United States v. Rogelio Juarez-Rebollar , 428 F. App'x 900 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-13817 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JUNE 1, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 2:09-cr-00022-RWS-SSC-6
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROGELIO JUAREZ-REBOLLAR,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(June 1, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Rogelio Juarez-Rebollar appeals his 78-month sentence, imposed after he
pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C § 846, one count of possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of illegal
entry into the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
Juarez-Rebollar contends that his 78-month sentence is procedurally and
substantively unreasonable. We disagree, and find that Juarez-Rebollar’s sentence
is reasonable under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007). At the sentencing hearing, the district court not only
acknowledged that it considered the § 3553(a) factors, but explicitly discussed the
co-defendant disparity issue. This is an adequate explanation for purposes of the
procedural reasonableness inquiry. See United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786
(11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
In addition, the sentence fell at the low end of the applicable 78–97
guideline range, and we ordinarily expect guideline sentences to be reasonable.
Id. at 788. The record shows that the district court correctly calculated the
guideline range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and considered
Juarez-Rebollar’s personal circumstances. We also note that Juarez-Rebollar’s
sentence was well below the statutory maximum of 30 years. See United States v.
Valnor, 451 F.3d 744, 751–52 (11th Cir. 2006) (using the fact that a given
sentence is significantly lower than the statutory maximum as an indicator of
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reasonableness). Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that a sentence at the low-end of the guidelines range was necessary to
comply with the purposes of § 3553(a).
Moreover, we have held that “[d]isparity between the sentences imposed on
codefendants is generally not an appropriate basis for relief on appeal.” United
States v. Regueiro, 240 F.3d 1321, 1325–26 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). “While
§ 3553(a)(6) speaks of ‘the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct,’ the provision is more concerned with the unjustified differences across
judges or districts than between co-defendants in a single case.” United States v.
Edinson, 209 F. App’x 947, 949 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting United
States v. Boscarino, 437 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2006)). Even if it were an
appropriate basis for relief, Juarez-Rebollar has failed to show that his sentence
was unreasonable when compared to the sentences of his co-defendants, especially
because they were not similarly situated—most of his co-defendants gave
substantial assistance to the government and received safety-valve reductions.
Accordingly, Juarez-Rebollar’s sentence was both procedurally and substantively
reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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