United States v. Imran Mandhai ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
May 2, 2006
No. 05-14612 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 02-60096-CR-WPD
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
IMRAN MANDHAI,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 2, 2006)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Imran Mandhai appeals his sentence for conspiracy to destroy buildings
affecting interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 844(n). Three of Mandhai’s
arguments are not properly before this Court. Mandhai’s remaining
argument—that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence—is without
merit. We dismiss in part and affirm in part.
This is Mandhai’s third time before this Court, and the factual background of
his conviction has been thoroughly recounted in our previous decisions. United
States v. Mandhai, 375 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2004) (Mandhai I); see also United
States v. Mandhai, 140 F. App’x 54 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (Mandhai II).
In Mandhai II, this Court vacated Mandhai’s sentence because of statutory error
under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 140 F. App’x
at 56. We also affirmed the decision of the district court to consider reliable
hearsay at Mandhai’s sentencing hearing. Id. at 55-56. We remanded the appeal
for the limited purpose of resentencing Mandhai under the advisory guidelines. Id.
at 56.
In this appeal Mandhai presents four arguments. Mandhai argues that the
district court erroneously applied the terrorism enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4; the
district court considered hearsay evidence at the sentencing hearing in violation of
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004); the district court
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relied on unreliable evidence at the sentencing hearing; and the district court
imposed an unreasonable sentence on remand.
Mandhai’s first three arguments, two of which were rejected in his earlier
appeals, are not properly before this Court because his arguments were not—and
could not have been—before the district court. The mandate issued by this Court
in Mandhai’s second appeal remanded the case for the limited purpose of
resentencing under the advisory guidelines. Mandhai II, 140 F. App’x at 56. “Our
settled circuit law obligates a district court to follow our mandates and not to assert
jurisdiction over matters outside the scope of a limited mandate.” United States v.
Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Our jurisdiction
arises from the final decision of the district court, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, so this Court
likewise lacks jurisdiction to review these arguments.
Mandhai’s only argument properly before this Court is that the district court
imposed an unreasonable sentence. Mandhai argues that the sentence is
unreasonable because it is greater than necessary under the statutory factors, see 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), but we disagree. The district court carefully and explicitly
considered each of the section 3553(a) factors and found that a sentence of 168
months of imprisonment—the minimum guidelines sentence—was appropriate.
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We cannot say, in the light of the conduct to which Mandhai pleaded guilty and the
sentencing factors, that Mandhai’s sentence is unreasonable.
DISMISSED in part and AFFIRMED in part.
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