Edman were later nolle prossed by the State
Attorney’s Office.
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On July 22, 1997, Edman sued Marano, Fernandez, and the City of
Hollywood for false arrest, battery in connection with his arrest, and Florida
statutory notary law violations in connection with the probable cause affidavits
and arrest incident reports improperly executed by the officers after Edman’s
arrest. Following the close of Edman’s case in chief, the district court granted
summary judgment against Marano and Fernandez on the § 1983 false arrest
claims. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Edman for $200,000 against Marano
individually, for $75,000 against Fernandez individually, for $275,000 against the
City of Hollywood for false arrest, and for $200,000 against the City for statutory
notary law violations. It returned a verdict in favor of the City on Edman’s state
law battery claim. The district court subsequently entered judgment in favor of
Edman for a total of $475,000.
On October 19, 2000, in Appeal Number 99-10550, a panel of this Court
affirmed the jury’s verdict as to liability but reversed and ordered a new trial as to
damages because the district court improperly aggregated an overlapping,
duplicative jury verdict.
On November 29, 2002, prior to a retrial on the issue of damages, Edman
agreed to accept a minimum “floor” damage award of $275,000. The district court
concluded that Edman’s acceptance of the floor damage award obviated the need
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for a new trial on the issue of damages. The district court then certified the issue
to this Court. On March 20, 2003, this Court dismissed the notice of appeal for
lack of jurisdiction, finding that the district court’s order was not final or amenable
to certification for immediate review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).
On February 9, 2004, Marano and Fernandez filed emergency pre-trial
motions seeking leave for a second updated deposition of Edman, as well as a
motion compelling Edman to submit to a mental examination to determine whether
he had suffered mental anguish as a consequence of his arrest. The motion
requested that Edman submit to a mental examination on February 28, 2005,
which was the day trial was scheduled to begin. On February 16, the district court
granted the defendants’ motion to conduct a deposition of plaintiff but denied the
motion for an emergency mental examination, ruling
The cause of action arose in January 1996, over nine
years ago. Defendants never sought a mental
examination. To now request one at the 11th hour is too
late in the game and unfairly prejudices the plaintiff.
The exam was requested for February 28, 2005. Trial is
scheduled to start on February 28, 2005. Defendants
have failed to show good cause under Rule 35.
The damages portion of the trial was retried in March 2005. Edman sought
compensatory damages, including those resulting from post-traumatic stress
disorder that he contended he had developed as a result of the false arrest. On
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March 10, 2005, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Edman and against Marano,
Fernandez, and the City for $225,000 (jointly and severally). The defendants filed
post-trial motions requesting a new trial, or in the alternative, remittur. The
district court denied the motion for new trial, and then entered an Amended Final
Judgment in favor of Edman and against Marano, Fernandez and the City (jointly
and severally) in the amount of $200,000, plus judgment in favor of Edman and
against Marano and Fernandez (jointly and severally) for $25,000. This appeal
followed.
Appellants make four arguments on appeal: first, the district court abused
its discretion by not compelling Edman to submit to a mental examination before
proceeding to the retrial on damages; second, the district court abused its
discretion by admitting certain testimony from the first trial, which appellants
contend was not relevant to the issue of damages; third, the district court erred in
its interpretation of Florida Statute § 768.25(5) by determining that the City was
liable for a total of $200,000; and fourth, the district court abused its discretion by
denying their motion for a mistrial or remittur, asserting that the verdict was
grossly excessive and not supported by the evidence.
Denial of Motion to Compel a Mental Exam of Edman
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First, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Marano and
Fernandez’s motion to compel Edman to submit to a mental examination. The
proposed mental examination was scheduled for the day the damages trial was
scheduled to begin. It was within the district court’s broad discretion to deny this
late request. See Chrysler Int’l Corp. v. Chemaly, 280 F.3d 1358, 1360-61 (11th
Cir. 2002) (noting that district courts have broad discretion to manage their cases,
including discovery and scheduling).
Admission of Allegedly Irrelevant Testimony from First Trial
Second, the district court also did not abuse its discretion by permitting
Edman to offer testimony from the first trial describing certain details about his
arrest and circumstances relating to the propriety of his subsequent prosecution.
Prior to jury selection, Edman provided the parties and the district court
with a Master Index of testimony from the first trial that he intended to read into
evidence. The district court heard arguments related to the objections posed by the
defendants. The district court ruled as follows:
It is the Court’s opinion that the Plaintiff should not be
penalized for having won on liability in another
proceeding. And to preclude the Plaintiff from going
into at least a limited amount of liability with witnesses
other than the Plaintiff himself, in the Court’s opinion
would unjustly penalize the Plaintiff. So the Court is
going to allow the Plaintiff to get into liability with the
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prior testimony of Officer[s] Fernandez and Marano and
any agent of the City of Hollywood. Any nonagents,
nonparties I agree that would be hearsay and
inadmissible.
In so permitting this testimony, the district court reasoned:
I am permitting the Plaintiff to get into some liability
because I agree with Plaintiff that liability to a large
extent is inextricably intertwined . . .. But the focus
really needs to be on damages. You can get into
liability, but that is on the periphery and not the main
focus. So I am allowing you to go into those areas but
the focus has to be on damages.
This Court will not overrule a district court’s evidentiary ruling unless it has
made a “clear error of judgment or has applied an incorrect legal standard.” See
Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines, 177 F.3d 1272, 1306 (11th Cir. 1999).
Because appellants have failed to demonstrate either, we affirm the ruling of the
district court. See Piamba Cortes, 177 F.3d at 1306 (noting that “when computing
damages for pain and suffering endured by a plaintiff ‘[in] most instances . . .
evidence describing the details of an accident is logically relevant and admissible,
even where liability has been admitted, to place the extent of injuries suffered by
plaintiff, as well as the degree of pain endured, in the proper context’”) (quoting
White v. Westlund, 624 So. 2d 1148, 1152 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)).
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The City further contends that because the first jury found that it was not
liable for the alleged battery against Edman in the hotel room subsequent to his
detention outside the hotel, there should have been no reference to it in the retrial
because “it allowed the 2nd jury to consider elements of plaintiff’s claim of
psychological injuries previously rejected by the first jury. It allowed the jury to
award an excessive verdict based upon the alleged egregious actions of the
Hollywood Police Officers.” The City contends that the probative value of this
evidence was substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudicial effect on the jury.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony
regarding the alleged battery against Edman at the hotel during the retrial on
damages. Edman’s damages claims against the officers and the City arose out of
the results of a false arrest. Edman was entitled to all damages flowing from the
arrest against all the defendants, aside from damages arising solely from Edman’s
claim of an independent tort of battery against the City. See, e.g., Jones v.
Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that “the grand jury
indictment broke the chain of causation for the detention from the alleged false
arrest and Jones may recover damages only for his detention prior to the grand jury
indictment”).
Furthermore, the district court charged the jury as follows:
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In this case you shall consider the following
elements of damage.
Any injury to reputation or health, and any shame,
humiliation, physical or emotional pain mental anguish
and hurt feelings experienced in the past or to be
experienced in the future.
However, any intentional touching or striking of
the Plaintiff against his will or intentionally caused
bodily harm to the Plaintiff cannot be considered in
assessing damages against the City of Hollywood.
The jury is presumed to have followed these instructions, charging them to
not consider any intentional touching or striking of the plaintiff in its
consideration of the damages against the City. See Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka,
261 F.3d 1295, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 2001).
Misapplication of Florida Statutory Law
Third, the City next argues that Edman is limited to recover a total of
$100,000 from it under Florida’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity law
statute. See Fla. Stat. § 768.28(5)(2004). It contends that the district court’s
amended judgment in favor of Edman for $200,000 jointly and severally against
the City was an improper application of Florida statutory law, which specifies a
limited waiver of sovereign immunity for its governmental entities. Section
768.28(5) states the following in relevant part:
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The state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be
liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances,
but liability shall not include punitive damages or
interest for the period before judgment. Neither the state
nor its agencies or subdivisions shall be liable to pay a
claim or a judgment by any one person which exceeds
the sum of $100,000 or any claim or judgment or
portions thereof, which, when totaled with all other
subdivisions paid by the state or its agencies or
subdivisions arising out of the same incident or
occurrence, exceeds the sum of $200,000. However, a
judgment or judgments may be claimed and rendered in
excess of these amounts and may be settled and paid
pursuant to this act up to $100,000 or $200,000, as the
case may be; and that portion of the judgment that
exceeds these amounts may be reported to the
Legislature, but may be paid in part or in whole only by
further act of the Legislature. . . .
Fla. Stat. § 768.28(5) (2004).
The district court did not err by entering judgment against the City for
$200,000, jointly and severally. Here, the false arrest claim was separate from the
statutory notary law claims, which occurred after Edman was arrested and released
from custody, where the officers filled in and had notarized by a city employee
pre-sworn affidavits about what had happened during the incident with Edman.
Because these are two separate incidents (false arrest and the subsequent notary
law violations), the maximum amount that Edman can collect from the City is
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$200,000, not $100,000. See Pierce v. Town of Hastings, 509 So. 2d 1134, 1135
(Fla. 5th DCA 1987) .
Whether $225,000 Damages are Excessive or Unreasonable
Fourth, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
defendants’ motions for a new trial and for remittur on the ground that the award
of $225,000 was grossly excessive or unreasonable. A Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(b) motion should only be granted where reasonable jurors “could not
arrive at a contrary verdict,” which is not the case here. Munoz v. Oceanside
Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2000). This Court is “particularly
deferential to the fact that the finder’s determination of compensatory damage
awards for intangible, emotional harm because the harm is so ‘subjective and
evaluating it depends considerably on the demeanor of the witnesses.’” Griffin,
261 F.3d at 1315-16 (quoting Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 476
(11th Cir. 1999)).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
We have reviewed Jeffrey Marano and Anthony Fernandez’s Reply Brief,
which was attached to their motion for reconsideration of this Court’s November
16, 2005 order denying their motion for an extension of time to file a Reply Brief.
Their motion for reconsideration to file a Reply Brief is GRANTED.
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